ACI HOLDINGS INC V TOWNSHIP OF SYLVAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ACI HOLDINGS, INC., f/k/a ARCTIC
COLISEUM, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2008
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 278263
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-321886
TOWNSHIP OF SYLVAN,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and O’Connell and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this property tax dispute involving tax years 2001 through 2004, petitioner ACI
Holdings, Inc. appeals as of right from the Tax Tribunal’s order granting respondent Sylvan
Township’s motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
A. Tax Years 2001 and 2002
ACI Holdings owns property used for the operation of an ice arena. In a Tax Tribunal
case concerning tax years 2001 and 2002, the Tax Tribunal entered a consent judgment that set
property tax values for each year. The assessed and taxable values for 2001 were left at
$3,879,100 and $3,370,600, respectively, while the assessed and taxable values for 2002 were
each reduced to $2,493,700. The true cash value of the property was set at $7,758,200 for 2001
and $4,987,400 for 2002.
B. Tax Year 2003
It appears undisputed that ACI Holdings did not protest the assessment for the property
for tax year 2003 to the Township’s board of review. The assessed value for 2003 was
$4,525,900 and the taxable value was $3,421,159.
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C. Tax Year 2004
In a case filed in the Tax Tribunal concerning tax year 2004, the Tax Tribunal entered a
consent judgment that set the revised and assessed taxable values at $1,450,000 each. The true
cash value of the property was set at $2,900,000.
D. ACI Holdings’ Petition
In April 2006, ACI Holdings filed the instant action in the Tax Tribunal, alleging that the
assessed values for tax years 2001 through 2004 were excessive. In Count I, ACI Holdings
sought damages and equitable relief based on allegations that the Township engaged in fraud or
constructive fraud by only using a cost approach to determine the true cash value of the property
In Count II, ACI Holdings sought damages and other relief under MCL 211.53a based on
allegations that there was a mutual mistake of fact with respect to the true cash value of the
property “as well as the legality of the inflated tax assessments.”
The Township sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (7), and (10),
arguing that the consent judgments for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004 barred ACI Holdings’
challenge to the property values for those years based on collateral estoppel. The Township also
argued that Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the fraud count challenging the tax assessment
for 2003 and that the fraud claim was also barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, the
Township argued that any claim predicated on MCL 211.53a failed because there was no mutual
mistake of fact. On May 3, 2007, the Tax Tribunal entered an opinion and order granting the
Township’s motion for summary disposition.
ACI Holdings now appeals.
II. Summary Disposition
A. Standard Of Review
ACI Holdings challenges the Tax Tribunal’s grant of the Township’s motion for
summary disposition. ACI Holdings argues that summary disposition was premature because it
was granted before the completion of discovery, and that the Tax Tribunal applied wrong legal
principles in granting the motion. This Court’s review of Tax Tribunal decisions in cases
involving property tax disputes is limited.1 “In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption
of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the
administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.”2 “‘All
1
City of Mt Pleasant v State Tax Comm, 477 Mich 50, 53; 729 NW2d 833 (2007).
2
Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
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factual findings are final if supported by competent and substantial evidence.’”3 We review de
novo issues of statutory construction.4
B. Applying The Court Rules
Pursuant to the Tax Tribunal rules, the Michigan Court Rules apply where there is no
applicable tribunal rule.5 Because there is no applicable tribunal rule governing summary
disposition motions, the Tax Tribunal appropriately applied MCR 2.116 when deciding this
matter.
C. Discovery
Generally, summary disposition is premature if it is granted before discovery on a
disputed issue is complete.6 However, the mere fact that the discovery period remains open does
not automatically mean that the court’s decision to grant summary disposition was untimely or
otherwise inappropriate. “If a party opposes a motion for summary disposition on the ground
that discovery is incomplete, the party must at least assert that a dispute does indeed exist and
support that allegation by some independent evidence.”7 The relevant question is whether
further discovery stands a fair chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing party’s
position.8
Here, ACI Holdings failed to show that summary disposition was premature with respect
to either the fraud or mutual mistake counts in its petition. The Township presented no affidavit
or other evidence showing a need for discovery to resolve the issues raised in the Township’s
motion for summary disposition to the Tax Tribunal. Further, the pleadings and documentary
evidence submitted to the tribunal in connection with the Township’s motion for summary
disposition reveal that summary disposition was properly granted.
3
City of Mt Pleasant, supra at 53, quoting Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v Holland,
437 Mich 473, 482; 473 NW2d 636 (1991).
4
Id.
