PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES MARTY KING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 29, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278101
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003587-FC
CHARLES MARTY KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murray and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2), and unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530.1 We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Complainant, Paul Stratton, testified that he lived in an apartment house where he shared
a common kitchen with his elderly landlord. On July 19, 2006, at approximately 5:00 a.m.,
Stratton was trying to sleep when he heard noises. He thought that his landlord might need
assistance and arose. As he turned on the light in his room, he saw defendant standing in front of
him. Defendant told him to turn off the light, and then did so when Stratton did not comply.
Defendant told Stratton that he was going to take the change that Stratton kept on a tray, in order
to feed defendant’s wife and kids. He told Stratton to sit on the bed, and then to get him a
pillowcase. Stratton pointed at a pillow. When defendant looked toward it, Stratton grabbed a
baseball bat that lay on the side of the bed and hid it next to him. Defendant, who had his hands
in his pants touching something with a blue handle in his waistband, told Stratton not to “go for
the gun.” This caused Stratton to think that defendant was armed. Defendant then took handfuls
of change from Stratton’s coin tray and brought the tray over to the bed near the pillowcases.
After defendant told Stratton that he was going to take some of Stratton’s belongings, Stratton
told defendant that he could not breathe. When defendant subsequently grabbed Stratton,
Stratton hit defendant in the head with the baseball bat. Defendant ran out of the room and left
the apartment through the kitchen window. Later, Stratton discovered that defendant had
1
Defendant was initially charged with armed robbery; however, the jury acquitted defendant of
this charge.
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apparently also taken $97 from a money clip in his pants as well as a flashlight with a blue
handle. Investigating officers found blood on the windowsill of Stratton’s apartment.2 This
blood was matched to defendant’s using a DNA test.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions. We disagree.
We review a defendant’s allegations regarding insufficiency of the evidence de novo.
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We will not
interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1202
(1992). Satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime can be shown by circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences arising therefrom. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). It is for the trier of fact to determine what inferences fairly can be drawn from the
evidence and the weight to be accorded to those inferences. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417,
428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the
prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to show that defendant had the intent to
commit a larceny in Stratton’s home on entry into the apartment. Because of the difficulty of
proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the
element of intent. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999).
Defendant admitted that he entered complainant’s home in the early morning hours by way of
the second floor kitchen window. Given Stratton’s testimony about defendant’s actions and
words when defendant was surprised in the darkened apartment, we find that the prosecutor
presented ample evidence to show that defendant intended to rob Stratton at the time he entered
the apartment. The prosecutor was not required to disprove defendant’s claim that he broke into
complainant’s apartment simply to use the phone. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614
NW2d 78 (2000).
Defendant, who was sentenced within the applicable sentencing guidelines, also
challenges a number of the trial court’s scoring decisions. A trial court has discretion in
determining the number of points to be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately
supports a particular score. People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006).
“Scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support will be upheld.” Id. We review de
novo as a question of law the interpretation of the statutory sentencing guidelines. Id.
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred by scoring five points for offense variable
(OV) 1 (aggravated use of a weapon). Defendant claims that the prosecution presented no
2
This window was located on the second floor of the building. According to the investigating
officer, someone entering through the window would need to climb on an electrical box, and
then walk across the roof of a covered porch to get to the window.
-2-
evidence that “a weapon was displayed or implied” so as to justify this scoring decision. MCL
777.31(1)(e). Defendant ignores Stratton’s testimony about defendant placing his hand on an
object in his waistband while telling Stratton not to “go for the gun”, and Stratton’s assertion that
defendant’s actions and words caused him to think that defendant was armed. The trial court’s
decision to score five points for this OV was supported by the evidence.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by scoring ten points for OV 9 (number of
victims), because the trial court improperly counted Stratton’s landlord as a “person in danger of
injury or loss of life” under MCL 777.39(2)(a), when he was not present during the robbery
attempt. We disagree. A person need not be the complainant in a criminal case in order to be
considered a victim for purposes of scoring OV 9. However, the person who is not a
complainant must have been placed at risk of physical injury by the defendant’s actions in order
to be counted as a victim under OV 9. See, e.g., People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269, 274; 651
NW2d 798 (2002). Here, while Stratton’s landlord remained in his room during the robbery, the
two shared common space, including the kitchen through which defendant entered. In addition,
defendant admitted at trial that the whole apartment was smaller than the courtroom. It is very
likely that Stratton’s landlord would have come out of his room had the confrontation continued
longer than it did. Nor was anything preventing defendant from entering the additional bedroom
in his quest for valuables. The risk of injury presented by these circumstances justified the trial
court’s score of ten points for OV 9.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it scored ten points for OV 19
(threat to security or interference with the administration of justice). An individual is scored ten
points for this variable when “the offender otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere
with the administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). Interfering or attempting to interfere with
the administration of justice includes, but is not limited to, acts that constitute obstruction of
justice. People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283, 286; 681 NW2d 348 (2004). “[T]he phrase “interfered
with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice” encompasses more than just the
judicial process.” Id. at 287-288. For example, because “[l]aw enforcement officers are an
integral component in the administration of justice,” and “[t]he investigation of crime is critical
to the administration of justice”, even providing a false name to the police has been held to
constitute interference with the administration of justice. Id. at 288. So has running from police
to escape apprehension. People v Cook, 254 Mich App 635, 638, 658 NW2d 184 (2003). In the
instant case, when police officers arrived at an acquaintance’s home on the day after the robbery
after receiving a tip that defendant was staying at the house, they tried to make contact with him.
When they told defendant that they were there “investigating a B & E” defendant barricaded
himself in a bedroom, and then got into a struggle with the officers when they forced open the
door. Defendant’s actions, while occurring some time after the robbery, interfered with the
officers’ investigation of the crime. Because there is some support for the score in the record, we
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when scoring OV 19.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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