IN RE SHANE STRICKLAND MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NYOKA PAULK, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 279806
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-000057-NA
DELORES WHITMORE,
Respondent-Appellant.
and
CRAIG WHITMORE,
Respondent.
In the Matter of SHANE STRICKLAND, a/k/a
SHANE PAULK, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 279807
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-000058-NA
DELORES WHITMORE,
Respondent-Appellant.
and
CRAIG WHITMORE, GENE PAULK, and ROY
ANDREWS
Respondents.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Delores Whitmore appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating
her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
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Respondent first claims on appeal that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights because after 182 days had lapsed following the initial disposition, the condition that led to
adjudication did not exist. We disagree.
We review for clear error the lower court’s factual findings and determinations regarding
statutory grounds for termination. In re TM (After Remand), 245 Mich App 181, 194; 628
NW2d 570 (2001). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. In re SR, 229 Mich
App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998).
MCL 712A.19b(3) provides, in relevant part:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
Well-established principles guide this Court’s statutory construction efforts.
Willett v Waterford Charter Twp, 271 Mich App 38, 48; 718 NW2d 386 (2006). We
begin our analysis by consulting the specific statutory language at issue. Kloian v
Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 458; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). This Court gives
effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s terms, giving the words of
the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. McManamon v Redford Charter Twp, 273
Mich App 131, 135; 730 NW2d 757 (2006). When the language poses no ambiguity, this
Court need not look beyond the statute or construe the statute, but need only enforce the
statute as written. Provider Creditors Comm v United American Health Care Corp, 275
Mich App 90, 95; 738 NW2d 770 (2007). We do not interpret a statute in a way that
renders any statutory language surplusage. Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675,
684; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).
Respondent argues that within 182 days of the initial disposition, she “demonstrated at
least the capacity to comply or substantially comply with the parent agency agreement and court
ordered treatment.” However, the trial court concluded that respondent failed to substantially
comply with the terms of her parent-agency agreement. During the pendency of the case,
respondent relapsed on drugs and alcohol, and ceased attending substance abuse treatment and
therapy for mental health issues. Respondent eventually entered a dual-diagnosis program for
mental health and substance abuse, but in light of her history, we cannot conclude that the trial
court clearly erred by finding that it was unlikely that she would have been able to remain sober
and mentally stable, and to refrain from exposing the children to drugs and domestic violence.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate
respondent’s parental rights under subsection (3)(c)(i). In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612
NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
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Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights under
subsection (3)(g), for failure to provide proper care or custody. We disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
“[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fail[ed] to provide proper care or custody for the child and
there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody
within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”
Respondent went to Florida for several months. During her time in Florida, respondent
failed to visit the children. Although she was dealing with her mother’s illness, respondent’s
absence caused a weakening of the bond between her and her children. Respondent did not see
the children from September 2006 till the termination hearing in June 2007. The trial court did
not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the requirements of subsection
(3)(g).
Respondent also contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
under subsection (3)(j). Again, we disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
“[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the
child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” Respondent’s repeated
substance abuse relapses, and her history of domestic violence and instability, unmistakably
suggest that the children would be at risk of harm if returned her care. Thus, subsection (3)(j)
was satisfied.
We conclude that, although clear and convincing evidence of only one statutory ground is
necessary to terminate parental rights, termination of respondent’s parental rights was warranted
under subsection (3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j). In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d
472 (2000).
Respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was “clearly not” in the
children’s best interests. We disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(5) provides: “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of
parental rights, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional
efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made, unless the court finds that
termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interests.” See Trejo,
supra at 353, 356-357.
Respondent clearly loved her children and had the capacity to be a good mother, when
she could turn her attention to parenting and conquering her issues with mental health and
substance abuse. She had a bond with at least Nyoka. However, the children are very young and
need a permanent, safe, and stable home, which respondent cannot provide. While these children
were returned to their father’s home in Florida, and respondent would not have had primary
custody, we still cannot find clear error in the trial court’s determination that termination was
necessary in order to give the father the legal tools to keep respondent away, should this prove
necessary. Termination of respondent’s parental rights was not clearly contrary to the children’s
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best interests, considering respondent’s mental and substance abuse problems, frequent absences,
and destructive behavior patterns. Compare Trejo, supra at 353, 356-357.
Respondent last argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We review
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo questions of constitutional law. Id.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the claimant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
deficiency, the factfinder would have reached a different result. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 309; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Counsel are given wide berth in matters of trial strategy,
because many calculated risks may be necessary in order to win difficult cases. See id. at 325.
There is accordingly a strong presumption of effective assistance of counsel. People v Matuszak,
263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). We will not substitute our judgment for that of
counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will we use the benefit of hindsight when assessing
counsel’s competence. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
On the record before us, respondent has not shown that trial counsel’s performance was
defective, that the defect deprived her of a fair trial, People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5-6; 594 NW2d
57 (1999), or that serious errors occurred, without which she would have enjoyed a reasonable
probability of a different result, LeBlanc, supra at 578; see also Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). While respondent moved for a new trial on
this ground, the motion was correctly denied for lack of jurisdiction, MCR 7.203(A), since
respondent had already filed a claim of appeal in this Court, and the trial court was without
authority to enter any order altering the result. MCR 7.208(A). Because respondent has not
shown that trial counsel’s alleged errors were prejudicial, or not sound trial strategy, trial
counsel’s performance overall was not constitutionally defective, and we find no reversible error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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