PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID LALL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 19, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273165
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-07008-DO
DAVID LALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b. Because the trial court did not violate defendant’s federal and
state constitutional protections against double jeopardy, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not
bar the introduction of certain evidence in defendant’s second trial, and juror communications
and alleged misconduct did not constitute reversible error or warrant a mistrial, we affirm.
I. Substantive Facts
Defendant’s conviction arises out of the sexual assault of the victim at Lakeland Hospital
in Saint Joseph, Michigan. During the afternoon of August 21, 2004, the victim attended the
Berrien County Youth Fair with her two daughters. The victim became ill at the fair and began
to feel nauseous and started vomiting. As the condition worsened, the victim was transported by
ambulance to the emergency room at Lakeland Hospital. Initially, the victim was placed on a
bed in the hallway but was later transferred to a patient room. Defendant, a male nurse, was
assigned to assist the victim. Defendant and a patient care assistant, Mandy McCrorey, came
into the victim’s room and assessed her condition. McCrorey helped her remove her shirt and
bra and put on a hospital gown. The victim kept her jeans on under the hospital gown. A lab
technician drew the victim’s blood. Dr. Patrick Holbert examined the victim, including palpating
her abdomen. Dr. Holbert advised the victim that her potassium was low, diagnosed her with
dehydration and vomiting secondary to the fair rides, and prescribed her Phenergan to settle her
nausea.
The victim testified to the following events. Defendant entered the room, told her he was
going to give her Phenergan, and then injected a syringe into her. The victim stated that the
injection hurt, she grabbed her arm, and then fell asleep. The victim was in and out of
consciousness but woke up briefly several times and has memories of the waking moments. The
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victim’s memories include: defendant pulling her underwear down and the victim pulling them
back up; defendant putting his tongue in her mouth and the victim trying to push him away;
defendant pressing his penis against her mouth trying to open it and the victim backing her head
away; the victim seeing defendant with his pants somewhat down and seeing defendant’s pubic
area; and, defendant administering a second shot and the victim complaining again that it hurt.
Finally, the victim remembers defendant putting his hand between her legs and penetrating her
vagina with his fingers. The victim removed defendant’s hand and asked defendant what he was
doing. The victim stated that defendant responded by saying, “you asked me to do this.” The
victim denied it and asked defendant where her pants were. The victim did not remember having
her pants removed.
Defendant reached under her gurney and retrieved the victim’s pants. Defendant assisted
the victim in getting her pants on and then she grabbed her bra and shirt. The victim asked for
her phone and defendant retrieved it and gave it to the victim. The victim called a coworker,
Marco Reyna, to come to the hospital and pick her up. The victim asked defendant for directions
to exit the hospital and defendant showed her the way to the door. The victim did not tell anyone
at the hospital about her experiences. As the victim waited outside for Reyna to pick her up, the
victim’s husband, James, who was at work, called. The victim was very upset but did not tell her
husband because she wanted to tell him in person. When Reyna arrived, the victim was crying.
The victim entered Reyna’s vehicle and told him that she had been raped. Reyna proposed going
to another hospital or the police but the victim declined. Reyna took the victim to her vehicle.
The victim picked up her daughters, dropped them off at home, and then proceeded to her
husband’s workplace. The victim told her husband what happened and they decided to go to
another hospital.
The victim and her husband went to Saint Joseph’s Regional Medical Center in South
Bend, Indiana. The victim told a nurse examiner what she remembered about what happened at
Lakeland Hospital. A doctor examined the victim and hospital staff took oral, vaginal, hair,
urine, and blood samples. The victim told hospital staff that she medicated with Vicodin,
Darvocet, and Fexeril for degenerative disc disease. She also stated that she had taken Valium
about a month prior to these events. A nurse called the police while the victim was at the
hospital. The victim spoke with a police officer over the phone. Tests revealed that only the
victim’s husband’s seminal fluid was found. Tests also revealed that the victim’s blood
contained both Valium and Phenergan.
II. Procedural History
The prosecutor charged defendant with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520b (multiple variables), and one count of delivery of a controlled substance with the
intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401a. The case proceeded to jury trial on
both counts. The jury was unable to read a unanimous verdict on the charge of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and acquitted defendant of the charge of delivery of a controlled
substance with the intent to commit criminal sexual conduct. Defendant moved for dismissal of
the remaining count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on double jeopardy and the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. The parties briefed the issue and the trial court issued an opinion
and order concluding that the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit the prosecution from
retrying defendant under two theories: force or coercion, MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i), and mental or
physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g). But the trial court also held that defendant’s
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double jeopardy protections prohibited the prosecution from again trying defendant for firstdegree criminal sexual conduct based on the theory that sexual penetration occurred under
circumstances involving the commission of any other felony, MCL 750.520b(1)(c), namely
delivery of a controlled substance with the intent to commit a sexual act MCL 333.7401a. The
trial court also held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude the prosecutor from
presenting evidence that defendant delivered Valium to the victim on retrial.
