RUSSEL WARNER V JAMES SCAVO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RUSSEL WARNER; MARY WARNER;
RICHARD DE LANO; PATRICIA DE LANO; D.
SCOTT HOLKEBOER; JULIE HOLKEBOER;
WILLIAM SPENCE; REBECCA SPENCE;
ROBERT TYLER; MARLENE PLUMMER,
Individually and as Trustee of the MARLENE M.
PLUMMER TRUST; ROBERT FULTON;
ROBERT HEFFNER; MELANIE HEFFNER;
DONALD HOFFMAN; DONNA BAILEY; and
KAAREN DEWITT,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 274266
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 05-037930-CH
JAMES SCAVO and HEATHER M SCAVO,
Defendants/Third-Party PlaintiffsAppellants,
v
RIVERTOWN BUILDERS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Meter and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by right from the trial court’s orders entering judgment for plaintiffs
and granting partial summary disposition in favor of third-party defendant Rivertown Builders
(Rivertown). We affirm.
Green Lake Park is a platted subdivision located in Allegan County on land that forms a
peninsula into Green Lake. In 1893, the Green Lake Park Association (the Association)
established and recorded the plat. The plat consisted of numbered lots one to 44, designated
additional common areas as the Court, Park Place, and Shore Commons, and named at least five
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streets. In 1897, the Association replatted Green Lake Park to divide Park Place into lots 45 to
60 and the Court into lots 61 to 71.
Today, many residents of Green Lake Park have docks off of Shore Commons. There are
no provisions contained within any of the Green Lake Park residents’ deeds regarding their rights
to access Short Street and Shore Commons. The plats are silent with regard to any dedication,
public or private, of Short Street and Shore Commons. The Green Lake Park residents, however,
have an understanding that they have access rights to Short Street and Shore Commons, which
derive from their ownership of plat lots and a 1966 judgment, where the Allegan Circuit Court
ruled that Short Street was a private street for the use of all of the lot owners in Green Lake Park
plat as replatted in 1897. Bailey v Miedema, unpublished judgment of the Allegan Circuit Court,
entered December 29, 1966 (Docket No. 1/1127). According to that judgment, those lots owners
“have an easement appurtenant to their respective lots over said Short Street, for the purpose of
traveling from Main Street . . . to Shore Commons and Green Lake for ingress and egress to and
from Shore Commons and Green Lake.” Id. Further, the Green Lake Park plat owners “have an
easement appurtenant to their respective lots, in common, for the use of Shore Commons for
park purposes, for gaining access to Green Lake, for bathing and launching boats on Green Lake,
for docking boats, for holding picnics thereon, and for any other purposes not inconsistent with
park purposes.” Id.
Defendants’ residence is located in the Rose Hill Addition to Green Lake Park. The Rose
Hill Addition was platted in 1921, but its proprietors were not involved in the Green Lake Park
plat, which is not referenced in the Rose Hill Addition plat. The Rose Hill Addition does not
abut Green Lake Park or Green Lake. The Hahn Addition separates the Rose Hill Addition from
Green Lake Park. The plat of Rose Hill Addition does not mention either Short Street or Shore
Commons.
Defendants wanted to place a dock on Shore Commons, and for a time, plaintiffs (various
lot owners in Green Lake Park plat) allowed defendants to do so. Later, however, plaintiffs
obtained an attorney’s opinion regarding their legal rights to Short Street and Shore Commons.
In sum, the opinion, following the language from the Bailey judgment, provided that plaintiffs
held easements rights over Short Street and Shore Commons, and the easement rights were
limited to owners of lots in Green Lake Park plat, as amended in 1897. Thus, according to the
legal opinion, defendants, as lot owners in Rose Hill Addition, did not have easement rights over
Short Street and Shore Commons. Plaintiffs wrote a letter to the lot owners of the Rose Hill
Addition and the Haan Addition, requesting those individuals, including defendants, cease and
desist any use of Short Street and Shore Commons. When defendants refused, plaintiffs filed
this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages.
Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Rivertown, the entity that sold
defendants their Rose Hill Addition residence, alleging misrepresentation and violation of the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. Defendants asserted that
Rivertown made representations that Rose Hill Addition lot owners had water access through
Short Street and Shore Commons.
