PEOPLE OF MI V ERIK WILLIAM SKIDMORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274207
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003318-FH
ERIK WILLIAM SKIDMORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and O’Connell and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver
marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d). He
was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to five years’ probation,
with 270 days in jail for the possession with intent to deliver conviction and 180 days in jail for
the drug house conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because
the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance he possessed was
illegal marijuana. Defendant contends that the prosecutor was required to prove that the
substance contained tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) to verify that the substance seized from his
house was marijuana. Marijuana is a controlled substance. MCL 333.7212(1)(c); People v
Derror, 475 Mich 316, 324; 715 NW2d 822 (2006). Under MCL 333.7401(2)(d), defendant is
guilty of a felony punishable by four or fewer years in prison if he possessed “[m]arihuana or a
mixture containing marihuana” with the intent to deliver it when “the amount is less than five
kilograms or fewer than 20 plants . . . .” According to MCL 333.7405(1)(d), defendant is guilty
of keeping a drug house if he “knowingly keep[s] or maintain[s] a . . . dwelling . . . that is used
for keeping or selling controlled substances in violation of this article.” The term “marihuana” is
defined in MCL 333.7106(3) as “all parts of the plant Canabis sativa L., growing or not; the
seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin . . . .” As our Supreme
Court observed in Derror, supra at 325, the prosecution is not required to affirmatively prove the
presence of pure THC in a substance for it to be classified as marijuana.
In this case, the substance that was seized from defendant’s home was examined by a
forensic scientist, who testified that both a visual examination and chemical testing of the
substance indicated that it was marijuana. The forensic scientist testified that the Duquenois-1-
Levine test, a color-change test, yields positive results when one or more of the following
compounds in marijuana are present: THC, cannabinol, and cannabidiol. His visual examination
of the substance indicated that it was marijuana, and the chemical test was also positive. While
other substances had similar characteristics to marijuana under either visual inspection or
chemical testing, he knew of no substance except marijuana that yielded positive results under
both tests. Moreover, defendant testified that he had smoked marijuana nearly all his life. He
also testified that he smoked some of the material that was later seized by the police, and he
specifically identified it as marijuana. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance
seized from defendant’s house was marijuana.
We also reject defendant’s argument that the prosecutor was required to prove that the
substance seized was the plant species, “Canabis sativa L.,” which is the specific species
mentioned in the statutory definition of marijuana. However, this Court has specifically rejected
this argument and held that a prosecutor is not required to establish the specific species or variety
of marijuana. People v Riddle, 65 Mich App 433, 436-437; 237 NW2d 491 (1975); see also
Derror, supra.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to dismiss a juror
for cause. We disagree. A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). Defendant
asserts that the jury foreman should have been excused under MCR 2.511(D) because he could
not be impartial in this case. Defendant refers to the juror’s background and experience as a
police officer who had participated in several narcotic investigations and who had testified as an
expert in narcotics identification in several cases. Upon questioning by the court, however, the
juror stated that he could be fair and impartial, and that his experiences as a police officer would
not affect his ability to render a verdict based only on the evidence presented in this case. The
fact that the juror was a police officer “is not of itself sufficient to warrant an inference of bias.”
People v Robert, 162 Mich App 60, 64; 412 NW2d 244 (1987). Further, the juror did not make
any comments suggesting that he had any preconceived notions or opinions about the case. This
case is also unlike Robert because the record here indicates that the juror was a police officer in a
different community from where the offense was prosecuted, and the record does not reflect any
prior cooperation with the prosecutor or the witnesses. See id. at 64-65. Unlike Robert, the juror
was not shown to be friends with any of the witnesses, and the credibility of police witnesses was
not critical to a successful prosecution of the defendant. See id. Instead, the case came down to
defendant’s credibility about whether he intended to personally consume the large amount of
marijuana found in his home. The trial court listened to the juror, assessed his demeanor, and
determined that he could be fair. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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