A second jury trial was held on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. After
the close of the proofs, during jury deliberation, two incidents occurred involving separate jurors.
At separate times during deliberation both Juror 19 and Juror 48 sent notes to the trial court
indicating that they wanted to speak with the court. Details surrounding both communications
and interactions with the trial court are included below in Section V of the opinion. Ultimately
both jurors remained on the jury and the jury convicted defendant. The trial court sentenced him
to a term of 56 to 112 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant first argues that the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional
protections against double jeopardy when it permitted the prosecution to try defendant a second
time on the theory that he administered a drug without consent. In response, the prosecutor
contends that the trial court properly ruled that double jeopardy principles did not prohibit the
prosecution from retrying defendant on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
the theories, force or coercion, MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i), and mental or physical incapacitation,
MCL 750.520b(1)(g). “A double jeopardy issue constitutes a question of law that is reviewed de
novo on appeal.” People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 705; 542 NW2d 921 (1995).
“A person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for a single offense.” People v Mehall,
454 Mich 1, 4; 557 NW2d 110 (1997). This protection is afforded under both the United States
and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy provides three separate protections: “(1) it protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) it protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.” People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).
In recent years, our Supreme Court held that the validity of successive prosecutions under
the Michigan constitution is measured under the federal “same elements test” enunciated in
Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932).1 Nutt, supra at
1
In Nutt, our Supreme Court overruled its decision in People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d
222 (1973), that articulated a “same transaction” test prohibiting serial prosecutions for
completely different crimes if they occurred during a single criminal event. Instead, the Nutt
Court adopted the Blockburger “same elements” test prohibiting serial prosecutions for crimes
sharing identical elements. Nutt, supra at 567-568. The Nutt Court reasoned that the Michigan
Constitution was intended to provide the same double jeopardy protection as the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 596.
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592. The Nutt Court specifically considered what constitutes a “second offense” within the
meaning of the constitutional prohibition. Id. at 575. Nutt concluded that the Blockburger test,
i.e., the “same elements” test, “is the well-established method of defining the Fifth Amendment
term ‘same offence.’” Id. at 576. “‘The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried
for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.’” Id. at 577,
quoting Morey v Commonwealth, 108 Mass 433, 434 (1871).
“In general, the Blockburger test ‘inquires whether each offense contains an element not
contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional
punishment and successive prosecution.’” People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 448; 687 NW2d
119 (2004), quoting United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 696; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556
(1993). The Blockburger “same elements” test “‘focuses on the statutory elements of the
offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied,
notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.’” Nutt, supra
at 576, quoting Iannelli v United States, 420 US 770, 785 n 17; 95 S Ct 1284; 43 L Ed 2d 616
(1975). In other words, under the Blockburger test, a subsequent prosecution for a crime from
the same transaction is not barred as a subsequent prosecution for the “same offense” if
establishing each crime “requires proof of a fact that the other does not.”2 Id.
In this case, although defendant concedes that his double jeopardy protections did not
prohibit the prosecution from trying him again for first-degree CSC under the theory of force or
coercion, MCL 750.520b(1)(f), he asserts that the trial court erred when it permitted the
prosecution to proceed again on the charge of first-degree CSC under the theory of mental or
physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g). Nutt teaches that the double jeopardy analysis
must focus on the statutory elements of the underlying offenses. Nutt, supra at 576. Thus, our
analysis of the issue starts with the elements of the offenses involved.
To prove defendant guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b under
the theory of mental or physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g), the prosecutor must prove
that defendant (1) sexually penetrated the victim, (2) caused personal injury to the victim, and (3)
knew or had reason to know that the victim was mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless. MCL 750.520b(1)(g). Further, MCL 750.520a provides definitions for
“mentally incapable,” “mentally incapacitated,” and “physically helpless.” It states as follows:
(h) “Mentally incapable” means that a person suffers from a mental disease or
defect that renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising
the nature of his or her conduct.
2
In applying the Blockburger test, the Nutt Court held that Oakland County could prosecute a
defendant for possessing stolen firearms, even though she had already been convicted of seconddegree home invasion in Lapeer County, without violating her double jeopardy protections,
because these two crimes did not share the same elements. See Nutt, supra, at 592-593.
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(i) “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily
incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a
narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that person without his or
her consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person without his or her
consent.
***
(l) “Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious, asleep, or for any
other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act. [MCL
750.520a.]
To prove defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance with the intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401a, the prosecutor must prove that defendant (1) delivered
or caused to be delivered a controlled substance to the victim, (2) without the victim’s consent,
(3) to commit or attempt to commit criminal sexual conduct. See MCL 333.7401a.
Again, the double jeopardy analysis must focus on the statutory elements of the
underlying offenses. Nutt, supra at 576. In reviewing the elements of the challenged offenses to
perform the Blockburger “same elements” test, we conclude that the elements that must be
proven for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b under the theory of mental or
physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g), are not identical to those required to prove
defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance with the intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 333.7401a. Establishing the charge of delivery of a controlled substance with the
intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401a, requires a showing that defendant
knowingly delivered a controlled substance to the victim. A careful reading of the elements of
the statutes reveals that there is no similar delivery requirement necessary to establish the charge
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b under the theory of mental or physical
incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g). Instead, all that is necessary is that the defendant took
advantage of a “mentally incapable,” “mentally incapacitated,” or “physically helpless” victim.
