PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES ALLEN MATHIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275655
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-010964-01
CHARLES ALLEN MATHIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Meter and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, felon
in possession a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was acquitted of
two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89. He was sentenced, as a
fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to four to 20 years in prison for each felonious
assault conviction, four to 20 years in prison for the felon in possession conviction, four to 15
years in prison for the carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and two years in prison for the
felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s codefendant, Mercedes Smoot, was charged with two counts of assault with
intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and two alternative counts of felonious assault, MCL
750.82. Smoot waived her right to a jury trial. The trial court granted Smoot’s motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the prosecutor’s presentation of evidence. Afterward, Smoot
testified as a witness on defendant’s behalf.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that because the case against Smoot was
dismissed after a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court erred when it gave the jury an
“accomplice testimony” instruction with regard to Smoot. We disagree.
“A trial court's decision whether to give an accomplice instruction is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 608; 709 NW2d 595 (2005).
Moreover, this Court reviews jury instructions in their entirety to determine if there is error
requiring reversal. People v McFall, 224 Mich App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997).
“Instructions that are somewhat imperfect are acceptable, as long as they fairly present to the
jury the issues to be tried and sufficiently protect the rights of the defendant.” People v Perry,
218 Mich App 520, 526; 554 NW2d 362 (1996).
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“The determination whether a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the case lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v Heikkinen, 250 Mich App 322, 327; 646
NW2d 190 (2002). Additionally, accomplice credibility is a jury question. Id. Because an
“accomplice may have a special interest in testifying . . . the testimony is suspect and must be
received only with great care and caution.” Id. A jury instruction regarding a “disputed
accomplice” – such as that given in the instant case – is appropriate where there is a factual
dispute concerning whether the witness “took part in the crimes that [the] defendant was charged
with committing . . . .” See Perry, supra at 527-529. An accomplice instruction may be
especially appropriate in cases involving closely drawn credibility contests. Heikkinen, supra at
328, 337.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury using a modified version of CJI2d 5.5 and
5.6, stating:
Before you may consider what Mercedes Smoot said in court, you must
decide whether she took part in the alleged crime that the defendant is charged
with committing. Ms. Smoot has not admitted to taking part in the crime, but
there is evidence that could lead you to think that she did.
A person who knowingly and willingly helps or cooperates with someone
else in committing a crime is called an accomplice. When you think about Ms.
Smoot’s testimony, first decide if she was an accomplice. If, after thinking about
all of the evidence, you decide that she did not take part in this crime, judge her
testimony as you judge that of any other witness.
But if you decide that Ms. Smoot was an accomplice, then you must
consider her testimony in the following way: You should examine her testimony
closely and be very careful about accepting it. You may think about whether the
accomplice’s testimony is supported by other evidence because then it may be
more reliable.
However, there is nothing wrong with using an accomplice as a witness.
When you decide whether to believe an accomplice, consider the following: Was
the accomplice’s testimony falsely slanted to make the defendant seem not guilty
because of the accomplice’s own interests, bias or for some other reason?
In general, you should consider an accomplice’s testimony more
cautiously than you would that of an ordinary witness. You should be sure you
have examined it closely before you base an acquittal or conviction on it.
There is evidence in the lower court record that Smoot knowingly and willingly helped or
cooperated with defendant in committing crimes against Stephen Babb and Maria Sanders.
Smoot drove defendant to the scene of the crimes at least once.1 Furthermore, around the time of
1
Babb and Sanders identified Smoot as the driver during defendant’s first trip to the gas station
where the crimes occurred, even though testimony from Jackeline Harrington, Daryl Sawyer, and
(continued…)
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the crimes, she only drove away from the gas station after defendant’s repeated prompts, and she
searched the neighborhood for defendant afterward. Nevertheless, Smoot never admitted to
encouraging or helping with the crimes. Additionally, she testified that she did not see defendant
with a gun. Finally, the trial court granted Smoot’s motion for a directed verdict in the case
against her, finding that the prosecutor did not present evidence of concert of action beyond a
reasonable doubt.
There was a factual dispute concerning whether Smoot knowingly and willingly helped
or cooperated with defendant in the crimes. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in instructing the jury to consider whether Smoot was an accomplice and to
examine her testimony closely if they determined that she was.