Before the bench trial commenced, the trial court granted partial summary disposition to
Rivertown pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) as to defendants’ misrepresentation, rescission, and
reimbursement claims. After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, concluding that:
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Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that [defendants] have no
legal right to use any common areas of Green Lake Park including Short Street
and Shore Commons; an injunction permanently enjoining [defendants] from
placing a dock on Shore Commons; and nominal damages for trespass.
[Defendants] are entitled to $250.00 for Rivertown’s violation of the MCPA
together with costs and attorney fees accrued in connection with their third-party
complaint. [Trial court opinion, 08/15/2006, p 6.]
Defendants now appeal. This Court will address first the issues involved in the plaintiffs’
action and then the issues implicated in the third-party action.
Defendants first argue that the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiffs possessed
an easement over Short Street and Shore Commons. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s
ruling on an equitable matter. Blackhawk Dev Corp v Dexter Village, 473 Mich 33, 40; 700
NW2d 364 (2005). But the extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a question of fact, and
we review for clear error the trial court’s factual determinations. Id. A trial court’s finding is
clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support the finding, this Court is left with
the definite and firm conclusion that a mistake has been made. Heindlmeyer v Ottawa Co
Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, 268 Mich App 202, 214, 222; 707 NW2d 353 (2005).
Easements may be created by express grant, by reservation or exception, by covenant or
agreement, or be acquired by prescription. Heydon v MediaOne of Southeast Mich, Inc, 275
Mich App 267, 270; 739 NW2d 373 (2007). An easement is “a right to use the land burdened by
the easement rather than a right to occupy and use the land as an owner.” Dep’t of Natural
Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 378; 699 NW2d 272 (2005)
(citations omitted). An easement is a limited property interest that is generally confined to a
specific purpose. Id. at 378-379. An “easement holder is said to enjoy all rights reasonably
necessary and proper to fully use the easement.” Id. at 403.
In the instant action, the trial court relied extensively on the decision in Bailey, finding
that “Short Street, Shore Commons and the other areas within Green Lake Park are private,
rather than public.” The trial court also found that “the plat is silent as to dedication, and
defendants did not present any evidence suggesting the proprietor intended to make a public
dedication.” Moreover, the trial court reasoned that even if the proprietor intended to dedicate
the plat’s roads to the public, there was no evidence that the public authorities accepted such
alleged dedication. The trial court then opined:
Perhaps the best evidence that Short Street and Shore Commons are private,
however, is a prior judgment involving these same areas. In Bailey v Miedema, a
group of lot owners in Green Lake Park brought an action to enjoin another lot
owner from closing Short Street. Although joined as a defendant, the Road
Commission defaulted. The court entered a declatory [sic] judgment finding as
follows:
“That Short Street lying south of lots 27 and 20, and north of lot 43, as shown on
Green Lake Park Plat recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds . . . is a
private street for the use of all of the lot owners in said plat, and that Plaintiffs, as
well as other lot owners in said plat, including the lot owners in any portion of
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said plat which was replatted, have an easement in common appurtenant to their
respective lots over said Short Street, for the purpose of traveling from Main
Street . . . to Shore Commons and Green Lake for ingress and egress to and from
Shore Commons and Green Lake.” [Trial court opinion, 08/15/2006, p 3, quoting
Bailey, supra at 2.]
We agree. Nothing in the record supports that there was a valid public dedication of the
streets or common areas in the 1893 or 1897 plats of Green Lake Park. “Generally, a valid
statutory dedication of land for a public purpose requires two elements: (1) a recorded plat
designating the areas for public use; and (2) acceptance by the proper public authority.” Higgins
Lake Prop Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 255 Mich App 83, 113; 662 NW2d 387 (2003). At
common law, unless an owner intentionally dedicates a road for public use and the public
authorities accept the dedication, the roads remain private. Missaukee Lakes Land Co v
Missaukee Co Rd Comm, 333 Mich 372, 377-380; 53 NW2d 297 (1952). The plat here is silent
with respect to designating streets and common areas for public use. Thus, even without an
express private dedication, caselaw supports concluding that the common areas were dedicated
to the use of the lot owners. See Schurtz v Wescott, 286 Mich 691, 697; 282 NW 870 (1938).