In other words, establishing that defendant delivered a controlled substance to the victim
is required to show that he committed the charge of delivery of a controlled substance with the
intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401, but delivery is not required to
establish that defendant committed the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b under the theory of mental or physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g). Thus,
defendant’s subsequent prosecution for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b
under the theory of mental or physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g) is not barred on
double jeopardy grounds based on defendant’s prior prosecution for delivery of a controlled
substance with the intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401.
The plain language of the double jeopardy clause protects individuals from being twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense, not for the same conduct or actions. Nutt, supra at 580. In
this case, defendant was not subjected to successive prosecutions for either the same offense or
the same conduct. Because the two prosecutions punished different conduct and different
offenses arising from that conduct, defendant has not established error.
IV. Collateral Estoppel
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Defendant next argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the prosecution
from presenting evidence that defendant administered a drug without consent. The prosecutor
responds that collateral estoppel did not bar evidence of defendant’s delivery of Valium to the
victim in defendant’s second trial. We review de novo the applicability of collateral estoppel.
Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243 Mich App 28, 34; 620 NW2d 657 (2000).
Collateral estoppel is “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy.” Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 445; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970). In Ashe,
the United States Supreme Court defined collateral estoppel as follows:
“Collateral estoppel” is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely
important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and full judgment,
that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
***
The ultimate question to be determined, then, . . . is whether this established rule
of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else that
constitutional guarantee may embrace, it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to “run the gantlet” a second time. [Id. at 443, 445-446
(citations omitted).]
Ashe requires that, after a thorough search of the record, a reviewing court must determine what
issues a jury must have decided in reaching its verdict. If the jury might not have decided a
specific issue, that issue will not be foreclosed. The reviewing court must decide whether a jury
could have based its decision on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to preclude
from consideration. Ashe, supra at 444. “The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and
viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation omitted.)
Our Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ollateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue
in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties where the prior proceeding
culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was (1) actually litigated, and (2) necessarily
determined.” People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 154; 452 NW2d 627 (1990). Gates counsels that
in analyzing whether an issue was “actually litigated” in a prior proceeding, this Court must
consider “whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue.” Id. at 156-157. Moreover, an issue is “necessarily determined”
in a previous proceeding “only if it is ‘essential’ to the judgment.” Id. at 158, quoting 1
Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 27, p 250, comment h, p 258. “The inability of a court to
determine upon what basis an acquitting jury reached its verdict, is, by itself, enough to preclude
the defense of collateral estoppel.” Id.
Here, defendant argues in particular that the collateral estoppel should have operated to
preclude the prosecution from presenting evidence at the second trial that he administered a drug
without consent to the victim for the reason that he was acquitted of the charge of delivery of a
controlled substance with the intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401, at his
first trial. But after reviewing the record, we conclude that the jury could have based its acquittal
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decision on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to preclude from consideration.
Ashe, supra at 444. In fact, our review of the record reveals that the jury could have reasonably
based its acquittal on more than one basis, not simply on the general factual conclusion that
defendant did not administer a drug without consent to the victim. Gates, supra at 158.
To prove defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance with the intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401a, the prosecutor must prove that defendant (1) delivered
or caused to be delivered a controlled substance to the victim, (2) without the victim’s consent,
(3) to commit or attempt to commit criminal sexual conduct. See MCL 333.7401a. Regarding
the first element, the jury could have believed, based on the proofs, that the substance defendant
injected the victim with was not Valium and therefore was not a controlled substance as required
by the statute. The jury could have believed that defendant injected the victim with Phenergan as
prescribed by Dr. Holbert and that Valium was found in the victim’s blood because she had
ingested Valium in pill form of her own volition. Regarding the second element, a rational jury
could have believed that the victim actually “consented” to the injection when she permitted
defendant to inject her with medication after Dr. Holbert prescribed her Phenergan to settle her
nausea. Finally, regarding the third element, under the circumstances of this case the jury could
reasonably have concluded that at the time defendant injected the victim arguably with Valium,
he did not actually intend to commit first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Instead, the jury could
have concluded that defendant did not intend to commit any crime at the moment of injection
and only later decided to commit a crime after the victim was rendered unconscious. Or, the jury
could have concluded that at the time defendant injected the victim he intended to commit a
crime, but a crime less than first-degree criminal sexual conduct, e.g. something less than
penetration such as only removing the victim’s underwear. Again, “[t]he inability of a court to
determine upon what basis an acquitting jury reached its verdict, is, by itself, enough to preclude
the defense of collateral estoppel.” Gates, supra at 158. Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
did not bar evidence of defendant’s delivery of Valium to the victim in defendant’s second trial.3
V.
