RONDA L BLANK V PATHWAYS COMM MENTAL HEALTH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONDA L. BLANK,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 275338
Lucie Circuit Court
LC No. 05-004486-CD
PATHWAYS COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murray and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Ronda L. Blank, appeals as of right the trial court’s December 12, 2006, order
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Defendant, who provided mental health services and assistance to mentally or
developmentally disabled clients, hired plaintiff as a life skills technician (LST) in 1999. When
plaintiff was hired she reviewed and signed a job description, which included language that
“transportation” was an “essential function” of her job.
On April 4, 2002, defendant sent plaintiff a letter informing her that her Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) time was going to exhaust on April 6, 2002 (plaintiff had taken three stints of
FMLA leave since February 26, 2001), and that if she needed to be off until April 29, 2002 (a
date her doctor had suggested), she would need to fill out a “request for leave without pay” form.
The letter additionally stated that if plaintiff failed to return to work on April 30, 2002 (without
prior approval) she might be terminated. Plaintiff filled out the appropriate documents, and her
leave without pay was approved.
On April 5, 2002, plaintiff received MRI test results, suggesting that she might be
suffering from multiple sclerosis (MS). Plaintiff informed defendant that she might have MS.
On April 24, 2002, defendant sent plaintiff another letter stating that she was expected to return
to work on April 30, 2002, and upon return should provide her supervisor, Vicki Derusha, with
“a return to work slip from [her] physician” noting any applicable restrictions. Defendant noted
that it would consider allowing plaintiff to work on a part-time basis as long as she could
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perform all “essential functions” of her job. Plaintiff and her husband, Kevin Blank, claim that
plaintiff subsequently submitted a return to work slip to one of defendant’s secretaries (“either
Jill or Michelle”),1 indicating that plaintiff “would be able to return to work on a part-time basis
[on April 30, 2002] but [would] not be able to drive or do heavy lifting.” Plaintiff stated that
Derusha responded that defendant could not accommodate her driving restriction because driving
was an essential part of plaintiff’s job. Barbara Elliot, defendant’s human resources (HR)
manager, stated that defendant never received the return to work slip.
On April 30, 2002, plaintiff requested that her unpaid leave be extended one more week
so that she could see how she was going to react to the medication that her physician put her on.
Defendant approved plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff alleges that she prepared and submitted another
request for leave without pay on May 6, 2002, requesting approximately four months off.
Although the letter was dated May 6, 2002, Elliot stated that she did not receive the letter until
May 10, 2006. On May 8, 2002, defendant sent plaintiff a letter stating that since she had not
returned to work, nor submitted required paperwork, it was “terminating [plaintiff’s]
employment.”
Subsequent to plaintiff’s termination, she applied for and was awarded Social Security
disability benefits (SSDB). Plaintiff’s application for SSDB indicated that she gets easily
confused, has trouble remembering things, cannot drive well, has trouble walking, and needs
help with basic daily activities such as bathing, lifting objects, cooking and cleaning. On
February 19, 2003, plaintiff additionally filed a charge of discrimination against defendant with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After failed attempts to negotiate a
settlement, the charge was referred to the Department of Justice, who eventually issued plaintiff
a right-to-sue letter on February 24, 2005.
Plaintiff filed a complaint (May 19, 2005), and amended complaint (May 23, 2005),
alleging that defendant violated the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when it refused to accommodate her disability.
After engaging in discovery, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing, in relevant part, that there were no genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether driving was an essential function of plaintiff’s job, and thus, plaintiff was not
a qualified individual under the ADA, and defendant was therefore entitled to dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint.2
Ruling from the bench, the trial court specifically found that “as a matter of law the – this
record supports the – the fact that aside from any exacerbation due to loss of employment,
reasonable minds cannot differ that the ability to drive based on the scope of the LST duties was
and is an essential function which plaintiff could not do, and leaving the defendant under no duty
1
It should be noted that neither Jill nor Michelle still worked for defendant at this point in time.
2
In plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, she abandoned her
PWDCRA claim, admitting that it was barred by the statute of limitations.
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to accommodate.” The trial court granted defendant’s motion in a December 12, 2006, order,
“for reasons stated on the record.”
