PEOPLE OF MI V JEROME COREY PAHOSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272906
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-004634-01
JEROME COREY PAHOSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and O’Connell and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of life
in prison without parole for the murder convictions, to be served consecutively to a two-year
term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, conditioned solely on defendant’s inability to
verify his insanity claim with neurological test results, and we remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the October 25, 2005, shooting deaths of Roger
Young, defendant’s mother’s ex-boyfriend, and Jason McBryar, defendant’s friend and Young’s
tenant. Carl Benton, the victims’ neighbor, heard gunshots at approximately 5:00 that afternoon,
and saw defendant run from the rear of the victims’ home. Benton observed defendant run into
the alley and then walk back into the home’s backyard. In the backyard, defendant leaned over,
pointed a firearm toward the ground and fired a shot. Defendant reentered the house, and Benton
heard another gunshot. Benton watched defendant walk down the street, remove his grey hooded
sweatshirt and wrap it around his firearm. When defendant had walked “a couple of houses
down,” Benton approached Young’s backyard and saw Young’s body on the ground, in the same
location where defendant had fired the shot.
The police discovered Young’s body in the backyard and McBryar’s body inside the
home. A Michigan State Police investigator described a trail of blood around a basement pool
table, and an officer testified that the basement computer had been “knocked over on its side,”
reflecting “a little struggle.” The medical examiner testified that her examination of Young’s
body revealed, in addition to two gunshot wounds, the presence of two or three superficial cuts
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that could have been made by a pocketknife. According to the examiner, McBryar suffered four
gunshot wounds.
The police arrested defendant and confiscated his tennis shoes and pocketknife, both of
which bore traces of Young’s blood. Several weeks later, a repairman working on the back steps
of defendant’s great aunt’s home found a pistol wrapped in a grey hooded sweatshirt bearing
defendant’s name. A ballistics expert identified the pistol as the weapon used to shoot Young
and McBryar.
After defendant’s arrest, the district court ordered an evaluation of his competency to
stand trial. Dr. George Daigle, a forensic center psychologist, interviewed defendant and
concluded that he was competent to stand trial, and that “neither the statutory criteria for mental
illness nor the requirements for legal insanity have been satisfied.” Dr. Daigle’s report noted that
defendant’s grandmother claimed defendant had suffered from auditory hallucinations as a child,
and that jail psychiatrists had diagnosed defendant with “unspecified psychosis,” as well as
“undifferentiated schizophrenia and alcohol dependence.” According to Dr. Daigle, however,
his forensic examination and the daily observations of defendant’s behavior by mental health and
correctional staff contradicted these conclusions.
On April 27, 2006, defense counsel filed a notice of defendant’s intent to offer an
insanity defense. That same day, at defendant’s circuit court arraignment, defense counsel
requested an independent psychiatric examination. Initially reluctant to sign an order permitting
the independent examination, the arraigning judge agreed to do so after defense counsel urged
that he did not want to incur any delay, and that “Dr. [Steven] Miller . . . said as soon as he can
get going, he’d appreciate it.”
On May 5, 2006, the judge assigned to defendant’s trial conducted a pretrial conference,
established a trial date of July 31, 2006, and acknowledged awareness of defendant’s proposed
insanity defense. At a motion hearing on June 16, 2006, defense counsel advised the trial court
that Dr. Miller had interviewed defendant at the jail, but needed additional documentary
information to complete his report. Defense counsel submitted orders for the production of
defendant’s medical, school, and jail records, and the court signed them.
On July 7, 2006, defense counsel presented the trial court with email correspondence
from Dr. Miller stating that he “is not prepared to proceed any further. He believes he needs a
neuropsychological evaluation.” The complete text of the email is not included in the trial court
record. The trial court read aloud the following portion:
“[Defendant] was cooperative with the evaluation, polite and responsive;
however, when we attempted to talk about his involvement with the alleged
offense, he was unable to provide any useful information concerning his mental
state or his behavior at the legally relevant time.
“He may be psychologically blocking access to these memories or may be
avoiding talking about his actual symptoms or thought processes. I’m not sure
what is going on here, and I’m writing to inform you, etcetera, about that.”
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Defense counsel requested an adjournment of the trial date to allow time for the
neuropsychological examination, and told the court that the prosecutor “has no objections to my
proposal.”
The trial court interpreted Dr. Miller’s email as reflecting defendant’s “refus[al] to
cooperate,” and noted that Dr. Daigle had already concluded that defendant was “playing games
and malingering, and I think that is basically what’s going on here.” The trial court denied
defendant an adjournment, explaining, “If it doesn’t work out and I’m wrong about it, then
another court can deal with that later on review, but we are proceeding with trial with the date
already of July 31, nine o’clock.”