Juror Communications
3
As an alternative basis for affirmance, the prosecution argues that defendant’s retrial in this
matter based on the same felony information is not a “subsequent, different cause of action”
within the meaning of collateral estoppel and thus collateral estoppel should not apply in this
context. In support of its argument, the prosecutor cites People v Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 127;
379 NW2d 49 (1985), for the proposition that hung jury mistrials have consistently been
considered as nullities and subsequent retrials have been determined to be nothing more than a
continuation of the same case. While we find this argument interesting in that it involves the
most basic tenet of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we decline to address it in light of our
resolution of the issue. Though were we to address it, it would ultimately fail because the United
States Supreme Court has specifically found that collateral estoppel applies in the criminal
context because it is “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.”
Ashe, supra at 445.
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A. Juror 19
Defendant asserts that the trial court violated the MCR 6.414(B) and denied him a fair
trial by engaging in an ex parte communication with Juror 19. “A trial court has wide, but not
unlimited, discretion and power in the matter of trial conduct.” People v Paquette, 214 Mich
App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). “A trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial
impartiality where its conduct or comments unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive the
defendant of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. We review the record as a whole and place the
court’s comments in context to determine if defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. Further, a trial
judge’s general conduct of a trial is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. See People v
Cole, 349 Mich 175, 200; 84 NW2d 711 (1957); In re King, 186 Mich App 458, 466; 465 NW2d
1 (1990). A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that does not fall within
the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666
NW2d 231 (2003). MCR 6.414(B) governs the trial court’s responsibilities when conducting a
jury trial. It provides as follows:
The trial court must control the proceedings during trial, limit the evidence and
arguments to relevant and proper matters, and take appropriate steps to ensure that
the jurors will not be exposed to information or influences that might affect their
ability to render an impartial verdict on the evidence presented in court. The
court may not communicate with the jury or any juror pertaining to the case
without notifying the parties and permitting them to be present. The court must
ensure that all communications pertaining to the case between the court and the
jury or any juror are made a part of the record. [MCR 6.414(B).]
The record reveals that at the end of the second day of the jury’s deliberations, the trial
court excused all of the jurors for the day except for Juror 19. The trial court stated that it had
received a message from the bailiff communicating that Juror 19 wanted to talk to the court and
attorneys. The trial court warned Juror 19 not to disclose anything about deliberations. Juror 19
indicated that she did not want to “do this in front of everybody.” Juror 19 also indicated that
she did not want to speak in front of counsel. Apparently the trial court then talked with defense
counsel and the prosecutor outside of Juror 19’s presence and off the record. The trial court then
spoke to Juror 19 in open court on the record stating:
THE COURT: Okay. Juror 19, I’ve talked with the attorneys. I have one
of two choices for you. One, clear everybody out of the courtroom and we would
be on the record, but it will just be us here. Or, alternatively, that we step aside –
you and I step aside and you can just, without getting into any detail, just give me
the nature of the issue.
JUROR NUMBER 19: I’d prefer that.
THE COURT: Okay.
(At 4:56 p.m., off record)
(At 5:01 p.m., on record)
THE COURT: You can just come right back up here, if you would?
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***
THE COURT: Okay. I have had a brief discussion with Juror Number
19, and I’m going to give her an instruction, part of the instructions, and I’m not
going to remove her from the jury. She’ll remain on the jury, and she’ll continue
deliberations.
The record reflects that the trial court did not remove the juror and instead reinstructed her by
rereading a portion of CJI2d 3.11, Deliberations and Verdict. The trial court then excused Juror
19 for the day.
After Juror 19 left the courtroom, the trial court gave the parties an opportunity to make a
record. The prosecutor had nothing for the record. Defense counsel then stated:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Just briefly, your Honor, and I 100 percent
appreciate the court’s – the delicate position that the court is in with a request like
that, but I owe it to my client to simply point out that according to MCR
6.414(A), [sic] under the subheading court’s responsibility, and really, I guess, the
last two or three full sentences, is what the pertinent part is for our discussion
here.
Defense counsel then read the relevant portion of MCR 6.414(B) into the record. The following
exchange then took place.
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Samouris, didn’t we just agree that we would –
that I would follow the procedure that I just did?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Actually, your Honor, what I thought was
happening when I asked if the court was going to make a record, and my
interpretation was the court was – determined it was not going to make a record of
it. I guess –
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Samouris, I want to be clear here.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Okay.
THE COURT: We stepped out in the – into the corridor and we discussed
this. I believe I did exactly what we discussed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe you did do exactly what we discussed,
but I guess what I’m –
THE COURT: And I thought that you agreed to that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I guess my interpretation was you were telling us
what you were going to do, and okay, that’s – and I’m not going to quarrel with
the court. And then after reading this court rule, even if we did agree to that, can
we agree to something that can’t be done?
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THE COURT: Well, Mr. Samouris, let me – let me understand this. Are
you saying that I did something different than we agreed to?
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
What I’m saying is, your Honor, my
interpretation of the discussion was more along the lines of this is how we’re
going to handle it. And you were right, I did not voice any strenuous objection.
