PEOPLE OF MI V CHANTANTUS S FRANKLIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275203
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-018315-FC
CHANTANTUS S. FRANKLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Meter and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant Chantantus S. Franklin was convicted of one count of
second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and one count of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felony-firearm”), MCL 750.227b.
Defendant received concurrent sentences of 375 months to 65 years’ imprisonment for the
second-degree murder conviction, 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for each assault with intent to
commit murder conviction, and 40 months to five years’ imprisonment for the carrying a
concealed weapon conviction, and a consecutive sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Early in the morning of May 5, 2006, Akil Goodman was killed and David Washington
and Greg Curry were injured in a shooting outside a bar in Flint Township, Michigan. Before
the shooting, a series of arguments and fights inside the bar had prompted the bouncers to escort
a large group of people outside. The group lingered near the front door underneath a canopy
covering the sidewalk. When DeAndre Williams exited the bar, he started an argument with
Goodman. After a verbal exchange, Williams made several attempts to walk away and
Washington encouraged Goodman to leave. Witnesses testified that, suddenly, defendant fired
several gunshots into the crowd, hitting Goodman and Washington. Defendant jumped into the
rear passenger seat of his friend’s car parked nearby. The driver of the vehicle, Defan Pringle,
fired several shots at the front door of the bar and then drove away. Police stopped the car soon
thereafter and recovered two guns from the car. Forensics experts later concluded that the bullets
and casings recovered at the scene were fired from these guns.
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II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for pursing only an
innocence defense instead of presenting the alternative argument that defendant was provoked
and requesting a manslaughter instruction. We disagree. Our review of defendant’s allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). “Whether a person has been denied the
effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge must
first find the facts, then must decide whether those facts establish a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.” People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484;
684 NW2d 686 (2004). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its
constitutional determinations de novo. Id. at 484-485.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that his attorney’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this performance so
prejudiced him that he was deprived of a fair trial. Grant, supra at 485-486. Prejudice exists if a
defendant shows “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s errors.” Id. at 486. Effective assistance is strongly presumed. People v Toma, 462
Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). “This Court will not second-guess counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, and even if defense counsel was ultimately mistaken, this Court will not
assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rice (On Remand), 235
Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
A defendant is entitled to a manslaughter instruction if it is supported by a rational view
of the evidence. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 542; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). “[T]o show
voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the
passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a
reasonable person could control his passions.” Id. at 535. The provocation must cause “the
defendant to act out of passion rather than reason.” People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510, 518;
586 NW2d 578 (1998), aff’d 461 Mich 992 (2000). The provocation must also be “that which
would cause a reasonable person to lose control.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a manslaughter instruction
because this instruction was not supported by a rational view of the evidence. Mendoza, supra at
542. The direct evidence suggests that defendant was not involved in the fights that occurred at
the bar. Although defendant was present when Williams argued with Goodman by the front
door, Williams merely threatened a fistfight. Goodman and Washington were not armed and the
argument was waning when defendant shot at them repeatedly. Therefore, defendant was not
adequately provoked to kill in the heat of passion. Sullivan, supra at 518. Because the evidence
does not support a manslaughter instruction, trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to
request it. “Trial counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position.” People v Snider, 239
Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant argues that it could be inferred, from his stained white t-shirt and evidence that
a person with a white shirt was seen fighting inside the bar, that he had been in a fight.
Consequently, defendant argues that he shot in the heat of passion. However, even if defendant
had participated in that fight, the bouncer testified that those involved reconciled soon afterward.
Defendant did not go outside to retrieve his gun from the car until all of the fights inside the bar
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dissolved and the crowd was ejected 45 minutes later. Therefore, the period between the
argument involving the man with the white t-shirt and the shooting was sufficient to allow
defendant to control his passion.
Moreover, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s failure to
request a voluntary manslaughter instruction constituted sound trial strategy. The defense
strategy was to argue that defendant was not the shooter. Defense counsel’s decision to pursue
this defense and not request a manslaughter instruction falls within the purview of trial strategy,
which we will not second-guess in hindsight. Rice, supra at 445.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Bill Schuette
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