PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH RAY BAGGETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276551
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-403588-FC
JOSEPH RAY BAGGETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with resisting arrest, MCL 750.81d(1), resisting and obstructing a
police officer, causing bodily injury, MCL 750.81d(2), and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2).
A jury convicted him of resisting arrest, and acquitted him of the other two charges. He was
sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 16 to 180 months’
imprisonment, and ordered to pay $9,485.52 in restitution. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
The charges arose out of an altercation defendant had with police officers and a state
trooper after they responded to a neighbor’s call concerning an argument defendant was having
with his live-in girlfriend. Defendant resisted arrest and the three officers attempted to subdue
him. Officer Michael Lanier broke his hand after punching defendant in the ribs. The resisting
and obstructing charge of which defendant was acquitted was based on the personal injury to
Lanier.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution for
Officer Lanier’s injuries, although the jury acquitted defendant of resisting arrest causing injury
This Court reviews a restitution order for an abuse of discretion. People v Gubachy, 272 Mich
App 706, 708; 728 NW2d 891 (2006). When the question of restitution involves a matter of
statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Id. Crime victims have both a statutory and
constitutional right to restitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 24; MCL 780.766; People v Grant, 455
Mich 221, 229; 565 NW2d 389 (1997). Under MCL 780.766(2), “when sentencing a defendant
convicted of a crime, the court shall order . . . that the defendant make full restitution to any
victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s
estate.” “[I]n determining the amount of restitution to order under [MCL 780.766], the court
shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense.” MCL
780.767(1).
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Defendant essentially argues that he cannot be required to pay restitution for an injury he
was not convicted of causing. We disagree. A sentencing court may order a defendant to pay
restitution to compensate all the victims who were injured in his course of conduct, even though
the specific criminal acts committed against some of the victims were not the basis of the
defendant’s conviction. People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 265; 571 NW2d 503 (1997). The trial
court is authorized by statute to order restitution to any victim of a defendant’s course of conduct
that gave rise to the conviction. MCL 780.766(2). Here, Officer Lanier was a victim of
defendant’s course of conduct that gave rise to the conviction: defendant resisted Trooper
Churchill’s efforts to arrest him, and, in the process of assisting Trooper Churchill in the arrest,
Officer Lanier was injured. Because Officer Lanier was injured due to defendant’s course of
conduct that gave rise to his conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the
restitution order, notwithstanding that the jury acquitted defendant of the charge of resisting and
obstructing causing injury to Lanier.
Defendant asserts that the trial court found that he did not commit the charge of resisting
arrest with respect to Officer Lanier, when it refused to score defendant for acquitted conduct
under OV 13; therefore, ordering him to pay restitution was error. The trial court made the
following factual findings with respect to OV 13: “. . . I think it’s not appropriate to score him
where the jury—where the jury has found him not guilty.” The fact that the trial court did not
score defendant for an offense variable has no bearing on the trial court’s decision to order
restitution. Further, the trial court never made a factual finding that defendant did not cause the
injury by resisting arrest. It simply recognized that defendant was acquitted of the charge.
Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to make the requisite factual findings
linking defendant’s conduct to the monetary loss. Defendant did not preserve this issue below;
therefore, our review of this unpreserved, nonconstitutional allegation of error is for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 773; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). There was no plain error. Defendant was required to challenge the amount of
restitution to trigger the trial court’s duty of settling the dispute by a preponderance of the
evidence; defendant did not do so. Grant, supra at 243. Defendant did not do so. Therefore, the
trial court was not required to make factual findings to resolve a dispute over the restitution, and
plain error did not occur.
Defendant next alleges that his right to a fair trial was compromised by prosecutorial
misconduct when, on cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked defendant if the police
officers were either mistaken or lying. Because defendant failed to object to the alleged
misconduct, this Court reviews this issue for plain error. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101,
110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
Although some of the questioning was improper, we find no error requiring reversal
because there is no basis to conclude that it affected the outcome of defendant’s trial, or that it
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or that it was a determinative factor
in defendant’s conviction at all, or that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454;
678 NW2d 631 (2004). The jury apparently judged defendant’s veracity based on the evidence;
it acquitted him of two of the three charged crimes. There is no reason to conclude that the line
of questioning somehow hampered defendant’s defense or undermined the judicial process.
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Moreover, a curative instruction could have cured any possible prejudice. People v Knapp, 244
Mich App 361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Defendant finally argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by
empanelling a jury whose members were referred to by number only. Defendant expressed
satisfaction with the jury at the close of voir dire, thereby waiving any issue pertaining to the
composition of the jury on appeal. People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 466467; 552 NW2d 493 (1996) (expressing satisfaction with a jury at the close of voir dire, waives a
party’s ability to challenge the composition of the jury subsequently impaneled and sworn).
We note, however, that there is no evidence that the jurors’ biographical information was
withheld from the parties, and both the trial court and the parties conducted voir dire. Defendant
fails to demonstrate that the use of numbers prevented him from conducting meaningful voir dire
or that his presumption of innocence was compromised. See People v Williams, 241 Mich App
519, 523-524; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). The jury in this case was “anonymous only in a literal
sense, so none of the dangers of an ‘anonymous jury’ was [sic] implicated.” People v Hanks,
276 Mich App 91, 94; 740 NW2d 530 (2007).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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