And then I consulted the court rule while we were doing this –
THE COURT: Did you get – before I – before I met with the jury, [sic]
did you state that you disagreed with that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: My exact wording, your Honor, was I specifically
remember asking if a record was going to be made. And I think in all fairness
there was discussion, but I think we need to know what this juror says after the
fact. And it’s almost like a subject matter of jurisdiction argument.
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Samouris, I will tell you, I’m exceedingly
disappointed in you. I gave you an opportunity, we came in here, I explained to
Juror Number 19 the two options we discussed, she chose one, so far as I can tell,
you never braced an objection to that at all.
Now after it’s done, you come in and you try to say that – I don’t know
what – I don’t even know what you’re saying here.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What I’m –
THE COURT: Apparently you’re not saying that you disagreed with it.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What I’m saying is, your Honor, I think we need
to know what was said, that’s all, between you and the juror.
And even if – for the sake of the argument, say, that my lack of objection
could be construed as some sort of complied [sic] consent, so be it. But I cannot
imply the consent –
THE COURT: Well, certainly I wouldn’t have done it if I didn’t think I
had your consent.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, your Honor, it’s not like I walk around with
MCR 6.44 [sic] and memorize it off the top of my head. As we were sitting here,
there was a few minutes lag, I consulted with the court rule, and I think – said to
myself, well, gee, I guess I owe it to my client to place this on the record.
And I appreciate the court’s position. It’s a very delicate position with a
request like that. And I – and I personally have no problem with the way the
court handled it. I’ll even state that for the record.
But if the court rules says there’s got to either be a record of it, or we’ve
got to be present, then do I bury my head in the sand and not address that?
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I think I owe it to my client to at least put that on the record. Fine, maybe
I should have objected. Maybe that’s my mistake. Maybe that’s something.
I guess the only thing I can say is, short of that, I think the court handled it
fine, and I think we – since a record wasn’t made, I think a record could be made
now of just the nature of the discussion this Honorable Court and Juror Number
19.
THE COURT: I have absolutely no problem at all doing that.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you.
THE COURT: But the idea that what I did was not what we had
discussed, and what I understood that we’d agreed on, and that you raised that
after the fact, is very disappointing to me, because I think I did exactly what we
agreed upon. And you were certainly here with [sic] Juror Number 19 asked to
speak privately. I understood that was part of the agreement, and that’s what we
did. And after the fact that you come in and try to say, well, now you want to
object afterwards, I think, as I said, is very disappointing to me.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Again, your Honor, for the record, I’m not
necessarily objecting, or even quarrelling with the court the way it handled it. I’m
just simply rereading the court rule, and I would just respectfully request that we
just know the nature of the discussion. That’s all.
THE COURT: I’ll be happy to tell you. She said that there was –
basically that there are issues among the jurors. She did not get into detail with
me. I refused to let her get into any detail with me. In fact, she did not try to get
into any detail with me. But she asked to be excused. I told her that I was not
going to excuse her as a juror. And she is going to have to come back. It was not
a basis for being excused, and she was going to have to come back and deliberate.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.
At the outset of the next day, the trial court stated that it wanted to revisit the issue of
Juror 19 by offering a summary of what had occurred and also allowing counsel another
opportunity to speak on the record.
THE COURT:
process as I saw it.
And I would just simply start by going through that
The jurors were in the courtroom at the end of the day, to give them the
following instructions not to discuss this with anyone, and tell them what time to
be here this morning. And [the bailiff] gave me a note, which he had drafted,
saying that Juror Number 19 wanted to talk with me. When the jurors left, I asked
Juror Number 19 to stay, and I showed the note to Mr. Sanford and Mr. Samouris.
-11-
I considered this to be an administrative matter, to try to figure out what
Juror 19 wanted to talk about.
Juror 19 seemed to be – seemed not to be willing to talk in the courtroom
in the way with everyone here. That created a practical problem as to how to
proceed. I decided I did not want to have Juror 19 removed from the courtroom at
that point, thought that might further isolate her, so I asked counsel to join me in –
outside the courtroom in the hallway. Of course, that was not on the record. For
that, any criticism of that, of course, should be directed to me, because that was
my decision.
Following our discussion, we returned to the courtroom. I posed two
alternatives to Juror 19, one, I could remove everyone from the courtroom other
than counsel and she could give me – say to me what she wanted, or,
alternatively, I told her that she and I could go into – I could go off into – meet in
private, I forget exactly how I phrased it. She chose the second alternative.
Again, I considered this an administrative matter to try to understand what
the issue was, and the jury – Juror Number 19 had.
We did discuss of [sic] the record. [The bailiff], our court officer, found a
vacant jury deliberation room, and we sat in there for a few minutes to – so I
could understand what the issue was.
I mentioned, when we came back, she apparently had some difficulty with
a juror, or I’m not sure who all it was, we didn’t get into anything beyond that,
and she asked to be removed.
