PEOPLE OF MI V ARTISS REGINALD WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278981
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-009898-FC
ARTISS REGINALD WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Fort Hood and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of six counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(e) (actor armed with a weapon), and two counts of unlawful
imprisonment, MCL 750.349b. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 75 years for each CSC conviction, and 10 to 22-1/2
years for each unlawful imprisonment conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
On September 18, 2006, at approximately 3:30 a.m., defendant solicited CM to engage in
an act of prostitution in exchange for $20. Once at defendant’s home, defendant told CM to wait
in the bedroom. CM noted that defendant was “nice” during the drive. When defendant came
into the bedroom, he “jumped on top of [her]” while holding a “big ole knife.”1 Defendant said,
“[you] just got played,” and directed CM to strip and be an “actress.” When CM started shaking
and crying, defendant threatened to harm her if she refused to calm down. CM explained that
she “had to act like [she] was [defendant’s] woman for hours.”2 Defendant “made” CM kiss him
and perform oral sex on him. Defendant had sexual intercourse with CM without protection, and
“sucked” her breasts, vagina, and feet. After nearly four hours, defendant drove CM to a
1
The police seized some “larger knives” from defendant’s home. When CM was shown one of
the knives, she indicated that the item looked like the knife defendant used, but opined that the
actual knife was longer. It was noted for the record that CM “gasped and started crying” when
she saw the knife at trial.
2
Defendant was drinking alcohol during the episode.
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location that she specified. CM subsequently reported the incident to the police, and provided
the police with defendant’s license plate number, description, and first name. A police witness
described CM as “distraught, crying, upset,” and “having a hard time communicating.”
CH testified that on September 18, 2006, at about 8:30 a.m., defendant solicited her to
engage in an act of prostitution in exchange for $40. Defendant drove CH to his home and
directed her to wait in his bedroom. Defendant came into the bedroom with a “butcher knife,”3
pushed her down on the bed, and directed her to be a good actress and do exactly as he
instructed. Defendant threatened her and cautioned that no one would believe her claims
because she is a prostitute. Defendant then sucked her breasts, performed oral sex on her, forced
her to perform oral sex on him,4 sucked her toes, touched the inside of her vaginal area with his
hands, and had sexual intercourse with her. During this time, defendant drank liquor and took
“some type of prescription drug.” After the incident, defendant drove CH to the pickup location,
and she subsequently called the police. A police witness described CH as “distraught,” “crying
and upset,” and fearful of being arrested for prostitution.
The complainants did not know each other and only saw each other in court in relation to
this case. CM explained that she and CH operated on “two different sides of town.” A police
witness explained that, as the police were questioning defendant in relation to CM, they received
an additional report with similar facts and ultimately connected the two assaults.
When questioned by the police, defendant initially denied that anyone was at his home at
the time of the offenses, but subsequently admitted to having sexual relations with both
complainants without the use of a knife. At trial, the defense asserted that the complainants were
crack cocaine users,5 they voluntarily engaged in sexual relations with him, he did not have a
knife, and that they falsely accused him after he did not pay for their services.6
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury
instruction on the defense of consent, CJI2d 20.27. Because defendant failed to raise this issue
in the trial court in connection with a motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this
Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436,
3
When CH was shown one of the large knives seized from defendant’s home, she said “that
would be the knife or similar to it.” CH shook and cried when she was shown the knife.
4
After oral sex, defendant ejaculated in CH’s mouth.
5
CH testified that although she used crack cocaine on the prior evening, when this incident
occurred, she “wasn’t even high anymore, that was way before.” She denied hallucinating the
events.
6
When CM was asked if she created this story because of defendant’s failure to pay, she
indicated that “there’s a difference between being [r]aped and robbed.” If she is robbed and not
hurt, she would “let it go.” But when her “life is in jeopardy,” the perpetrator will do it to
somebody else and needs to be stopped. CH testified that, as a prostitute, if you do not get paid,
“you just don’t,” and that people have failed to pay before.
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443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659;
620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Id.
“A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate, and present all
substantial defenses.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). A
defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. People v
Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on other grounds 453
Mich 902 (1996).
Each complainant testified that defendant forced her to remain in his home for hours and
engage in numerous sexual acts by threatening her with a large knife, and that she was afraid that
defendant would harm her with the knife. In pointed contrast, at trial, defendant denied having a
knife, and argued that both complainants engaged in the sexual acts voluntarily and falsely
accused him because he did not pay. A request for an instruction on the defense of consent
would have been reasonable if defendant admitted his possession of a knife and argued that the
complainants consented to engage in the sexual acts while he brandished the knife. On appeal,
defendant ignores the deficiency in the evidence when he states: “It is unlikely that, for a
prostitute, having sex with someone armed with a weapon is always inconsistent with the sex
being consensual.” Because there was no evidence to support a theory that defendant displayed a
knife as part of the sexual episodes to which the complainants consented, we are not persuaded
that defense counsel’s failure to request an instruction on the defense of consent was below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of
first-degree CSC on the basis of a digital penetration of CH. We disagree. When ascertaining
whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction, this Court must view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of evidence or
the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514. “[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable
inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462
Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
As applicable to this case, a “person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person” while “armed with a
weapon.” MCL 750.520b(1)(e). “Sexual penetration” is defined as “sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a
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person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body. . . .”
MCL 750.520a(p).
Defendant argues that there was no evidence of digital penetration introduced at trial.
Defendant relied on the following exchange during the direct examination of CH:
Q. Do you recall whether or not he used his hands in any way?
A. I’m sure he might have touched my, my outside vaginal area at some point.
Q. Did anything other than his mouth go beyond the outer lips of your vaginal
area?
A. Not that I can remember, no.
On redirect examination, however, CH was shown her preliminary examination
testimony and indicated that it refreshed her recollection.7 She then testified that, in addition to
performing the acts of oral sex, defendant touched the “outer area” of her vagina but “his fingers
never entered inside.” When asked what specific area defendant was touching, she testified that
defendant used his hands to touch “the clitoral area.” This evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to reasonably infer
that defendant digitally penetrated the complainant’s genital opening. An intrusion into the labia
constitutes penetration of the female genital opening under MCL 750.520a(p). People v Bristol,
115 Mich App 236, 238; 320 NW2d 229 (1981); see also People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131,
133; 494 NW2d 797 (1992) (the act of cunnilingus described by the complainant involved
penetration because she testified that the defendant touched the part of her body that she “[went]
to the bathroom with”). Furthermore, there is no requirement that physical evidence or
eyewitnesses corroborate the complainant’s testimony. Rather, a complainant’s uncorroborated
testimony is sufficient to convict a defendant of CSC. MCL 750.520h; People v Lemmon, 456
Mich 625, 632 n 6; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s
conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
7
At the preliminary examination, CH testified that defendant “took his hand . . . and played with
[her] vaginal area.” He rubbed “the clitoral area and stuff” and put his fingers “[i]n between the
lips but not entering into the vagina.”
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