5
TTR 205.1111(4); see also Signature Villas, LLC v Ann Arbor, 269 Mich App 694, 705-706;
714 NW2d 392 (2006).
6
Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 566; 618 NW2d 23 (2000).
7
Bellows v Delaware McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d 707 (1994); see
also MCR 2.116(H)(1) (“A party may show by affidavit that the facts necessary to support the
party's position cannot be presented because the facts are known only to persons whose affidavits
the party cannot procure.”); Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 570; 719 NW2d 73 (2006)
(concluding that the plaintiffs could not complain that summary disposition was premature
because they did not offer the required MCR 2.116(H) affidavits, with the probable testimony to
support their contentions).
8
Village of Dimondale, supra at 566.
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D. The Fraud Claim
(1) Legal Standards
With respect to ACI Holdings’ fraud claim involving tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004, we
agree with the Tax Tribunal that the prior consent judgments entitled the Township to summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Summary disposition is appropriate under this rule if a
“claim is barred because of release, payment, prior judgment, immunity granted by law, [or]
statute of limitations[.]”9 All documentary evidence submitted by the parties is considered, to
the extent that the substance or content would be admissible as evidence, to determine if there is
a genuine issue of material fact.10 The contents of the petition are accepted as true unless
contradicted by affidavits or other documentary evidence.11 If there is no material factual
dispute, the question whether a claim is barred may be decided as a question of law.12
(2) The Tax Tribunal’s Treatment Of ACI Holdings’ Petition
A threshold issue in this case is whether the Tax Tribunal appropriately treated ACI
Holdings’ claim, in substance, as an appeal of the property assessments for tax years 2001, 2002,
and 2004. This is so because the Tax Tribunal is a quasi-judicial agency of limited jurisdiction,
whose primary function is to find facts and review decisions of agencies within its jurisdiction.13
Former law permitted a taxpayer to seek relief from a tax assessment in a judicial forum based
on fraud.14 Examples of fraud include intentional overassessments and the use of a valuation
method that does not determine true cash values.15
“A valuation is necessarily fraudulent where it is so unreasonable that the assessor
must have known that it was wrong. If the valuation is purposely made too high
through prejudice or a reckless disregard of duty in opposition to what must
necessarily be the judgment of all competent persons, or through the adoption of a
rule which is designed to operate unequally upon a class and to violate the
constitutional rule of uniformity, the case is a plain one for the equitable remedy
by injunction.”[16]
9
MCR 2.116(C)(7).
10
Watts v Polaczyk, 242 Mich App 600, 603; 619 NW2d 714 (2000); see also MCR 2.116(G)(5)
and (6).
11
Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 419; 684 NW2d 864 (2004).
12
Huron Tool & Engineering Co v Precision Consulting Services, Inc, 209 Mich App 365, 377;
532 NW2d 541 (1995).
13
Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617, 629; 322 NW2d 103 (1982); Perry v Vernon Twp, 158 Mich
App 388, 390; 404 NW2d 755 (1987); see also MCL 205.721 and MCL 205.731.
14
See City of Birmingham v Oakland Co Supervisors, 276 Mich 1; 268 NW 409 (1936).
15
Helin v Grosse Pointe Twp, 329 Mich 396, 407; 45 NW2d 338 (1951).
16
Id. at 406-407, quoting 4 Cooley on Taxation (4th ed), § 1645.
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However, the Tax Tribunal Act17 provides for the Tax Tribunal to make an independent
determination of the true cash value of property.18 “The Tax Tribunal is not bound to accept the
parties’ theories of valuation. It may accept one theory and reject the other, it may reject both
theories, or it may utilize a combination of both in arriving at its determination of true cash
value.”19 Regardless of the approach used, the value must represent the usual price for which the
property would sell.20
The Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction is set forth in MCL 205.731, which provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all of the
following:
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling,
determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates,
special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this
state.
(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the
property tax laws of this state.
The Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction depends on whether the petitioner is contesting the
legality of the tax bills received, as determined by a consideration of the relief sought and the
underlying basis of the action.21 The Tax Tribunal’s powers include, but are not limited to:
(a) Affirming, reversing, modifying, or remanding a final decision,
finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency.
(b) Ordering the payment or refund of taxes in a matter of which it may
acquire jurisdiction.
17
MCL 205.701 et seq.
18
MCL 205.735(2). See also Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379,
389; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). We note that Tax Tribunal proceedings commenced after
December 31, 2006, are now governed by MCL 205.735a. But because ACI Holdings
commenced this matter in April 2006, MCL 205.735 applies. In any event, both statutes provide
that a proceeding before the Tax Tribunal is original and independent and is to be considered de
novo.