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel when his attorney failed to move to suppress the on-scene identifications made by Babb
and Sanders. Defendant claims that the circumstances surrounding the identifications were
unduly suggestive. We disagree.
Because there was no evidentiary hearing below with regard to defendant’s ineffective
assistance claim, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). The determination whether a defendant
has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). The court must
first find the facts and then decide whether those facts constituted a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. The trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. at 484485.
A prompt on-scene identification allows the police to immediately decide whether a
“suspect [is] connected with the crime . . . or merely an unfortunate victim of circumstances.”
People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 363; 650 NW2d 407 (2002) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, on-scene identifications are sometimes indispensable in order to
determine whether a subject should be released from police custody. Id. at 361-362. They also
allow victims to make identifications when their memories are fresh. Id. at 362. However, an
identification procedure “violates a defendant’s right to due process of law when it is so
impermissibly suggestive that it gives rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.”
People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998) (footnote omitted). An identification
procedure “is evaluated in light of the total circumstances to determine whether the procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.”
People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). The following factors are
relevant to determine the likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity for the witness to
view the suspect at the time the crime occurred; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the
accuracy of any prior descriptions by the witness; (4) the witness’s level of certainty during the
(…continued)
Smoot suggests that Harrington was that driver. Smoot admitted that she drove defendant on his
second trip to the gas station.
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identification; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. People v
Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304-305; 591 NW2d 692 (1998).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Babb’s and Sanders’s on-scene
identifications of defendant were not based on an impermissibly suggestive procedure leading to
a substantial likelihood of misidentification. First, Babb and Sanders observed both of
defendant’s trips to the gas station. The gas station was well-lit, so when he passed Babb’s car
they could see his face clearly. Furthermore, their attention was drawn to defendant on his first
trip because he spoke angrily to a man selling compact discs. On defendant’s second trip,
defendant exited a car thirty feet from Babb’s car, held a gun, and said, “talk that s--t now.”
Then, defendant approached Babb’s car, held the gun three inches from Babb’s head, and
demanded money. Thus, Babb and Sanders had adequate an opportunity to view defendant at
the time the crime occurred. Colon, supra at 305. Second, because Babb and Sanders felt
threatened by defendant, their attention was piqued. Id. Third, Babb’s and Sanders’s initial
descriptions of defendant accurately described his appearance and clothing, which he wore when
he was detained. Id. Fourth, Babb and Sanders immediately recognized defendant in the squad
car and there is no evidence on the record that they expressed uncertainty. Id. Finally, because
the police responded to the report of the assault, detained defendant, and executed the on-scene
identification within minutes, the length of time between the crime and the confrontation was
minimal. Id. Under these circumstances, Babb’s and Sanders’s on-scene identifications of
defendant did not violate defendant’s right to due process of law. Gray, supra at 111.
Michigan has adopted the ineffective assistance of counsel standard established by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984). Grant, supra at 485. Effective assistance is strongly presumed, and the
reviewing court should not evaluate an attorney’s decision with the benefit of hindsight. Id., p
485; People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). To demonstrate ineffective
assistance, a defendant must show: (1) that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, (2) that this performance likely affected the outcome of the trial, and
(3) that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Grant, supra at 485-486;
People v Rogers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Here, defendant’s attorney’s
performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Indeed, counsel is not
required to raise futile objections. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818
(2003). Because the on-scene identifications were not impermissibly suggestive, a motion to
suppress would have been futile.
Defendant lastly argues that the gun admitted at trial was irrelevant and consequently
inadmissible. Because defendant’s trial counsel explicitly stated on the record that he had no
objection to the admission of this evidence, this issue is waived and any error has been
extinguished. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to object to the admission of the abandoned gun into evidence. However,
defendant did not include this claim in his Statement of Questions Presented. Therefore, it is not
properly before this Court. See MCR 7.212(C)(5), and People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735,
748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). At any rate, the ineffective assistance claim is without merit
because we conclude that any objection by defense counsel would have been futile. Ackerman,
supra at 455. The recovery of an abandoned gun in the neighborhood of the assault several days
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after the crime made the charges against defendant more likely. The jurors properly were
allowed to assess the proper weight to be afforded to the gun.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Bill Schuette
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