WESTFIELD GROUP INSURANCE COMPANIES V JENKINS CONSTRUCTION INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WESTFIELD GROUP INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 278558
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-315018-CZ
JENKINS CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendant-Cross Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
JENKINS EXCAVATING, INC.,
Defendant-Cross Defendant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Talbot and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Westfield Group Insurance Company (Westfield),1 appeals as of right the trial
court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant, Jenkins Construction, Inc. (Jenkins
Construction), in this negligence, nuisance, and trespass claim. The matter arises from a loss
incurred as a result of a construction project in the city of Detroit. Because plaintiff Westfield
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the record, summary disposition was proper
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and we affirm.
I
1
Pursuant to an order of this Court dated February 21, 2008, Westfield Group Insurance
Company is substituted as the real party in interest in place of the prior plaintiff-appellant, City
of Detroit. See City of Detroit v Jenkins Construction, Inc., unpublished opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 21, 2008 (Docket No. 278558).
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The Greater Grace Temple Church hired defendant Jenkins Construction to build a new
church located near Seven Mile Road and Shiawassee Avenue in the city of Detroit. The
construction project included the installation of a private sewer line to be connected to the city’s
sewer system. In turn, defendant Jenkins Construction contracted with Jenkins Excavating, Inc.
(Jenkins Excavating) to perform the excavating work. Jenkins Excavating and Jenkins
Construction are separate entities, though James Jenkins is the President and sole shareholder of
both companies. Plaintiff Westfield insured Jenkins Excavating under a Commercial Insurance
Coverage Policy.2
During construction and excavation activities at the project site, an underground
combined sewer/overflow (CSO) owned by the city of Detroit, collapsed on September 22, 2000.
The CSO basin is located on property immediately adjacent to property owned by Greater Grace
Temple Church. In fact, Greater Grace Temple Church had previously owned the property but
sold it to the City in 1996 so the CSO could be built to collect wastewater overflow from the
City’s sewer system. Greater Grace Temple Church retained a perpetual easement over the
underground CSO for its church parking lot.
The city of Detroit brought suit against both Jenkins Excavating and defendant Jenkins
Construction alleging that as they were excavating a storm sewer trench, Jenkins Excavating
“and/or” defendant Jenkins Construction deposited spoil (excavated dirt and other material) on
the basin, the weight of which caused the CSO’s roof to collapse. The city of Detroit’s
complaint set forth three counts against both defendant Jenkins Construction and Jenkins
Excavating including negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Defendant Jenkins Construction
asserted that Jenkins Excavating exclusively performed the work causing the collapse.
Defendant Jenkins Construction also asserted that the sole cause of the collapse was the failure
of Jenkins Excavating to follow the staking, fence line, and field location that Jenkins Excavating
itself established to manage the spoil.
The trial court granted defendant Jenkins Construction’s motion for summary disposition
on the negligence claim finding that plaintiff had not provided any evidence that a question of
fact existed on the record. In a subsequent order, the trial court also granted defendant Jenkins
Construction’s motion for summary disposition on the remaining claims of trespass and nuisance
again finding that plaintiff had not provided any evidence that a question of fact existed on the
record regarding these claims. Former plaintiff city of Detroit then settled its claims against
Jenkins Excavating and all claims against Jenkins Excavating were dismissed with prejudice. As
part of the settlement, the city of Detroit assigned to Plaintiff Westfield any claims that might
still remain against Jenkins Construction. As such, plaintiff Westfield now appeals as of right
the trial court orders granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Jenkins Construction.
II
2
Defendant Jenkins Construction was separately insured by Home-Owners Insurance Company
under a business owners policy.
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Plaintiff Westfield argues on appeal that viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff,
there is evidence in the record to support its claim that defendant Jenkins Construction
independently acted in ways that contributed to the collapse of the CSO. And, in its reply brief
on appeal, plaintiff Westfield specifically asserts that “there are questions of fact about [Jenkins]
Construction’s role in the marking of the basin and the decision on how to handle the spoil given
the configuration of this site.” Defendant Jenkins Construction responds that it is not liable to
plaintiff Westfield because the record is clear that it delegated all aspects of the excavation work
to Jenkins Excavating including spoil removal, storage, and disposal and had absolutely no role
in the CSO collapse.
III
We review rulings on motions for summary dispositions de novo. Willett v. Waterford
Charter Twp., 271 Mich.App. 38, 45, 718 N.W.2d 386 (2006). Summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) presents an issue of law for the Court’s determination and, thus, we review a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Ormsby v Capital Welding,
Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). Where the parties rely on documentary evidence,
appellate courts proceed under the standards of review applicable to a motion made under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Krass v Tri-County Security, Inc, 233 Mich App 661, 665; 593 NW2d 578 (1999).
A motion made under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Dressel v
Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003).
A motion made under MCR
2.116(C)(10) should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 246; 631
NW2d 760 (2001). When the burden of proof at trial would rest on the nonmoving party, the
nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by
documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); Karbel v Comerica
Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 97; 635 NW2d 69 (2001). A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open an
issue on which reasonable minds could differ. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665
NW2d 468 (2003).
When deciding a motion for summary disposition under this rule, a court must consider
the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence then filed in
the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR
2.116(G)(5); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). But
such materials “shall only be considered to the extent that [they] would be admissible as
evidence.” MCR 2.116(G)(6); Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 163; 645
NW2d 643 (2002); Campbell v Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 230; 731 NW2d 112 (2006).