19
Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp, supra at 389-390.
20
Id. at 390; see MCL 211.27.
21
See Colonial Village Townhouse Coop v Riverview, 142 Mich App 474, 478; 370 NW2d 25
(1985).
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(c) Granting other relief or issuing writs, orders, or directives which it
deems necessary or appropriate in the process of disposition of a matter of which
it may acquire jurisdiction.[22]
Although the Tax Tribunal is empowered to grant “other relief” in a matter where it may
acquire jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 205.732(c), it does not have judicial power, such as the
power to hear class actions,23 the power to order an injunction,24 or other equitable powers.25
Here, the essence of ACI Holdings’ fraud count is that the true cash value of the subject property
for each tax year was set too high. But ACI Holdings couched its claim in terms of the test for
fraud applicable in judicial proceedings before the Tax Tribunal Act was enacted and sought
damages beyond a mere refund of overpaid taxes. ACI Holdings alleged that the excessive tax
assessment caused it to default on covenants in loan documents, which led to the foreclosure of
the property and its business to fold. To the extent that ACI Holdings’ fraud claim seeks
damages for tortious conduct, the Tax Tribunal lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the
claim, because common-law tort claims fall outside the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction.26
However, to the extent that ACI Holdings’ claim, though couched as fraud, constituted a
challenge to the legality of the property tax assessment for the applicable tax years, we conclude
that the Tax Tribunal correctly treated the claim as an appeal. Pursuant to MCL 205.731, the
Tax Tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction to review tax assessments.
Examined in this context, we conclude that the Tax Tribunal’s application of MCL
205.745 to the prior consent judgments entered in the Tax Tribunal for tax years 2001, 2002, and
2004 was not erroneous. Although the Township relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel in
its motion for summary disposition, the Township asserted the prior consent judgments as an
affirmative defense in its answer to the petition, and its motion for summary disposition was
predicated on the existence of the prior consent judgments. An adjudicative tribunal, like a
court, is empowered to go beyond issues raised and address any issue that, in its opinion, justice
requires be considered and resolved.27 We note that if ACI Holdings believed that the Tax
Tribunal misapplied MCL 205.745, it could have moved for rehearing or reconsideration, as
permitted by the Tax Tribunal’s rule TTR 205.1288.
Further, we conclude that the Tax tribunal did not err in its application of MCL 205.745
to this case. In general, the doctrine of res judicata applies to consent judgments in civil
22
MCL 205.732.
23
Perry, supra at 391.
24
Wikman, supra at 647.
25
Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346, 359; 411 NW2d 169 (1987).
26
Highland-Howell Dev Co, LLC v Marion Twp, 469 Mich 673, 678; 677 NW2d 810 (2004).
27
Paschke v Retool Industries (On Rehearing), 198 Mich App 702, 705-706; 499 NW2d 453
(1993), rev’d on other grounds 445 Mich 502 (1994).
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actions.28 Res judicata also applies to controversies adjudicated by the Tax Tribunal.29 MCL
205.745 provides:
An order or decision may be entered by a member of the tribunal upon
written consent of the parties filed in the proceeding or stated in the record. The
order or decision is not appealable and has like effect as an order or decision in a
contested hearing.
We enforce unambiguous statutory language as written.30 It is clear from MCL 205.745
that a consent judgment is to be given the same effect as an order following a contested hearing
and, therefore, is subject to the doctrine of res judicata. It follows that ACI Holdings’ “fraud”
claim was barred because, in substance, the only matter properly within the Tax Tribunal’s
jurisdiction was a challenge to the amount of the tax assessments and the valuations on which
they were based. ACI Holdings cannot avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata by couching its
claim as sounding in fraud under standards applicable to judicial actions before the Tax Tribunal
Act was enacted. Therefore, the Tax Tribunal properly granted the Township’s motion for
summary disposition with respect to petitioner’s fraud claims for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004,
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). In light of this decision, it is unnecessary to address the merits of
the Tax Tribunal’s determination that there was no evidence of constructive fraud.
With respect to the fraud count related to tax year 2003, we conclude that the Tax
Tribunal lacked subjective-matter jurisdiction over this claim. As the Tax Tribunal indicated in
its decision, MCR 2.116(C)(4) applies to a claim that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.
Although the Tax Tribunal did not specifically state that it was dismissing the fraud claim with
respect to tax year 2003 under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court may review a summary disposition
ruling under the correct subrule.31
Whether the Tax Tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is reviewed de
novo as a question of law.32 When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), we must
determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law or whether any affidavits or other proofs submitted by the parties show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact.33
ACI Holdings does not argue that it properly invoked the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction
under MCL 205.735 by protesting the tax assessment to the board of review or by filing a
28
Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich App 569, 576; 625 NW2d 462 (2001).
