LINDA ROBINSON V BIRDS EYE FOODS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA ROBINSON,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BIRDS EYE FOODS, INC., d/b/a DEAN FOODS
AGRILINK, IVANHOE HUNTLEY 7001 OLR,
L.L.C., IVANHOE MAINTENANCE COMPANY
and IVANHOE MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
No. 277339
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 06-072938-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
This premises liability action arises out of injuries incurred by plaintiff when she slipped
and fell on a patch of ice on the sidewalk outside the office of Birds Eye Foods, Inc., d/b/a Dean
Foods Agrilink (“Birds Eye”). Birds Eye is a tenant of Ivanhoe Huntley 7001 OLR, L.L.C.,
Ivanhoe Maintenance Company and Ivanhoe Management Company (“defendants”). The trial
court dismissed Birds Eye, and Ivanhoe moved for and was granted summary disposition
because defendants did not have notice of the ice patch, and the ice patch was an open and
obvious hazard.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that defendants had constructive notice of the ice based on the
weather patterns preceding the accident. Plaintiff also argues that the patch of ice was not open
and obvious, but even if it were, it possessed special aspects that triggered defendants’ duty to
remedy the condition or warn against it.
On appeal, a decision to grant a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Hines v Volkswagen of Am, Inc, 265 Mich App 432, 437; 695 NW2d 84 (2005). When
reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must consider
the record in the same manner as the trial court. Id. Any court considering such a motion must
consider all the pleadings and the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
A court may not weigh the evidence or make factual findings. Id. The motion tests whether
there exists a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.
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In a premises liability action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, (3) the breach caused plaintiff injury, and (4) the
plaintiff suffered damages. Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich App 710,
712; 737 NW2d 179 (2007). Further, in order to show a breach of duty, a plaintiff’s injury
resulting from a dangerous condition must be caused either by the active negligence of the
defendant or a dangerous condition that is known to the defendant or has existed long enough
that the defendant should have known about it. Hampton v Waste Mgt of Mich, Inc, 236 Mich
App 598, 603-604; 601 NW2d 172 (1999).
Further, this duty does not extend to dangerous conditions that are open and obvious.
Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). An open and obvious
condition is one that an average person of ordinary intelligence could discover upon casual
inspection. Kennedy, supra at 713. Thus, it is an objective test unrelated to the actual
perceptions of a particular plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff argues that weather reports show that the temperature was consistently below
freezing for nearly two days before plaintiff’s fall. Thus, she argues that the patch of ice must
have existed for at least that long; consequently, defendants had constructive notice of the ice.
This is merely circumstantial evidence which may give rise to a possible inference. Clark v
Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 420-421; 634 NW2d 347 (2001). In the face of this possible
inference, a witness to the scene testified that she clearly remembered seeing the snow melting
from the roof of the building on the day in question. It is not uncommon for freezing and
thawing patterns to be inconsistent with reported ambient temperatures. Sunshine, shade, heat
emanating from buildings or pipes, wind, and a host of other factors may contribute to the actual
temperature of a specific location or surface. The testimony about melting snow was consistent
with fluctuations in temperature. Further, the presence and creation of ice is unpredictable.
Circumstantial evidence that ice may have formed under the weather conditions of the previous
two days does not allow a reasonable inference that it was created at the beginning of those
conditions or that defendants had constructive notice of it. See Clark, supra at 421 (reasonable
inference drawn from location of grape which could only be left by human hand), and Altairi v
Alhaj, 235 Mich App 626, 640; 599 NW2d 537 (1999) (meteorologist’s affidavit of general
weather conditions was not evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of ice). The trial court
properly granted summary disposition because defendants did not have notice of the dangerous
condition.
Plaintiff also argues that the ice was not open and obvious because it was clear and
therefore not discoverable by a casual observer. This Court has stated that “[a]s a general rule,
and absent special circumstances, the hazards presented by snow and ice are open and obvious.”
Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 428; 705 NW2d 164 (2005). The conditions considered in
Teufel and cases it cites involve snow and ice. Id. at 428-429. Snow is a common condition in
Michigan winters and presages potentially hazardous walking surfaces, whether the danger
actually presented is snow or ice. Royce v Chatwell Club Apts, 276 Mich App 389, 392-393; 740
NW2d 547 (2007); Ververis v Hartfield Lanes (On Remand), 271 Mich App 61, 65; 718 NW2d
382 (2006). But, where there is no snow on the surface of the walkway and no other indication
that the walkway presents a slipping hazard, the ice itself must be discoverable upon casual
observation in order to be an open and obvious hazard. See Royce, supra at 394; Joyce v Rubin,
249 Mich App 231, 239; 642 NW2d 360 (2002).
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In the instant case, plaintiff avers that the ice on the sidewalk was not covered or
otherwise accompanied by snow. There was snow on the ground elsewhere, but it had been
cleared off the sidewalks. She further states that the ice was clear and not visual to the casual
observer. Plaintiff had been walking the sidewalks of the area delivering mail for approximately
an hour before encountering this ice. The only other witness to the scene testified that she saw
the ice when she came to the aid of plaintiff. The witness did not testify about the general ability
to see the ice, and she did not observe the ice under conditions that could be called “casual
observation.” She specifically looked at the vicinity of the ice where plaintiff fell because of
plaintiff’s predicament. A condition need not be invisible to escape casual observation.
Michigan law does not support the contention that all sidewalks present appreciably
dangerous conditions during the winter months. Plaintiff properly raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the ice that caused her fall was open and obvious.1 Summary
disposition was nevertheless proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact that
defendants had notice of the condition.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
Plaintiff also argues in the alternative that the condition possessed special aspects taking it out
the scope of the open and obvious doctrine. We need not address this argument.
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