II. Analysis
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion
for summary disposition based on its erroneous finding that driving was an essential function of
her job that could not be accommodated. We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for summary disposition de novo, Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d
151 (2003), viewing the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary
evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed,
470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). Summary disposition is proper under MCR
2.116(C)(10) if the documentary evidence shows that there is no genuine issue regarding any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Veenstra v
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 164; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
Under the ADA, a covered entity may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability. 42 USC § 12112(a); Peden v Detroit, 470 Mich 195, 202;
680 NW2d 857 (2004). A plaintiff alleging a violation of the ADA bears the burden of proving
that she is a qualified individual with a disability who has been discriminated against. Id. 42
USC § 12111(8) defines a qualified individual with a disability as:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation,[3] can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter,
consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a
job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. [(Emphasis added.)]
Here, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff has a disability (MS), nor do they dispute
that plaintiff cannot drive. Therefore, if the trial court properly determined that driving was an
“essential function” of plaintiff’s job that could not be accommodated without undue hardship to
defendant, it follows that the trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. 42 USC § 12111(8); 42 USC § 12112(b)(5)(A); See also Collins v Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 570-571; 579 NW2d 435 (1998).
3
Reasonable accommodations may include:
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities. [42 USC § 12111(9).]
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A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a challenged function is not an “essential
function” of his or her job. Peden, supra at 208. As previously discussed, 42 USC § 12111(8)
provides that an employer’s “written description,” and an “employer’s judgment” shall be
considered in determining whether a questioned function is considered “essential.” Moreover,
the EEOC regulations provide that in addition to considering the two factors discussed in 42
USC § 12111(8), a court should also consider “(iii) The amount of time spent on the job
performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.”
29 CFR 1630.2(n)(3); Peden, supra at 207.
Here, plaintiff’s job description included language that “transportation” was an “essential
function” of her job, and additionally listed “transporting [clients] to placement sites” under the
title “other functions,” and “ability to transport residents as needed,” and a valid driver’s license
as “other requirements,” while noting that the listed qualifications “are intended to represent the
minimum skills and experience levels associated with performing the duties and responsibilities
contained in this job description.” Under “physical requirements” the job description
additionally stated that the “physical demands described here . . . must be met by an employee to
successfully perform the essential functions of this job,” such as having the “ability to transport
recipients from place to place such as appointments.” It is therefore quite clear that defendant’s
judgment, as evidenced by its written job description, was that driving was an “essential
function” of an LST’s job.
Furthermore, the duties of past and current LST’s have included driving, which is
evidenced by plaintiff’s co-worker’s testimony, as well as plaintiff and her husband’s testimony.4
Finally, although Brenda Shoebottom, a program coordinator for defendant, agreed that driving
composed approximately only ten percent of an LST’s duties, an LST would not be able to
perform the remaining 90 percent of their job if he or she could not pick up their clients and
bring them to the requisite location. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it
found as a matter of law that driving was an “essential function” of plaintiff’s job. 42 USC §
12111(8); 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(3); Peden, supra at 207. See also Kapche v City of San Antonio,
176 F3d 840, 843 (CA 5, 1999) (holding that although many police officers hold desk jobs, given
that the plaintiff’s training included various aspects of driving and that plaintiffs’ job description
stated that he would be required to use a police vehicle, driving was an essential part of the job).
Moreover, “the mere fact that a disabled person can perform ‘some’ job is not relevant;
rather, he must be able to perform the job he held” at the time the alleged violation occurred,
“and any accommodation must be directed toward enabling the plaintiff to perform the duties” of
4
Plaintiff and her husband acknowledged that plaintiff’s job included picking up clients at their
homes and transporting them to places in the community or a “drop-in location” where she and
the client would perform activities together. Furthermore, when plaintiff was asked whether
driving was an essential function of her job, although she replied that she felt her inability to
drive could be accommodated, she did admit that driving was an essential part of an LST’s job
and that all LST’s drove.
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the job he held. Peden, supra at 206, n 9 (emphasis in original). It is therefore irrelevant
whether plaintiff could have performed some other job as she suggests. Id. Furthermore,
requiring other LST’s to perform all of plaintiff’s driving duties would be an undue hardship to
defendant because it would require defendant to make sure that plaintiff always worked with
another LST, thereby hindering defendant’s ability to maximize the use of its staff by having
them all work on their own with individual clients. We therefore hold that the trial court
likewise did not err when it found that defendant did not have to accommodate plaintiff’s
inability to drive. See Basith v Cook County, 241 F 3d 919, 932 (CA 7, 2001) (holding that “an
employer is not required to reallocate the essential functions of a job”). It follows that plaintiff
was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 USC § 12111(8).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. Peden, supra at 202.
Given our resolution of plaintiff’s appeal, we need not address the arguments raised by
defendant in its cross-appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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