Came back in the courtroom, I gave her instructions that – the standard
jury instruction 3.11, which I’d previously given to them, and I also – and which
was also in the written instructions, which they have and took into the courtroom
with them.
And I told her that I would not remove her and that she was to begin
deliberations.
With that, as I mentioned, I considered this an administrative matter.
***
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have nothing to ad your Honor, just, again, I
truly thought when we talked off the record the court was simply advising what
the court was going to do, and that as a courtesy was telling us ahead of time, and
perhaps was even offering our input. And that’s how I interpreted that. And I just
felt I had no choice to bring up what I brought up. That’s all.
THE COURT: Okay.
-12-
We have scrutinized the lengthy and complicated exchanges between the trial court and
defense counsel regarding the handling of the Juror 19 issue. It appears that defense counsel
initially approved the procedure agreed on by the trial court and the parties off the record, then
later apparently withdrew his approval after reading MCR 6.414(B) though not actually placing
an objection on the record, then after further discussion, again provided express approval to the
procedure stating he had “no problem with the way the court handled it.” Under these
circumstances it is impossible to determine whether defense counsel acquiesced to the procedure
used by the trial court by expressly approving it or forfeited any error by never placing a clear
and definite objection to the procedure on the record.
If we consider defense counsel’s behavior as acquiescence, then defendant has waived
appellate review of this issue. A party may not acquiesce to the trial court’s handling of an issue
only to challenge the ruling on appeal as error. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583
NW2d 199 (1998). Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (citations omitted). Where a
defendant’s counsel affirmatively acquiesces to the court’s handling of a jury’s request, the
defendant waives appellate review of any error. Id. at 216; Fetterley, supra at 519-520. Waiver
precludes appellate review because any error has been extinguished. Carter, supra at 216.
If we consider defense counsel’s behavior as forfeiture, forfeited issues do not extinguish
error and are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To ensure fairness, we will review the issue for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. But, in doing so, we are cognizant that a party
cannot claim error requiring reversal based on a ruling to which he contributed by plan or
negligence. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 224; 663 NW2d 499 (2003).
A trial court may not communicate with a deliberating jury without notifying the parties
and permitting them to be present. MCR 6.414(B). “The court must ensure that all
communications pertaining to the case between the court and jury or any juror are made part of
the record.” MCR 6.414(B). Here, before communicating with Juror 19, the trial court notified
the parties and offered alternative methods of dealing with the issue. One of the options included
allowing counsel to be present and have any interaction with Juror 19 recorded in the court
record. Thus, by offering that alternative and later twice making a detailed record of its
communication with Juror 19, arguably, the trial court was in compliance with MCR 6.414(B)
and defendant has not shown error affecting his substantial rights.
Even if we consider the trial court not in compliance with MCR 6.414(B), a violation of
this rule does not require automatic reversal. People v France, 436 Mich 138, 142-143; 461
NW2d 621 (1990). In France, our Supreme Court defined three types of communication:
Substantive communication encompasses supplemental instructions on the law
given by the trial court to a deliberating jury. A substantive communication
carries a presumption of prejudice in favor of the aggrieved party regardless of
whether an objection was raised. The presumption may only be rebutted by a
firm and definite showing of an absence of prejudice.
Administrative communications include instructions regarding availability of
certain pieces of evidence and instructions that encourage a jury to continue its
-13-
deliberations. An administrative communication carries no presumption. The
failure to object when made aware of the communication will be taken as
evidence that the administrative instruction was not prejudicial.
***
Housekeeping communications are those which occur between a jury and court
officer regarding meal orders, rest room facilities, or other matters consistent with
general “housekeeping” needs that are unrelated in any way to the case being
decided. A housekeeping communication carries a presumption of no prejudice.
[Id. at 142-144.]
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court’s communication with Juror
19 falls within the classification of administrative communications and does not require
automatic reversal. France, supra at 142-144. The record reveals that the communication was
brief, the trial court and Juror 19 did not discuss anything related to deliberations or that would
prejudice defendant, and the trial court thoroughly described the communication on the record.
Juror 19 simply communicated that there were issues among the jurors and that she was having
difficulty with an unidentified juror. For this reason Juror 19 requested to be removed, but the
trial court denied her request finding that the situation was not a basis for excusing her from the
jury. The trial court then reinstructed her and encouraged her to return to deliberations the
following day.
We conclude that the brief and non-substantive communication was
administrative in nature, and defendant has not shown plain error affecting his substantial rights.
Id.
B. Juror 48
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
mistrial based on jury misconduct. We review the denial of a motion for mistrial based on juror
misconduct for an abuse of discretion. People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 175; 561 NW2d
463 (1997). Again, a trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that does not fall
within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Babcock, supra at 269.
On the third day of jury deliberations, the trial court received a note from Juror 48. The
trial court showed the note to counsel and read the note into the record:
I need to speak to the judge urgently. I feel un-useful as a juror, and feel it is – it
is best served if I’m replaced – by an alternate, somebody who can be better
served by an outcome of this case, period. Thank you. Number 48[.]