29
Wayne Co v Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277-278; 590 NW2d 619 (1998).
30
Signature Villas, LLC, supra at 699.
31
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 338; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
32
See Trostel, Ltd v Treas Dep’t, 269 Mich App 433, 440; 713 NW2d 279 (2006); Calabrese v
Tendercare of Michigan, Inc, 262 Mich App 256, 259; 685 NW2d 313 (2004).
33
Jones v Slick, 242 Mich App 715, 718; 619 NW2d 733 (2000).
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petition on or before June 30 in the Tax Tribunal.34 Rather, ACI Holdings argues that the Tax
Tribunal acquired jurisdiction over its “constructive fraud” claim under the “other relief” powers
in MCL 205.732(c). For the reasons previously discussed with respect to tax years 2001, 2002,
and 2004, we conclude that the Tax Tribunal lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a tort
claim for damages with respect to tax year 2003. Treating ACI Holdings’ claim as an appeal
from the tax assessment for tax year 2003, the Tax Tribunal correctly relied on Electronic Data
Systems Corp to reject petitioner’s argument. As this Court stated in Electronic Data Systems
Corp, the Tax Tribunal does not have equitable powers to grant a delayed appeal from a tax
assessment.35
E. Mutual Mistake
The Tax Tribunal dismissed ACI Holdings’ mutual mistake claim under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Summary disposition is proper under this subrule when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.36 “‘A genuine
issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the
opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.’”37
MCL 211.53a, which is the basis for ACI Holdings’ “mutual mistake of fact” claim,
provides:
Any taxpayer who is assessed and pays taxes in excess of the correct and
lawful amount due because of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact made by
the assessing officer and the taxpayer may recover the excess so paid, without
interest, if suit is commenced within 3 years from the date of payment,
notwithstanding that the payment was not made under protest.
The dispositive question is whether there is factual support for ACI Holdings’ claim of a
“mutual mistake of fact” for each tax year. For purposes of MCL 211.53a, the Michigan
Supreme Court has defined a “mutual mistake of fact” as “an erroneous belief, which is shared
and relied on by both parties, about a material fact that affects the substance of the transaction.”38
In Ford Motor Co, the Supreme Court found that a mutual mistake of fact existed
because, although an assessor is required to exercise judgment under the General Property Tax
Act, the assessor chose to rely on factual information provided by the taxpayer, which was later
determined to be inaccurate, to determine the tax assessment.
34
See generally Electronic Data Systems Corp v Flint Twp, 253 Mich App 538, 543; 656 NW2d
215 (2002) (stating that the time limits in MCL 205.735 are jurisdictional).
35
Id. at 548.
36
Signature Villas, LLC, supra at 698-699.
37
Id. at 699, quoting West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
38
Ford Motor Co v Woodhaven, 475 Mich 425, 442; 716 NW2d 247 (2006).
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Here, ACI Holdings filed documentary evidence with its petition and, in particular, relied
on a June 21, 2004, letter written by the Township’s assessor to the city of Chelsea as support for
its claim that MCL 211.53a affords a basis for relief based on a mutual mistake of fact. The
letter indicates that the taxable value of the property for tax year 2004, which was ultimately
included in the consent judgment, was arrived at following a consideration of cost and market
approaches to valuation, with the assistance of market information provided by the Washtenaw
County Equalization Office. The assessor’s letter indicates that the amount of an earlier
stipulation “under a 2003 Michigan Tax Tribunal Protest” was “based primarily on the cost
approach to value since we were lacking in market comparables.” Additional evidence that the
Township filed in support of its motion for summary disposition indicates that the consent
judgment for tax years 2001 and 2002 was entered in June 2003, and that the consent judgment
for tax year 2004 was entered in March 2005.
In opposition to the Township’s motion, ACI Holdings filed a brief in which it alleged,
without providing a supporting affidavit or other admissible evidence as required by MCR
2.116(G)(6), that it believed that the Township’s assessor had followed three valuation methods
(cost, market, and income) but subsequently discovered that the assessor did not do so, as
indicated by the June 21, 2004 letter. The Tax Tribunal rejected this theory as supportive of a
mutual mistake of fact. It determined that an assessor is not required to apply all three valuation
methods and there was no evidence that both parties shared an erroneous belief regarding the
assessor’s approach to valuation. Because the Township does not address this basis of the Tax
Tribunal’s decision, we deem this issue abandoned.39
But with regard to ACI Holdings’ claim that it could pursue a mutual mistake theory on
the ground that the parties shared a belief that there were no comparable properties to conduct a
market valuation of the property, we agree with the Tax Tribunal that this claim is linked to ACI
Holdings’ erroneous claim that the assessor was required to use all three valuation approaches.