Moreover, Michigan caselaw provides that lot owners hold easements in privately
dedicated common areas and streets. See Kirchen v Remenga, 291 Mich 94, 108; 288 NW 344
(1939). More recently, our Supreme Court has held that “dedications of land for private use in
plats before 1967 PA 288 took effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated
land.” Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 553, 564; 677 NW2d 319 (2004). We conclude the trial
court did not err in finding that Short Street and Shore Commons were private, because the
common areas in Green Lake Park were not dedicated for public use; therefore, the common
areas remained private. While the trial court did not expressly find that plaintiffs held easements
in the common areas, plaintiffs hold “at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land.” Id.
In fact, plaintiffs hold easements appurtenant. “The purchasers of lots in the original plat
took not only the interest of the grantor in the land described in their respective deeds, but, as an
incorporeal hereditament . . . appurtenant to it, took an easement in the streets, parks and public
grounds mentioned and designated in the plat . . . .” Kirchen, supra at 108 (citation omitted).
“An easement appurtenant is one ‘created to benefit another tract of land, the use of easement
being incident to the ownership of that other tract.’” Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, supra at 378 n
40, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).
Defendants next argue that plaintiffs did not have standing to maintain a trespass action.
We disagree. This Court reviews de novo whether a party has standing. Mich Citizens for Water
Conservation v Nestle Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 280, 291; 737 NW2d 447 (2007).
We view this issue as not so much whether plaintiffs have standing, but whether the trial
court used the proper nomenclature. A trespass occurs when a person’s interest in the exclusive
possession of his land is invaded. Mable Cleary Trust v Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 262 Mich
App 485, 508; 686 NW2d 770 (2004). “In order to recover for trespass, a plaintiff must have
title to or actual possession of the land on which the trespass is claimed.” Id. An easement is the
right to use, not occupy or possess, the burdened land. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, supra at 378.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs clearly have standing to enforce their easement rights. Plaintiffs possess
an interest in the property in question and assert that defendants have violated their easement
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rights, especially their recreational use of Shore Street and Shore Commons. “Standing may be
proven by showing that the ‘[defendants’] activities directly affected the [plaintiffs’] recreational,
aesthetic, or economic interests.’” Kallman v Sunseekers Property Owners Ass’n, L.L.C., 480
Mich 1099; ___ NW2d ___ (2008), quoting Michigan Citizens, supra at 296.
Whether it is proper to refer to the interference with an easement as a “trespass” is
debatable. The broad definition of a “trespass” is any “unlawful act committed against the
person or property of another; esp., wrongful entry to another’s property.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th ed), p 1508. Further, our Supreme Court has referred to the obstruction of an
easement as a “trespass.” In Longton v Stedman, 182 Mich 405; 148 NW 738 (1914)(Longton I),
the defendant erected a brick building right up to his property line, obstructing a five-foot strip of
property reserved as a part of a joint easement with the adjoining property. Id. at 410. The Court
referred to this building erected on the defendant’s own property as an “encroachment and
trespass.” Id. at 415. On remand, the trial court ordered the defendant to remove the offending
building from the easement. See Longton v Stedman, 196 Mich 543, 544; 162 NW 947 (1917)
(Longton II). The Longton II Court rejected the defendants’ statute of limitations “demurrer”
opining:
A sufficient answer to this contention is found in the fact that plaintiffs’ action is
not based on any covenant. It is an action in which plaintiffs seek by the aid of a
mandatory injunction to abate and restrain a continuing trespass. This action is
open to plaintiffs at any time until the trespasser has extinguished the easement
claimed by plaintiffs by adverse possession 15 years. [Longton II, supra at 545
(emphasis added).]
On the other hand, our Supreme Court has held that trespass will not lie for the
obstruction of an easement, explaining in Hasselbring v Koepke, 263 Mich 466, 476; 248 NW
869 (1933):
Ejectment will not lie to recover an easement. Trespass to try title will not lie
because there is no breach of the owner's possession. A party need not submit to
an invasion of his rights and content himself with suing on the case for damages.
Plaintiffs’ remedy, if any, is in equity. [Id. (citations omitted).]
