IN RE JORDAN O LEWIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JORDAN O. LEWIS, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 15, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 281809
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-100298-NA
CARLENE KAYE LEWIS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Hoekstra and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (h). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that she was denied due process and equal protection when the
trial court did not permit her to be physically present for the termination hearing. At the time of
the hearing, respondent was incarcerated. She did not physically attend the hearing but
participated by telephone and was represented by counsel.
An incarcerated parent does not have the “absolute right to be present at the dispositional
hearing.” In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 48-49; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). This Court has
applied the three-part balancing test set forth in Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319; 96 S Ct 893;
47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), to determine whether a trial court has to secure the physical presence of an
incarcerated parent at a termination hearing. Id. at 50. The Mathews balancing test requires the
reviewing court to look at the “private interest that will be affected by the official action,” the
likelihood of “an erroneous deprivation of such interest” and the probability that other
procedures would protect that interest, and the “[g]overnment’s interest,” which includes “the
fiscal and administrative burdens” of a substitute procedure. Mathews, supra at 335.
With regard to the first factor, this Court has declared that the private interest affected by
parental termination hearings is a compelling one. Vasquez, supra at 47.
With regard to the second factor, the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation was not
increased by respondent’s physical absence at the termination hearing. Respondent’s attorney
knew that respondent was incarcerated and conferred with her at the pretrial hearing.
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Respondent also spoke with her attorney, the minor child, and the child’s attorney on the
morning of the termination hearing in the trial judge’s office. Although respondent had
difficulty hearing the testimony at times, and the trial court had to remind everyone present to
speak loudly and directly into the speaker for respondent, a review of the transcript reveals that
respondent’s presence would not have changed anything. The essential facts of the case were not
in dispute. Moreover, respondent does not assert on appeal that anything factually significant is
missing from the transcript for appellate review. Respondent was well represented and was able
to testify on her own behalf. At no time during the hearing did respondent or her attorney object
to the proceedings or ask for time to confer or discuss the testimony. Thus, the likelihood of an
erroneous deprivation of respondent’s parental rights as a result of her telephone appearance was
not increased by her physical absence. Id. at 48. Also, because there were no facts in dispute,
respondent’s physical presence would have not added any value to the hearing. Id.
With regard to the final factor, the burden on petitioner to transfer respondent from the
Ypsilanti prison where she was incarcerated to Flint where the termination hearing was held
would have been higher than any risk of erroneous deprivation in this case. Accordingly,
respondent’s presence at the termination hearing by telephone did not deny respondent her due
process rights.
Respondent’s equal protection argument also fails. Because there is no absolute right to
be physically present at the hearing to terminate parental rights and due process does not
necessarily require the trial court to procure the physical presence of an incarcerated parent, there
is no disparity in treatment between respondents who attend the hearing in person and by
telephone. Id. at 50.
Respondent also argues that the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights should
be reversed. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and
(g) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Therefore, any error in terminating respondent’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) was harmless because the trial court needed clear and
convincing evidence of only one statutory ground to support its termination order. In re
McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Further, the evidence did not show that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegation of long-term drug abuse in the petition,
and the caseworker assigned to the case testified that respondent had a severe addiction to crack
cocaine. Respondent failed to address her substance abuse problem, and after the March 7, 2006
adjudication hearing, respondent failed to participate in the case at all. Respondent was
incarcerated from June 2006 through the termination hearing, except for about two weeks in
April 2007. Respondent saw the minor child once during that time when she happened to run
into him in Flint. Respondent also spoke to the caseworker once in April 2007 and asked for a
visit, but visitation had already been suspended. Because respondent failed to make any attempts
to regain custody of her child and would not be able to participate in any services until May
2008, her earliest outdate, the trial court properly concluded that clear and convincing evidence
supported termination pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g).
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Considering that when the minor child was removed from respondent’s care he had lived
with her for less than one month because she had been incarcerated for the previous 11 years and
that he had actually only lived with respondent for about three or four years of his life, the trial
court properly concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not clearly contrary
to the best interests of the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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