TRAVIS TURNER III V CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRAVIS TURNER, III,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 276943
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-012772-CZ
CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS and TIM
HOORNSTRA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Bandstra and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of defendants. We affirm and remand for determination of defendants’ attorney fees and costs
associated with this appeal as a sanction against plaintiff for a vexatious appeal.
In an amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that he and his wife were engaged in a
domestic dispute on February 4, 2004, as he was preparing divorce documents, that plaintiff was
arrested when police responded to the disturbance despite plaintiff not having struck the first
blow, and that he was arrested simply because he is male. Documentary evidence regarding the
incident submitted by the parties for purposes of summary disposition included an "affidavit"1 by
plaintiff averring that his wife physically assaulted him first before he bit her on the arm in selfdefense and a police report which reflected that plaintiff had no apparent injuries, despite his
claim that his wife assaulted him, that plaintiff's wife had visible bite marks on her arm, and that
plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff also submitted an "affidavit" from his wife that contained
1
The so-called affidavit submitted by plaintiff contains no seal, no certificate of
acknowledgment, and is not attested or notarized; it is simply signed by plaintiff. Therefore, it is
not a legally recognizable affidavit. See MCR 2.119(B); Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120,
128; 730 NW2d 695 (2007) (an affidavit is a “notarial act” controlled by the Uniform
Recognition of Acknowledgements Act (URAA), MCL 565.261 et seq.); Holmes v Michigan
Capital Medical Ctr, 242 Mich App 703, 711; 620 NW2d 319 (2000). The claimed affidavit
fails to comply with the URAA. The affidavit signed by plaintiff’s wife suffers from the same
deficiencies.
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averments confessing that she physically assaulted plaintiff as he had claimed and that she lied to
police because of fears of losing custody of her and plaintiff's children.
Plaintiff further alleged that on March 5, 2004, he had his pickup truck towed by a towing
company from the apartment where his wife lived, and where he formerly resided, to plaintiff's
new residence. Plaintiff contended that his wife called the police because of the incident, falsely
claiming that plaintiff, in violation of a personal protection order (PPO), came to her home and
took the truck. Documentary evidence regarding this incident included plaintiff’s affidavit that
supported his allegations, a receipt from the towing company supporting plaintiff's allegations,
and a police report that reflected that no action was taken because plaintiff's wife did not actually
witness plaintiff taking the truck.
Plaintiff next alleged in the amended complaint that, later in the day on March 5, 2004,
after the towing company gave him the truck, he charged the truck's battery, took the truck for
refueling, and then returned home. According to the amended complaint, shortly thereafter,
defendant Hoornstra, a city police officer, arrived at plaintiff's residence in response to a second
incident and a new false complaint by plaintiff's wife and her neighbor that plaintiff had violated
the PPO. Documentary evidence regarding this second incident on March 5 included a police
report which stated that plaintiff's wife and the neighbor informed police that plaintiff showed up
at the wife's residence in the truck, honking the horn and spinning the tires, that plaintiff denied
being present at his wife's residence, claiming to have been at his mother's home except for the
brief time that he ran out to get gas, and that plaintiff was arrested for violating the PPO and his
bond on the earlier assault. In plaintiff's affidavit, he denied that he drove his truck to his wife’s
residence, and in his wife’s affidavit she averred that she was mistaken in reporting that plaintiff
violated the PPO, discovering after the fact that it was someone else’s truck that she and the
neighbor had observed.
Finally, plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that he was arrested, spent five days in
jail with common criminals, and that he suffered actual damages, mental anguish, and violations
of his constitutional rights, given that he was cleared of wrongdoing for the events that transpired
on February 4 and March 5, 2004, and obtained a civil judgment against the neighbor for making
false and malicious police reports.2 The full extent of plaintiff's allegations regarding a legal
cause of action is found in the complaint's caption wherein he alleged, "14th [A]mendment
violations of loss of liberty, 4th [A]mendment violation of unlawful seizure of his person and
mental anguish, warrantless entry and deprivation of due process of the laws."
2
Documentary evidence submitted by plaintiff included a judgment showing a nolle prosequi
with respect to the alleged domestic assault, with the handwritten notation “witness FTA’d.”
The record also includes an order dismissing the prosecution for the alleged PPO violation “per
request of the Prosecuting Attorney.” A default judgment in the amount of $10,000 in favor of
plaintiff and against the neighbor is also included in the record. Plaintiff further submitted the
following documentary evidence: orders for return of fingerprints, arrest card, and arrestee’s
description relative to the two arrests, plus two other arrests for domestic assault in 2003 and
2005; and, a police report of an alleged PPO violation called in by plaintiff’s wife on March 3,
2004, with no result identified.
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On plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, to which defendants responded and also
requested summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2), the trial court found that defendant
city was not liable as a matter of law because the theory of respondeat superior was inapplicable
and plaintiff failed to allege or show a city policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional
violations. In regard to defendant Hoornstra, the trial court ruled that he was shielded by
immunity, where his conduct was objectively reasonable.3
The only claims set forth in plaintiff’s complaint alleged, in broad and general terms,
constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.