This Court relied on Hasselbring, among other decisions, in holding the plaintiffs could
not “maintain an action in trespass quare clausum fregit (q.c.f.)”1 against the defendant in
possession of the property burdened with the easement for its obstruction. Tittiger v Johnson,
103 Mich App 437, 440-441; 303 NW2d 26 (1981). The Court held that for the plaintiffs to
bring such an action, the plaintiffs would have “to establish that their rights in the easement
equated to possession or title in the subject parcel.” Id. at 440. Arguably, plaintiffs here made
such a showing because their easement rights were exclusive and the fee owner, the Green Lake
Park Association, has been defunct since 1923.
1
A trespass quare clausum fregit (q.c.f.) is defined as “[a] person’s unlawful entry on another’s
land that is visibly enclosed.” Black Law Dictionary (7th ed), p 1509.
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We need not decide in this case whether it is proper to refer to such an action as one for
trespass. As noted already, plaintiffs have standing to bring an action for the interference with
their easement rights and may seek equitable relief or money damages. “For interference with an
easement, the owner of it may sue for damages, for an injunction, or both.” 25 MLP, Real
Property, § 117; see, also, 2 Restatement Property, 3d, § 8.1, p 474 and § 8.3, p 492.
In the instant action, the trial court found the
. . . testimony revealed that although Scavos did not physically prevent Plaintiffs
from accessing Shore Commons, they did interfere with Plaintiffs’ use and
enjoyment of the area. By placing their dock on Shore Commons, Scavos
diminished the already limited space available for docking. Additionally, Scavos’
dock encroached on the common swimming space, and interfered with Plaintiffs’
ability to safely navigate their boats in the area. Based on the evidence, this Court
finds Scavos sufficiently interfered with Plaintiffs’ easement rights to warrant,
nominal damages for trespass. [Trial court opinion, 08/15/2006, pp 5-6.]
We find no clear error in the trial court’s factual determination regarding the scope of
plaintiffs’ easement rights or that defendants interfered with the easement. Nor do we find any
legal error in the court’s determining plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages for this
interference with their easement rights. Even if the trial court erred by referring to defendants’
actions as a “trespass,” it is still proper for us to affirm: This Court will affirm a trial court when
it reaches the right result albeit for the wrong reason, or in this case, uses a term that may not be
technically correct. See Hall v McRea Corp, 238 Mich App 361, 369; 605 NW2d 354 (1999).
Defendant next contends on appeal that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs
declaratory and injunctive relief. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial for clear error and its
conclusions of law de novo. Ligon v Detroit, 276 Mich App 120, 124; 739 NW2d 900 (2007).
Under MCR 2.605 a court may grant declaratory relief. “The language of MCR 2.605 is
permissive rather than mandatory; thus, it rests with the sound discretion of the court whether to
grant declaratory relief.” PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of the Office of Financial and Ins Services,
270 Mich App 110, 126; 715 NW2d 398 (2006). “Under the deferential standard of review
outlined in MCR 2.605, a reviewing court must affirm the trial court’s decision even if a
reasonable person might differ with the trial court in its decision to withhold relief.” Id. at 129.
A trial court’s grant of injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mich
Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm’n, 465 Mich 212, 217; 634 NW2d 692
(2001). Our Supreme Court adopted a default standard of review in Maldonado v Ford Motor
Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006):
[A]n abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances
in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than
one reasonable and principled outcome. . . . When the trial court selects one of
these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it
is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court’s judgment.
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a declaratory
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants. MCR 2.605(A) empowers a circuit court
to issue a declaratory judgment in “a case of actual controversy.” See PT Today, supra at 127.
Here, there was an actual controversy regarding whether defendants had a legal right to use Short
Street and Shore Commons. The trial court found that “Short Street, Shore Commons and other
areas within Green Lake Park are private, rather than public.” The trial court therefore
concluded that “plaintiffs may have a judgment declaring that [defendants], as non-lot owners,
are not entitled to use any common areas within Green Lake Park plat including Short Street and
Shore Commons.” Under the deferential standard of review in declaratory judgment actions, this
Court affirms the trial court’s decision “even if a reasonable person might differ with the trial
court in its decision to withhold relief.” PT Today, supra at 129.
