GARY GRAY V BRENT BOCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY GRAY and SHERRYL MCDONALDGRAY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 278560
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 05-001647
BRENT BOCK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Smolenski and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a judgment in their favor and a post-judgment order
denying their motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
Gary Gray was injured while riding in a car driven by defendant Brent Bock. Plaintiffs
sued Bock. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of defendant’s negligence, Gary Gray suffered a
serious impairment of body function and had not been able to work since the accident. Sherryl
McDonald-Gray sought damages for loss of consortium. The trial court granted plaintiffs’
motion for summary disposition on the issue of negligence, but denied the motion on the issue of
threshold injury.
The case proceeded to trial on the issues of whether Gary Gray was injured in the
accident, whether his injuries constituted a serious impairment of body function, and the amount
of damages. Gary Gray’s request for wage loss was limited to those losses occurring more than
three years after the accident.1 During the trial, defendant made several references to the fact
that Gary Gray received no-fault wage loss benefits for the three years following the accident.
The jury found that Gary Gray suffered injuries as a result of the accident and that his
injuries constituted a serious impairment of body function. The jury awarded Gary Gray $12,000
1
Gary Gray received wage loss benefits for the three years following the date of the accident, as
provided under the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).
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for his economic losses and $20,000 for his noneconomic losses. The jury awarded no damages
to Sherryl McDonald-Gray. In the judgment, the trial court awarded Gary Gray these damages,
but awarded defendant case evaluation sanctions in the amount of $13,272. The judgment also
included pre-judgment interest in the amount of $1,802.98.
Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the issue of damages. Plaintiffs argued that the trial
court denied them a fair trial by allowing defendant to introduce evidence that they were insured.
In response, defendant asserted that plaintiffs attempted to misrepresent their financial condition
by contending that they had exhausted their savings and were on the verge of poverty. And
defendant argued that, under these circumstances, references to Gary Gray’s receipt of no-fault
wage loss benefits was not improper. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is within the discretion of the trial
court. Coble v Green, 271 Mich App 382, 389; 722 NW2d 898 (2006). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the result is outside the range of principled outcomes. Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich
151, 158; 732 NW2d 472 (2007).
In Cacavas v Bennett, 37 Mich App 599, 604; 194 NW2d 924 (1972), citing MCL
500.3030, this Court noted that neither party may refer to the available insurance coverage before
the trier of fact. The Court explained that it would be error that warranted reversal “to
intentionally interject the subject of insurance if the sole purpose is to inflame the passions of the
jury . . . .” Id. However, the Court also recognized that it would not be error “if the subject is
only incidentally brought into the trial, is only casually mentioned, or is used in good faith for
purposes other than to inflame the passions of the jury.” Id.
Plaintiffs assert that defendant violated this rule by mentioning that Gary Gray received
no-fault wage loss benefits for the first three years after the accident—a period for which they
were not even seeking compensation—and that the reference to those benefits fatally prejudiced
their case. Cf. Kokinakes v British Leyland, Ltd, 124 Mich App 650, 653-655; 335 NW2d 114
(1983). We disagree.
Plaintiffs’ position, as reflected in counsel’s opening statement and Gary Gray’s direct
testimony, was that plaintiffs had exhausted their savings as a result of Gary Gray’s inability to
work following the accident, and were facing severe financial hardship. Defendant sought to
rebut this inference by pointing out that Gary Gray had received no-fault wage loss benefits for
three years following the accident. Decisions from this Court indicate that mention of insurance
under such circumstances, while not preferred, does not necessarily warrant reversal. See, e.g.,
Cogo v Moore, 119 Mich App 747, 755-756; 327 NW2d 345 (1982) (stating that the plaintiff’s
reference to insurance was not error when designed to rebut defense counsel’s assertion that
client was unemployed and unable to pay judgment); Cacavas, supra at 604 (stating that the
defendant’s reference to insurance was not error when made to rebut the plaintiffs’ assertions of
inability to secure hospitalization). Further, Gary Gray’s testimony was inconsistent with certain
statements made in a document entitled “Ordinary and Necessary Services Affidavit.” Under
these circumstances, the references to insurance were properly offered for the limited purpose of
challenging credibility. Id. at 604; see also MRE 411.
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The trial court correctly held that the admission of evidence regarding Gary Gray’s
receipt of no-fault wage loss benefits was proper, and did not abuse its discretion by denying
plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on that basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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