We first address the action against defendant Hoornstra, which, according to the briefs,
although not decipherable from the complaint,4 related only to Hoornstra’s involvement in
arresting plaintiff for the PPO violation.
Pursuant to 42 USC 1983, a person who experiences the deprivation of rights secured by
the United States Constitution because of the actions of another person acting under color of
state law may file an action seeking redress against the party that caused the deprivation. Walsh
v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 635; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). Such a suit brought against a police
officer for violation of a constitutional right permits the officer to invoke the defense of qualified
immunity, and a plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a reasonable officer in the
defendant’s position could not have believed that his conduct was lawful. Id. at 635-636; see
also Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000) (governmental official
performing discretionary function is entitled to qualified or good-faith immunity if official’s
conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person
would have known). The Fourth Amendment protects people from unlawful searches and
seizures, requiring probable cause, and the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the state from
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Here, defendant Hoornstra arrested plaintiff after plaintiff’s wife and a neighbor reported
that plaintiff showed up at the wife’s residence in his truck, in violation of the PPO, honking the
horn and spinning the tires. Even if we could consider the defective affidavit from plaintiff’s
wife, it acknowledged that this information was indeed reported to the police, regardless of her
later claim that she had been mistaken. And even if we could consider plaintiff’s defective
affidavit, it would not call into question Hoornstra’s actions or change the perception of events
3
The trial court also entertained dismissing the action under MCR 2.504 for plaintiff’s failure to
pay sanctions ordered in numerous frivolous lawsuits filed by plaintiff in the Kent Circuit Court.
However, the trial court ultimately dismissed the action on the merits of the claims presented.
4
We note that the complaint completely fails in adequately stating “the specific allegations
necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is
called on to defend.” MCR 2.111(B)(1).
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that confronted Hoornstra on March 5, 2004; there were two eyewitnesses claiming clear
unlawful conduct on the part of plaintiff. The prior history of plaintiff and his wife that entailed
police involvement was not such that Hoornstra was in a position to ignore the claimed PPO
violation and not arrest plaintiff, especially given the supporting claim of a third party, the
neighbor, and the initial lie by plaintiff’s mother regarding plaintiff’s whereabouts. The fact that
charges for the alleged PPO violation were dropped and that plaintiff obtained a default
judgment against the neighbor does not equate to a finding that Hoornstra lacked probable cause
to arrest plaintiff at the time or that a reasonable police officer faced with the same circumstances
would not have believed that arresting plaintiff was lawful.5 In sum, on de novo review, the
vague, cursory complaint failed to state a cause of action against Hoornstra, MCR 2.116(C)(8),
and, viewing the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no genuine
issue of material fact that Hoornstra was entitled to summary disposition, MCR 2.116(C)(10),
where his actions were entirely proper and constitutionally sound. See Kreiner v Fischer, 471
Mich 109, 129; 683 NW2d 611 (2004); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996). The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(I)(2).
The action against the city is even more lacking in merit than the action against
Hoornstra. “A plaintiff may sue a municipality in . . . state court under 42 USC 1983 to redress
a violation of a federal constitutional right.” Jones v Powell, 462 Mich 329, 337; 612 NW2d 423
(2000), citing Monell v New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690 n 54; 98 S Ct
2018; 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978). In Monell, id. at 694, the United States Supreme Court held:
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not attach to § 1983 actions against
municipalities. Collins v City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 US 115, 123; 112 S Ct 1061; 117 L
Ed 2d 261 (1992). There must be a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and
the alleged constitutional deprivation, and the policy or custom must reflect a deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons who come in contact with the police. Id. at 123-124; see
also Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 333; 738 NW2d 278 (2007)(applying
deliberate indifference standard to claim of Eighth Amendment violation relative to prison
medical care).
As reflected in the cited cases, the city could not be held liable under 42 USC 1983 on the
theory of respondeat superior. Moreover, plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any allegations
of an unconstitutional policy or custom employed by the city, let alone an allegation that a
5
The dropping of charges relative to the alleged domestic assault and PPO violation are likely
attributable to plaintiff’s wife changing her stories, but we cannot state whether the change was
to speak the truth or to pacify plaintiff and get him off the hook.
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custom or policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Accordingly, summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(I)(2).
Furthermore, there was no documentary evidence establishing the existence of an
unconstitutional custom or policy employed by the city, let alone evidence of a custom or policy
that amounted to a deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly,
summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and MCR 2.116(I)(2).
Finally, we find, sua sponte, that plaintiff’s appeal was vexatious because it “was taken
for purposes of hindrance or delay” and “without any reasonable basis for belief that there was a
meritorious issue to be determined on appeal.” MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a). Plaintiff is ordered to pay
defendants’ reasonable attorney fees associated with defending the appeal, along with
defendants’ costs. MCR 7.216(C)(2); MCR 7.219(I).
Affirmed and remanded for determination of defendants’ attorney fees and costs
associated with this appeal and entry of an order thereon.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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