The trial court and parties discussed the note, and with the parties’ agreement, Juror 48 was
brought into the courtroom. The trial court advised the juror not to say anything related to the
status of deliberations, and then asked her of there was anything she wanted to say. Juror 48
stated, “[t]hey told me they’re going to send me to the psych ward.” The trial court again
cautioned Juror 48 not to say anything about jury deliberations. Juror 48 responded and the
following exchange took place on the record:
-14-
JUROR NUMBER 48: No, that’s – it’s not that. I’m impossible, I guess,
to the others.
THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you for a minute. The –
JUROR NUMBER 48:
different.
Not to do with where we’re at.
It’s totally
THE COURT: You mean totally unrelated to the deliberations?
JUROR NUMBER 48: Yes. Thank you.
THE COURT: So it is strictly a personality kind of issue? Would that be
fair?
JUROR NUMBER 48: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
JUROR NUMBER 48: And I think they’re right. I hated to have wasted
anyone’s time, but I think they’re right.
THE COURT: Are you saying that in good conscience that you cannot
deliberate with the others? Or what are you saying?
JUROR NUMBER 48: They had me read the note to everyone before it
could be sent, and that caused an outburst, yes. Knowing how they feel about me,
even as a person, I don’t think I’m best served to be open minded.
I knew my personality clashed with the majority. I am by far younger,
you know, I have a different perspective on things. But it didn’t make a
difference to me, because I am an open-minded person, which is what I thought
was needed.
THE COURT: So it does have something to do with your views about this
case. And, again, I want to tell you, do not, in any way, tell me what those views
are.
JUROR NUMBER 48: I can’t answer that with a yes or no.
The trial court then asked if counsel had any questions for Juror 48. Defense counsel
then questioned the juror as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you feel you’re being intimidated?
JUROR NUMBER 48: Yes.
-15-
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And do you feel that the criticisms are personal in
nature as opposed to any objective, constructive, well, look, why don’t you try to
see it our way? I mean, is it just nasty in there, or what?
JUROR NUMBER 48: I guess (indistinct) statement for this to explain it,
but since I am the most outspoken, I am the one that people come to me and say,
why don’t you say this, why don’t you say that, because they don’t. And because
I am the only one that says all of it. I’m the target now.
***
I feel I am being very juvenile right now, and that’s not my goal. I’m just
an emotional person.
***
And I’m under attack by complete strangers in places they shouldn’t be to
do with this case, that’s personal.
Juror 48 left the courtroom and defense counsel immediately stated that Juror 48 had just
described jury misconduct. Defense counsel said it would not be appropriate to bring an
alternate in because of jury misconduct and made a motion for a mistrial based on jury
misconduct. The prosecutor stated that he was not opposed to having Juror 48 excused. Counsel
and the trial court continued to discuss the merits of replacing Juror 48. Ultimately, the trial
court concluded:
THE COURT: I have to say I’m very reluctant to replace her.
Well unless one of you, or both of you, tell me that you ask her to be
replaced, and so far I’ve not heard that from either one of you, I’m going to bring
her back in and ask her to continue to try. If she convinces me that she cannot
continue to try, then I’ll again consider replacing her. But otherwise, that would
be my inclination.
I do not know what it’s like in that jury room. She does. It sounds like it is
not an inviting place for her. But by the same token, we’ve got 12 different
people, and these things are difficult.
So, my inclination at this point will be to bring her back in, give her my
thoughts, and ask her to continue. If she simply – if I find that she simply cannot
do that then we will – I’ll talk to you again.
The prosecutor stated that it was a “reasonable course.” Defense counsel stated, “[t]hat’s
fine, your Honor. I mean, for the record, we moved for a mistrial, and that’s been noted for the
record. But I have no objection to how, you know, short of that, how the court wishes to
proceed, and that’s probably the most prudent course.”
The trial court brought Juror 48 brought back into the courtroom the following discussion
took place:
-16-
THE COURT: Welcome back, Juror 48. I’ve given thought to this issue.
I will tell you that I’ve [sic] very, very reluctant to remove you at this time. And I
want to ask you, if I do not remove you, can you at least try to continue to
participate as a juror?
***
JUROR NUMBER 48: It’s hard to be a juror when I’m told not to speak.
Can you understand that?
THE COURT: I can understand that.
JUROR NUMBER 48: Okay.
THE COURT: But what I need to know from you is – I guess the most
important thing is that you understand that you have your own vote as a juror.
And the critical question is whether you will vote your vote based on your own
decision?
JUROR NUMBER 48: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Having said that, I’m going to ask you to continue
to serve. I know it’s not easy.
JUROR NUMBER 48: I didn’t think it would be.
THE COURT: But I’m going to ask that you continue to serve, and I’m
going to read to you an instruction, which I gave before. It’s part of the jury
instructions you have.
JUROR NUMBER 48: Can I just ask something? And if it’s
inappropriate, just cut me off, because I don’t know. But if there are jurors who
have that handbook you’re going to read, and they’re deliberately going against it,
then what do you do?
THE COURT: Well, okay. I will – what I’ll do is I will not read this to
you.