We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting injunctive
relief. “Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that courts normally grant only when ‘(1)
justice requires it, (2) there is no adequate remedy at law, and (3) there exists a real and
imminent danger of irreparable injury.’” Higgins Lake Prop Owners, supra at 106 (citations
omitted). This Court has noted that a key inquiry in determining the propriety of injunctive relief
is whether “‘a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury must exist to support a grant of
injunctive relief.’” Id. at 106 (citations omitted). But this Court has also held that “[w]hen an
injury is irreparable, the interference is of a permanent or continuous character, or the remedy at
law will not afford adequate relief, a bill for an injunction is an appropriate remedy.”
Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 40; 570 NW2d 788 (1997), citing Soergel v Preston, 141
Mich App 585, 589-590; 367 NW2d 366 (1985).
Michigan courts have long enforced easements with injunctive orders. See Minnis v
Jyleen, 333 Mich 447, 453; 53 NW2d 328 (1952) (plat owners with easement in privately
dedicated roads could maintain suit in equity for the protection and enforcement of their private
rights), and Ives v Edison, 124 Mich 402; 83 NW 120 (1900) (an easement stairway in a building
ordered replaced). In the latter case, the Court found that damages for having moved a stairway
were inadequate and rejected the defendant’s contention that irreparable injury had not occurred
because the change was actually beneficial to the complainant. Ives, supra at 405. The Court
observed: “It is the duty of the courts to protect persons in their right of property, even though
the holdings may be small, instead of justifying a trespass, or compelling the owner of the
property to accept something else in the place of it.” Id. at 410.
Likewise, in Schadewald, supra at 40, this Court found that the trial court abused its
discretion by not enjoining the use of an easement by owners/users of property not entitled to its
benefit. The defendant Brule owned the dominant estate but used the easement for a lot (539) to
which the easement was not appurtenant. This Court did not require proof of overburdening,
only that the property was not permitted to use the easement. The Court found that “the pertinent
question is not whether the burden on [the] plaintiffs’ property has substantially increased, but
rather whether lot 539 has any right to an easement over plaintiffs’ property.” Id. at 38. Further,
the Court held that even if it were necessary to establish overuse of the easement, “the Brules
have not established that relief is unwarranted” because declining to do so would grant “the
owner of the dominant estate carte blanche to unilaterally extend an easement to other property
as long as he is careful not to increase the present burden on the servient estate.” Id. at 39.
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Here, plaintiffs hold a valuable property right limiting the use of Shore Street and Shore
Commons to plat owners. Allowing non-plat owners use of Shore Street and Shore Commons
burdens the servient property beyond the intended scope of the easement. Furthermore,
expanding use of the easement beyond Green Lake Park plat owners diminishes the plat owners’
use and enjoyment of the easement. Because defendants do not own property with an
appurtenant easement to use Shore Street and Shore Commons, plaintiffs are not required to
show defendants’ use was overly burdensome to obtain injunctive relief. Schadewald, supra at
39-40; Soergel, supra at 589. A fundamental principle governing easements is that its owner has
all rights “‘necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.’” Blackhawk,
supra at 40, quoting Unverzagt v Miller, 306 Mich 260, 265; 10 NW2d 849 (1943). Here, it
would be very difficult to determine an amount of money damages because of defendants’
interference with plaintiffs’ easement. Further, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
defendants were persistent in the use of easements to which they were not entitled, and that this
violation would likely continue without judicial relief. In essence, the trial court determined
defendants’ interference was permanent or continuous such that a remedy at law was inadequate.
Schadewald, supra at 40; Soergel, supra 589-590. So, the trial court’s granting injunctive relief
was within the principled range of outcomes and not an abuse of discretion. Maldonado, supra
at 388.
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred by declining to allow the testimony of
Darwin VanderArk, a former supervisor of Leighton Township. The trial court ruled that
VanderArk’s testimony as to Leighton Township’s “understanding of the nature of Short Street”
was not relevant. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158-159; 732 NW2d 472 (2007). Defendants fail
to present any analysis or cite legal authority that would render VanderArk’s testimony relevant.
An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims; nor may he give issues cursory treatment with little or no
citation of supporting authority. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406;
651 NW2d 756 (2002). Moreover, an appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his
assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue on appeal. Id.