IV
Plaintiff Westfield argues that the trial court erred by failing to find a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding defendant’s independent liability for its own active negligence in
causing damages as a result of the collapse of the CSO. Defendant responds that it is not liable
for two reasons, first, because based on the independent contractor doctrine it is not vicariously
liable for negligence; and second, because it delegated all excavation work including spoil
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removal, storage, and disposal to Jenkins Excavating it is not independently liable for
negligence. The trial court found that no question of fact existed on the record because plaintiff
presented no evidence that defendant Jenkins Construction was independently liable separate
from Jenkins Excavating, and also based on the “general rule . . . that a general contractor is not
liable to third parties for the negligence of its subcontractors.”
A.
It is not disputed that defendant Jenkins Construction was the general contractor of the
church construction project and Jenkins Excavating was its subcontractor. At common law,
neither a landowner who enters a contract for the construction of an improvement to the land, nor
a general contractor overseeing the construction project’s completion, could ordinarily be found
negligent for injury to a subcontractor’s employee. Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich
45, 53; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). However, in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104;
220 NW2d 641 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems,
Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982), our Supreme Court held that a general contractor
could be held liable if a subcontractor clearly failed in its duty to provide proper safeguards to its
employees in common work areas. To establish the liability of a general contractor under Funk,
a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) that the defendant contractor failed to take reasonable
steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against readily observable
and avoidable dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers
(4) in a common work area. Ormsby, supra at 57, citing Funk, supra at 104. A plaintiff must
satisfy all elements of the common work area doctrine before a general contractor may be found
negligent under this theory of liability. Id. But because plaintiff asserts liability on the part of
defendant Jenkins Construction only for its own independent negligence, we need not engage in
the vicarious liability analysis.
B.
In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must be able to show
that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the defendant’s
breach caused the plaintiff’s injury, and that the plaintiff suffered damages. Case v Consumers
Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). In the present case, the trial court found that
there was no evidence that defendant Jenkins Construction was independently liable for damages
caused by the collapse of the CSO. This finding was supported by the deposition of Reginald
Paige, a foreman superintendent for Jenkins Excavating, who testified that Jenkins Excavating
was responsible for the removal of the spoil. He also stated that Brian Biasutto, Jenkins
Excavating’s project manager, was the person responsible for determining when and how to “get
rid” of the spoil or to have it carted away. Paige also described conversations that took place
prior to the excavation about the presence of the CSO and the importance of avoiding coming
into contact with the tank during excavation. The trial court’s finding was also supported by the
deposition of Darrell Greer, a project manager for defendant Jenkins Construction. Greer
testified that Jenkins Excavating dug out the area, removed the spoils, and had a third party
trucking company haul the spoils from the job site.
Plaintiff did not present any evidence to rebut this testimony. And plaintiff presented no
evidence that defendant Jenkins Construction was independently involved in any negligent
activities that caused the collapse of the CSO. Even reviewing the record in the light most
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favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff’s reliance on the language of the subcontract agreement between
defendant Jenkins Construction and Jenkins Excavating does not rebut the testimonial evidence
provided by Paige and Greer. Plaintiff relies heavily on a line in the subcontract agreement that
states, “Remove from site all spoils removing from your work.” The text of the line is lined out
by hand and is initialed “BB.” Plaintiff asserts that the initials represent Brian Biasutto, Jenkins
Excavating’s project manager. But plaintiff does not provide any evidence explaining how the
crossed out language directly implicates defendant Jenkins Construction and proves the elements
of negligence. In fact, when asked about any implications that might arise from the crossed out
language, Greer testified that he would not know of anyone else that would remove the spoils
from the job site and that Jenkins Excavating actually did remove the spoils. As a result,
plaintiff failed to establish the elements of negligence and no genuine issue of material fact
exists, making summary disposition proper pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
V
Finally, plaintiff Westfield argues that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, defendant Jenkins Construction knew or had reason to know that a nuisance and
trespass were likely to occur as a result of the excavating work it hired Jenkins Excavating to
perform. In support of its claim, plaintiff alleges that the work site was errantly configured, that
defendant Jenkins Construction knew or should have known of logistical difficulties related to
handling the spoil, and that defendant Jenkins Construction failed to clearly delegate the task of
removing the spoil. Defendant Jenkins Construction asserts that despite its label, plaintiff’s
argument is merely another attempt to establish its negligence claim.
A court is not bound by the party’s choice of labels for the cause of action because to do
so would exalt form over substance. Johnston v City of Livonia, 177 Mich App 200, 208; 441
NW2d 41 (1989). The gravamen of a party’s claim is determined by reviewing the entire claim,
and a party cannot avoid dismissal of a cause of action by artful pleading. See Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 135; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Our review of the record reveals that
plaintiff’s allegations ultimately sound in negligence. As we found above, plaintiff failed to
establish the elements of negligence and no genuine issue of material fact exists on the record,
thus the trial court properly granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor
of defendant. But even if we did consider the torts of nuisance and trespass separately, plaintiff
Westfield has not presented any evidence whatsoever that create questions of fact that defendant
Jenkins Construction caused a nuisance or trespass to occur at the jobsite. Thus, plaintiff’s
claims of trespass and nuisance also fail.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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