STEVEN L REANO V NANETTE M REANO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN L. REANO,
UNPUBLISHED
May 27, 2008
Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 276509
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 06-037562-DM
NANETTE M. REANO,
Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the judgment of divorce following a bench trial. The
bench trial was limited to certain issues that the parties could not resolve. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion as to the amount, $1,200 a
month, and duration, three years, of spousal support awarded. We disagree. A spousal support
award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 432; 664
NW2d 231 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d
132 (2007). Additionally, a trial court’s findings of fact in relation to spousal support are
reviewed for clear error. Gates, supra. Those factual findings are presumptively correct and the
burden is on the appellant to show clear error. Id. A trial court’s decision as to alimony must be
affirmed unless the reviewing court is firmly convinced that it was inequitable. Sparks v Sparks,
440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).
“The main objective of alimony is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a
way that will not impoverish either party, and alimony is to be based on what is just and
reasonable under the circumstances of the case.” Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App 619, 631; 671
NW2d 64 (2003).
Among the factors that should be considered are: (1) the past relations and
conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties
to work, (4) the source and amount of property awarded to the parties, (5) the
parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the present
situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties’ health, (10) the
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prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the
support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint estate, (12) a party’s
fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on a party’s financial
status, and (14) general principles of equity. [Id.]
We first consider the amount of the spousal support awarded. In its opinion, the trial
court acknowledged the 21-year marriage, the disparity in income, and the concerns over
defendant’s health. However, the court also weighed that the parties had been living well
beyond their means and apparently placed some weight on defendant’s seeming refusal to take
advantage of the four-year period in which the parties were contemplating divorce to better
herself through furthering her education. Plaintiff’s projected expenses are not patently
unreasonable, and while defendant faults plaintiff for continuing to live in the expensive marital
home, the record evidences that plaintiff wanted to list the home for sale but that it was
defendant who was uncooperative and believed the home to be worth much more than it was.
Moreover, defendant indicated that she wanted plaintiff to wait out the housing down cycle to
obtain a share in any potential equity once it was sold. If the home is eventually sold and
plaintiff’s monthly expenses were substantially decreased, there is nothing that would prevent
defendant from moving to modify the spousal support award. See, e.g., Gates, supra at 435.
As for the duration, the length of the award also does not appear outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes because during that time defendant should be able to
rehabilitate herself to become more marketable. See Zecchin v Zecchin, 149 Mich App 723, 734735; 386 NW2d 652 (1986). Therefore, no abuse of discretion occurred with regard to the
spousal support award.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in only awarding $3,600 of
the $15,000 in attorney fees then owed. We disagree. A trial court’s decision on an award of
attorney fees in a divorce action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Olson, supra at 634.
Attorney fees in divorce actions may be awarded if the record supports a finding that the
party to whom they are awarded is unable to bear the expense of the litigation. Id. at 635. More
specifically, “[i]t is well settled that a party should not be required to invade assets to satisfy
attorney fees when the party is relying on the same assets for support.” Gates, supra at 438. The
party requesting attorney fees bears the burden of showing that an award is appropriate.
Borowsky v Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 687; 733 NW2d 71 (2007).
The evidence here generally established that defendant was not in a position to make
substantial payments toward her attorney fees and would therefore be required to invade her
assets to bear the expense of litigation. However, the record also evidences that plaintiff would
be required to invade his assets as well to bear, not only his attorney fees, but the amount
awarded against him. As a factor in awarding the fee that it did, the trial court found that
defendant unnecessarily delayed resolving this litigation, apparently with regard to valuing and
listing the marital home, which was relevant toward one of the tried issues. It was appropriate
for the trial court to consider that factor in lessening the amount of fees it awarded. Cf.
Borowsky, supra (providing that attorney fees are available where the party requesting the fees
has incurred them as a result of the other party’s unreasonable, protracted litigation).
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As for the amount awarded, roughly 25% of the amount then owed, this is not a situation
where the opposing party was in a comfortable position to pay without invading his support
assets and the trial court only awarded a small fraction of the attorney fees requested. See, e.g.,
Gates, supra at 436-438 (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding only
$5,500 of the $70,900 attorney fees requested in an action where the opposing party was
awarded over $500,000 in marital property and apparently had significant earning capacity).
Accordingly, because the trial court considered appropriate factors in awarding an amount of
attorney fees that was not unreasonable or unprincipled, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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