JUROR NUMBER 48: Okay.
THE COURT: I’ll read it when everybody comes in so everybody hears
it.
JUROR NUMBER 48: Okay
THE COURT: Okay? With that, do you think you can continue? I’m not
asking you if it’s easy, I just asking if you can?
JUROR NUMBER 48: I’m going to give it my 110.
-17-
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.
After Juror 48 left the courtroom, the trial court indicated that it would read CJ2d 3.11 to
the entire jury. Neither party objected. Defense counsel then made another motion for mistrial
stating:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Just for the record, and I’ll be brief.
In light of what Juror Number 48 just said, with specific reference to
jurors who have, in her words, who have taken that handbook and are purposely
acting contrary to that handbook, again, that’s jury misconduct. I owe it to my
client to make a motion for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Okay. She did say that she would vote as a juror in
accordance with what she believed the verdict should be that’s what I understood
her to say.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I agree, your Honor. It sounds like she – it
sounds like she was describing a problem with at least some of the other 11.
***
My motion is noted for the record.
The trial judge read CJI2d 3.11 to the jury. Later that afternoon, the jury sent a message
to the court stating, “Judge, we are not able to reach a unanimous verdict.” In response, the
prosecutor suggested reading the hung jury instruction to the jury. Defense counsel agreed that
reading the hung jury instruction was a reasonable request but stated that it would rather the trial
court declare a hung jury and a mistrial. The trial court decided to give CJI2d 3.12, finding that a
possibility existed that more deliberations would be worthwhile. After giving the instruction, the
trial court excused the jury for the day. The next day, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The trial court polled the jurors and when asked, “[I]s this
and was this your verdict?,” all of the jurors including both Juror 19 and Juror 48 responded
affirmatively.
On appeal, defendant argues that in light of the fact that Juror 48 indicated that the other
jurors were intimidating her and not following instructions, the trial court erroneously failed to
make any further inquiry and erred when it denied defendant’s motion for mistrial. A denial of a
mistrial based on juror misconduct is an abuse of discretion only if the misconduct was such that
it affirmatively affected the impartiality of the jury or disqualified its members from exercising
the powers of reason and judgment. Messenger, supra at 175. A new trial will be denied if no
substantial harm was done to the defendant, even if the misconduct merits a rebuke from the trial
court if brought to its notice. Fetterley, supra at 545. Prejudice must be shown, or facts clearly
establishing the inference that it occurred from what was said or done. Id.
After receiving the note from Juror 48, the trial court promptly investigated the matter by
questioning the juror on the record and allowing counsel to question the juror. Juror 48 revealed
that she was “emotional” and felt intimidated, but very clearly told the trial court that issues with
-18-
the other jurors concerned personality clashes “totally unrelated to the deliberations.” The trial
court specifically asked Juror 48 a critical searching question: “will you vote your vote based on
your own decision?” Juror 48 answered in the affirmative. The trial court also questioned Juror
48 regarding whether she felt she could continue deliberating with the rest of the jury and again,
she responded affirmatively. At this point, the trial court determined that Juror 48 could render a
fair and impartial verdict based on her own decision. After reviewing the record, we conclude
that defendant has not displayed that the circumstances surrounding Juror 48 affected the
impartiality of the jury or disqualified her from exercising her own powers of reason and
judgment. Messenger, supra at 175. Further supporting our conclusion was the fact that, post
verdict, Juror 48 represented during jury polling that the jury verdict “is” and “was” her own
verdict. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision not to grant a mistrial based on Juror 48’s
situation was not an abuse of discretion.
Juror 48 also revealed that another unidentified juror might have been deliberately acting
in contravention to the jury instructions during deliberations. The trial court took the
information seriously, discussed it with counsel, and then decided to immediately reinstruct the
entire jury. The trial court’s instruction reinforced that all jurors were required to follow the
court’s instructions and consider the opinions of the other jurors during deliberations. After the
trial court reinstructed the jury by reading from CJI2d 3.11, there was never any expression of
dissension or intimidation raised by Juror 48, Juror 19, or any other juror during the remainder of
the deliberation period. “It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). The record displays
that the trial court carefully and reasonably handled the problem. Under the circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when, after conducting an inquiry into the situation, it
elected to instruct the jury consistent with CJI2d 3.11 in lieu of granting a mistrial. Defendant
has not shown substantial harm as a result of the situation, thus a mistrial was not warranted.
Fetterley, supra at 545.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court properly ruled that double jeopardy principles did not prohibit the
prosecution from retrying defendant on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
the theory of mental or physical incapacitation, MCL 750.520b(1)(g). The doctrine of collateral
estoppel did not bar evidence of defendant’s delivery of Valium to the victim in defendant’s
second trial. The trial court’s brief and non-substantive administrative communication with
Juror 19 did not result in plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Finally, defendant
has not displayed that the trial court’s handling of the situation involving Juror 48 or her report
of the unidentified juror not following jury instructions, resulted in substantial harm to defendant
and thus a mistrial was not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
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