Next, defendants assert that the trial court erred in ruling that defendants abandoned their
contention that the Rose Hill Addition was a part of the Green Lake Park plat. However,
defendants appear to be arguing that the trial court failed to address whether the Rose Hill
Addition was a replat of Green Lake Park. While the trial court noted that it would not make a
finding as to the issue whether Rose Hill Addition was a replat of Green Lake Park, such a
finding was, at least, implicit in the trial court’s ultimate conclusion. Thus, the trial court
addressed it. Moreover, defendants have abandoned this issue, because, again, they have failed
to cite any authority to support their argument. See Yee, supra at 406.
Finally, this Court concludes defendants’ allegations of error regarding the third-party
action lack merit. Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in granting Rivertown’s motion
for partial summary disposition.
MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial
judgment as a matter of law.” This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary
disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Like the trial court,
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this Court must view the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and determine if there exists
a relevant factual issue about which reasonable minds might differ. Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins
Co, 235 Mich App 675, 681; 599 NW2d 546 (1999). The moving party must support its motion
with affidavits or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3). If the moving party does so,
the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). The nonmoving party may
not simply rely on allegations or denials in the pleadings. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to
present evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly
granted. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 361-363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
In the instant action, in responding to Rivertown’s motion for summary disposition,
defendants failed to go beyond the pleadings to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact
existed. Thus, we conclude that Rivertown was entitled to summary disposition on defendants’
fraud claim because defendants failed to present documentary evidence establishing the
existence of a material factual dispute. Quinto, supra at 361-363.
Further, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition with
respect to defendants’ rescission and reimbursement claims. Defendants’ argument regarding
these claims is premised on a finding that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition
of the fraud claim. But the trial court did not err in that regard, so this issue is without merit.
Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).
Defendants finally contend on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied defendants
actual damages for their MCPA claim. This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory
interpretation. City of Taylor v Detroit Edison Co, 475 Mich 109, 115; 715 NW2d 28 (2006).
We review the trial court’s determination of damages after a bench trial for clear error. Alan
Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 513; 667 NW2d 379 (2003).
MCL 445.903(1) prohibits unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. MCL 445.904(1)(a) includes an exemption for
any “transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory
board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” A private
person may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, and actual damages or $250,
whichever is greater. MCL 445.911(1), (2). “A party asserting a claim has the burden of
proving its damages with reasonable certainty.” Berrios v Miles, Inc, 226 Mich App 470, 478;
574 NW2d 677 (1997). Generally, “damages based on speculation or conjecture are not
recoverable;” however, “damages are not speculative merely because they cannot be ascertained
with mathematical precision.” Id.
On this record, we conclude that the trial court’s award of the statutory minimum for
damages under the MCPA was not clearly erroneous. Defendants had the burden of proving
their damages with reasonable certainty. Berrios, supra at 478. At the bench trial, defendants
provided only self-serving testimony regarding their damages. The testimony demonstrated that
defendants believed that a residence with lake access was worth 10 percent more than a
residence without lake access. However, defendants’ testimony and documentary evidence
established that defendants had at least two other access points to Green Lake within close
proximity to their residence. Thus, defendants could access Green Lake from their residence.
This Court will “defer to the trial court’s superior position to observe and evaluate witness
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credibility.” Marshall Lasser, PC v George, 252 Mich App 104, 110; 651 NW2d 158 (2002).
After reviewing the record, we are not be left with a firm and definite conviction that the trial
court erred with respect to its award of damages. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that Rivertown argues it is exempt from the MCPA,
because it is a residential homebuilder. Recently, our Supreme Court held that “under MCL
445.904(1)(a), residential home builders are exempt from the MCPA because the general
transaction of residential home building, including contracting to perform such transaction, is
‘specifically authorized’ by the Michigan Occupational Code (“MOC”), MCL 339.101 et seq.”
Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203, 206; 732 NW2d 514 (2007). We decline to
address this issue because it is not properly before this Court since Rivertown did not file a
cross-appeal. Barnell v Taubman Co, 203 Mich App 110, 123; 512 NW2d 13 (1993).
Moreover, Rivertown may not raise new issues by filing a supplemental authority. MCR
7.212(F)(1).
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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