IN RE TYRIEK KORDELL DENTMOND MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TYRIEK KORDELL
DENTMOND, Minor.
THOMAS WESTON BUGBEE and LISA
MICHELLE BUGBEE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 10, 2008
Petitioners-Appellees,
v
No. 283598
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-006855-AY
CLAUZELL DENTMOND, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Bandstra and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to § 51(6) of the Michigan adoption code, MCL 710.51(6). We affirm.
“A petitioner in an adoption proceeding must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of parental rights is warranted.” In re Hill, 221 Mich App 683, 691; 562 NW2d
254 (1997). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 691-692. “A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe
the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
MCL 710.51(6) provides:
If the parents of a child are . . . unmarried but the father has acknowledged
paternity . . . and if the parent having legal custody of the child subsequently
marries and that parent’s spouse petitions to adopt the child, the court upon notice
and hearing may issue an order terminating the rights of the other parent if both of
the following occur:
(a) The other parent, having the ability to support, or assist in supporting,
the child, has failed or neglected to provide regular and substantial support for the
child or if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially comply
with the order, for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.
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(b) The other parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate
with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a
period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.
With respect to financial support, because a support order was in place, petitioner was
only required to prove a substantial failure to comply with the order for two years or more before
the filing of the petition.1 In re Hill, supra at 692. Published opinions from this Court have only
defined “substantial compliance” by illustrating what it is not: complete failure to pay, In re
Caldwell, 228 Mich App 116, 122; 576 NW2d 724 (1998), and In re Hill, supra at 693-694;
payment of $100 a year against an obligation of $300 a month, In re Meredith, 162 Mich App
19, 21, 24; 412 NW2d 229 (1987); and payment of approximately eight percent of the total
support due over four years, with most payments made during the first half of the two-year
period and only three made during the second half, In re Colon, 144 Mich App 805, 807-808,
812; 377 NW2d 321 (1985). Substantial compliance has been defined in other states as
“compliance which substantially, essentially, in the main, for the most part, satisfies the means of
accomplishing the objectives sought to be effected by the decree and at the same time does
complete equity,” Pittman v Pittman, 419 So 2d 1376, 1379 (Ala, 1982), and as “a regular, bona
fide pattern of payment” over the requisite period, In re CDO, 39 P3d 828, 831 (Okla App,
2001).
The evidence showed that respondent was required to pay child support of approximately
$75 a week, or $308.68 a month, as of January 2005. During the 24 months preceding the filing
of the petition, respondent was obligated to pay $7,408 in support. He made sporadic payments
of no more than $40, paid nothing in seven of the 24 months, and submitted a total of $555, less
than eight percent of what was owed. In light of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err
in finding that respondent did not substantially comply with the support order, i.e., he did not
demonstrate a regular pattern of payments showing a good-faith effort to meet his support
obligations.
In addition to proving substantial failure to comply with a support order, petitioners were
required to prove that respondent had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child
and regularly and substantially failed or neglected to do so for at least two years preceding the
filing of the petition. Because the terms “visit, contact, or communicate” are phrased in the
disjunctive, the petitioner is “not required to prove that respondent had the ability to perform all
three acts. Rather, petitioner merely ha[s] to prove that respondent had the ability to perform any
one of the acts and substantially failed or neglected to do so for two or more years preceding the
filing of the petition.” In re Hill, supra at 694.
The evidence showed that a custody, support, and visitation order was entered in 1998
that granted respondent supervised visitation only. Respondent did not visit. The parties
disputed whether the lack of visitation was due to improper interference by Lisa Bugbee or lack
of interest by respondent. Nevertheless, in 2000 or 2001, respondent filed a motion for
1
Petitioner was not required to prove respondent’s ability to pay because his ability to pay was
already factored into the support order. In re Hill, supra at 692.
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visitation. Rather than grant the motion, the court ordered him to attend an eight-week program
at the child and parent center. Respondent completed the program and then returned to court.
The court ordered respondent to repeat the program. Respondent refused to comply with the
court’s order and did not otherwise exercise his right to supervised visitation because he did not
believe his visitation should be supervised. Thereafter, respondent saw his son once, in the
summer of 2004. He sent him one letter in 2004 and spoke to him at least once by telephone
approximately three years earlier. While respondent contends that Lisa Bugbee denied him
visitation, she did not have authority to permit visitation in violation of the court order allowing
only supervised visitation. Furthermore, complaints that the custodial parent wrongfully
withheld visitation are unavailing here, where respondent had a legal right to visit under the
terms of a court order. If respondent believed that his legal rights were being violated, he could
have sought assistance from the Friend of the Court or the court. In re SMNE, 264 Mich App 49,
51; 689 NW2d 235 (2004). Under the circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that respondent had the ability to visit and regularly and substantially failed to do so for the twoyear period preceding the filing of the petition.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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