MCL 211.53a does not apply unless there is a shared erroneous belief about a material fact that
the parties relied upon and that affected the substance of the transaction. In this case, the
pertinent transaction is the tax assessments, as originally determined or modified for purposes of
the consent judgments.
The cost and market approaches to valuation are among the three traditional approaches
used to determine the true cash value of property for a tax assessment.40 Under the traditional
cost approach, true cash value is generally derived by adding the estimated land value to the
estimated current cost of reproducing or replacing improvements, and deducting the loss in value
from depreciation of structures on the property.41 Under a traditional market or sales-comparison
39
Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999) (“It is axiomatic that
where a party fails to brief the merits of an allegation of error, the issue is deemed abandoned by
this Court.”).
40
Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v Holland, 437 Mich 473, 484-485; 473 NW2d 636
(1991).
41
Id. at 484 n 18.
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approach, true cash value is derived by analyzing recent sales of similar properties, comparing
the sales to the subject property, and adjusting the sales prices of the comparable properties for
differences with the subject property.42 The sale price of another piece of property is not
conclusive evidence of value because the price might reflect factors, personal to the parties or
otherwise, that are not part of the usual price.43 The existence of a number of comparable
properties, if sufficiently similar, can cure this deficiency, but if the sale price of each property is
flawed, the result of this approach will also be flawed.44
Thus, merely identifying another ice arena that might be comparable to the property at
issue here does not require application of the market approach. Nor does it render the cost
approach, as a sole or primary method of valuation, an inaccurate indicator of value. Further, the
evaluation of what valuation approach to follow is not made with the benefit of hindsight, but
must consider the circumstances as they existed when the assessment was made or, as in this
case, when the assessment was modified for certain tax years as part of a consent judgment.
There is no single correct means for determining the true cash value of property.45
Therefore, we conclude that the assessor’s decision to rely on a cost approach (or at least to
primarily rely on a cost approach to valuation before tax year 2004, as indicated in the June 21,
2004, letter) was not a mutual mistake of fact affecting the substance of the transaction. This is
so regardless of whether the assessor conducted an adequate investigation of recent sales data in
reaching this decision.
Moreover, examining the evidence in a light most favorable to ACI Holdings, the
evidence does not support an inference that the requisite shared belief to recover overpaid taxes
under MCL 211.53a existed for any of the four tax years. This case is unlike Ford Motor Co, in
which a quantifiable factual mistake was linked to the taxpayer. There, the assessor effectively
adopted the petitioner’s overstatement of the quantity of taxable personal property to determine a
tax assessment.46 By contrast, here the assessor’s omission was not linked to any factual
information provided by ACI Holdings.
Accordingly, we affirm the Tax Tribunal’s decision to grant the Township’s motion for
summary disposition. ACI Holdings failed to show either a genuine issue of material fact or that
summary disposition was premature because of a need for discovery with respect to its theory
that the assessor should have found sufficient information to use a market approach for each tax
year’s valuation.
42
Id. at 485 n 19.
43
Antisdale v Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 278; 362 NW2d 632 (1984).
44
Id. at 278-279.
45
Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Assn, supra at 485; Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp,
supra at 390.
46
Ford Motor Co, supra at 446-447.
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Finally, ACI Holdings’ claim that a mutual mistake of fact existed with respect to the
assessor’s familiarity with ice arena properties is not properly before us because it was not
presented to the Tax Tribunal. The time to set forth facts showing a genuine issue of material
fact was in the proceedings before the Tax Tribunal.47 In any event, regardless of the assessor’s
experience, the “general rule is that knowledge of an agent on a material matter, acquired within
the scope of the agency, is imputed to the principal.”48 A government agency, like other entities,
can only act through its agents and employees.49 And in Ford Motor Co,50 the Michigan
Supreme Court considered the assessor’s erroneous belief regarding the accuracy of a taxpayer’s
personal property statement in concluding that there was a mutual mistake of fact. Since MCL
211.53a itself requires that the “assessing officer” make the mistake, we find no merit to ACI
Holdings’ suggestion that the Township be separated from its assessor for purposes of
determining if there was a mutual mistake of fact.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
47
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
48
Turner v Mut Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 316 Mich 6, 21; 24 NW2d 534 (1946).
49
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 621 n 35; 363 NW2d 641
(1984).
50
Ford Motor Co, supra at 442-443.
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