IN RE EMILY ANN GEREN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of EMILY ANN GEREN, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 282967
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-677246-NA
BRENDA COLETTA ANDERSON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Smolenski and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (b)(iii), (g), and (j). We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Although respondent challenges the trial court’s determination that statutory grounds for
termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence, she only contests the trial court’s
findings with respect to §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j). Because only one statutory basis for termination
need be proven, In re Archer, 277 Mich App 71, 73; 744 NW2d 1 (2007), and because
respondent does not address the merits of the trial court’s determination that termination was also
appropriate under § 19b(3)(b)(ii),1 appellate relief is not warranted with respect to whether a
statutory basis for termination was sufficiently established. See In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App
92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
353-354 (2000).
In any event, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), and (j)
were each proven by clear and convincing evidence. The child had been in foster care for two
years because of neglect, stemming in part from respondent’s inability to financially support her.
After services, the child was eventually returned home. Respondent then allowed her boyfriend,
1
Petitioner concedes that termination was improper under § 19b(3)(b)(iii), because respondent
did not have notice that termination would be sought on that basis.
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a known sex offender who had been imprisoned for sexually abusing his own daughter, to move
in with her. Respondent downplayed the severity of her boyfriend’s conduct and failed to protect
her daughter from the boyfriend’s verbal abuse and attempted sexual molestation, and further
refused to leave him because she had become financially dependent upon him.
Respondent’s reliance on Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 114; 92 NW2d 604 (1958),2
overruled on other grounds by In re Hatcher, 443 Mich. 426, 444 (1993), for the proposition that
petitioner was required to prove, and the trial court was required to find, that she would neglect
her child for the long-term future is misplaced. Fritts predates the enactment of § 19b(3), which
now sets forth the criteria for termination.
Further, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354, 356357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Contrary to respondent’s argument, the trial court was not
obligated to place the child with relatives and maintain temporary wardship in lieu of
termination. See In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), In re McIntyre,
192 Mich App 47, 53; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and In re Futch, 144 Mich App 163, 170; 375
NW2d 375 (1984). The trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the
child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
2
In re Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666, 676; 438 NW2d 866 (1989), which respondent cites in
her appellate brief, relied on Fritts.
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