The case proceeded to trial as scheduled. Defendant did not present an insanity defense
and called no witnesses. After the parties rested, defendant requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter, and the court agreed to do so. The parties
then gave their closing arguments. Defense counsel argued that defendant killed Young in selfdefense, and that Young accidentally shot McBryar. According to defense counsel’s theory,
Young attacked defendant in the basement, and defendant tried to escape Young’s grasp by
superficially cutting Young’s neck and abdomen with his pocketknife. Defense counsel
contended that defendant then ran up the basement stairs, Young grabbed a nearby weapon and
gave chase and accidentally shot McBryar. Defense counsel’s theory suggested that defendant
then managed to disarm Young and shot Young in self-defense. Although the trial court allowed
defense counsel to argue this scenario to the jury, it refused to instruct the jury on self-defense
because counsel had not requested a self-defense instruction. The trial court also refused
counsel’s request that it provide the jury with defendant’s written theory of the case. The jury
convicted defendant of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of felony-firearm.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give a self-defense jury
instruction. Because the trial court record reveals that defendant did not request this instruction,
we review this issue only for plain error that affects defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
“A defendant asserting an affirmative defense must produce some evidence on all
elements of the defense before the trial court is required to instruct the jury regarding the
affirmative defense.” People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 619; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). Selfdefense by the use of deadly force is an affirmative defense that requires a showing that the
defendant honestly and reasonably believed he faced an imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, and that using deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger. See People v Sorscher,
151 Mich App 122; 391 NW2d 365 (1986); People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119; 649 NW2d 30
(2002). “The necessity element of self-defense normally requires that the actor try to avoid the
use of deadly force if he can safely and reasonably do so, for example by applying nondeadly
force or by utilizing an obvious and safe avenue of retreat.” Id. Here, the evidence did not
support a self-defense instruction because Benton saw defendant run from Young’s house
towards the alley and then walk back to the backyard where he shot toward Young’s body. Even
assuming the existence of a basement struggle between defendant and Young, defendant did not
limit his use of force or retreat, but instead calmly returned to the backyard and used deadly force
against Young. This testimony was not contradicted. Because the facts did not support a selfdefense instruction, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense did not affect the
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outcome of the trial. Defendant further claims, however, that counsel’s failure to request a selfdefense jury instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. However, defendant had no
factual substantiation for his claim of self-defense, so he cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the jury instruction would have changed the result of his trial. People v Rodgers,
248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s denial of an adjournment for
neuropsychological testing violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. A trial court’s decision
whether to grant a requested trial adjournment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 17; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). “[T]o invoke the trial court’s discretion to
grant a continuance or adjournment, a defendant must show both good cause and diligence.” Id.
at 18; see also MCR 2.503(C). Pursuant to MCL 768.20a(3), a felony defendant asserting an
insanity defense has the right to secure an independent psychiatric evaluation, including
neurological tests that a psychiatrist deems necessary in assessing the defendant’s sanity. See
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 333; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Although we understand a trial
court’s natural opposition to unnecessary delay, “a general interest in promoting judicial
economy and efficiency may not deny the clear mandate of [MCL 768.20a(3).]” Pickens, supra
at 334.
In this case, defense counsel timely initiated efforts to preserve an insanity defense at
defendant’s arraignment, and counsel properly followed the procedures set forth in MCL
768.20a(3). Defense counsel assiduously apprised the trial court of his efforts to preserve this
defense and did not request an adjournment until Dr. Miller expressed a need for
neuropsychological testing. See Pickens, supra. Although the trial court correctly noted that Dr.
Daigle had characterized defendant as evasive and uncooperative, other facts contained in
Daigle’s report suggested that defendant’s apparent non-cooperation might have stemmed from
mental illness. Dr. Daigle reported that two jail psychiatrists believed defendant to be psychotic
or schizophrenic. The trial court failed to articulate any reason for denying defendant’s request,
other than the firm trial date and its personal skepticism of defendant’s insanity defense. Under
the circumstances, the trial court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Pickens, supra.
Defendant was prevented from presenting his insanity defense, so he adequately demonstrated
prejudice. Additionally, the record contains no evidence that defense counsel acted negligently
or had sought previous adjournments, so, unlike Pickens, supra, the trial court’s ruling, on the
limited record before us, constituted manifest injustice.
However, reversing defendant’s convictions and sentences outright is not a remedy that is
justified by the circumstances. Cf. People v Shahideh, 277 Mich App 111, 121-122; 743 NW2d
233 (2007). In this case, the trial court had no objection to allowing Dr. Miller an opportunity to
perform the neuropsychological testing, and its primary concern was with the delay associated
with adjourning the trial date. However, the trial court also found that Dr. Miller’s report
suggested that defendant was less than cooperative. A trial court’s finding that a defendant is
less than “fully” cooperative in the testing requires the trial court to bar presentation of the
insanity defense. MCL 768.20a. Moreover, the trial court’s order to proceed with trial, without
delay, did not necessarily preempt defendant from actually taking a neurological test and
obtaining its results. If the results do not vindicate Dr. Miller’s theory that perhaps defendant’s
particularized memory loss is attributable to insanity rather than indolence, then the trial court
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correctly, albeit prematurely, barred the defense. On remand, the trial court should determine
whether the testing was ever actually completed, and, if it was completed, ascertain the results of
any tests and whether they supported defendant’s insanity defense. MCR 6.507(A). This
preliminary measure could potentially save the trial court considerable time and energy.
In any event, the proper remedy is to remand this case to the trial court with the
instruction that it should afford defendant the relief that he initially sought—an opportunity to
have the appropriate testing performed to determine his mental condition at the time of the
charged offense. We are not now in a position to determine whether a new trial is necessary,
because the claimed error only warrants reversing defendant’s convictions and sentences if
neurological testing verifies defendant’s insanity theory and justifies his apparent reluctance to
recall the homicidal events. Therefore, after completion of the appropriate testing, the trial court
should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if defendant was, in fact, denied his right to
present an insanity defense or if the defense was properly barred. This approach comports with
the understanding that a decision to grant post-conviction relief, generally, and particularly a new
trial, is often best left to the trial judge who has reviewed all the relevant evidence. See People v
Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691-692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003); MCR 6.502; MCR 6.508(D). The trial
court should make an independent determination, on the basis of the new record, whether a new
trial is in order. MCR 6.508(E); cf. Shahideh, supra. If the trial court finds that the test results
support Dr. Miller’s tentative insanity theory, then a new trial is warranted. Otherwise, the trial
court’s original ruling was valid, as are defendant’s convictions and sentences. The trial court
should make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to enable meaningful review.
We conditionally affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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