IN RE ANGELO ARTHUR SANTINI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ANGELO ARTHUR SANTINI.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 15, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 271491
Emmet Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-005341-DL
ANGELO ARTHUR SANTINI,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent was adjudicated responsible, following a jury trial, of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. MCL 750.520b(1)(g).1 He was sentenced to twelve to eighteen months of
juvenile probation, with thirty to ninety days of secure detention. He now appeals and we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Respondent first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication
for CSC-1. We agree. The charge against respondent was based upon causing personal injury to
the victim and the victim being mentally incapable. Respondent challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence on both the personal injury and the mentally incapable elements.
Turning to the mentally incapable element, MCL 750.520a(i) defines “mentally
incapable” as meaning “that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect that renders that
person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.” We
review a claim of insufficient evidence by looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecutor and determining whether a rational trier of fact could find each element of the
1
The jury had adjudicated respondent responsible for both first-degree and third-degree criminal
sexual conduct. But because the third-degree charge was in the alternative to the first-degree
charge, the trial court set it aside after trial.
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offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 443; 709 NW2d
152 (2005).
In Cox, a significant amount of evidence was presented establishing the victim’s mental
incapability. For example, there was testimony from a psychologist that the victim had
borderline intelligence, just above mental retardation, lacked self-insight or self-awareness, and
was easily manipulated and vulnerable to exploitation. Moreover, the psychologist opined that
the victim could not appreciate the social or moral significance of his acts, nor could he make an
informed decision regarding sexual activity. Id. at 444-445. Furthermore, a counselor testified
that, regarding the victim’s vulnerability to manipulation, the victim functioned emotionally at
the eight-year-old level and intellectually at the fourth or fifth grade level. Id. at 445.
By contrast in the case at bar, the prosecutor points to no such evidence to establish the
victim’s mental incapability. The prosecutor points to the victim’s own testimony that he suffers
from Asperger’s Syndrome, though no expert presented any such diagnosis, and that he had
difficulty picking up on some social cues. The prosecutor also refers to the victim’s testimony
regarding a lack of familiarity with the term “blow job” and that he thought what respondent
wanted was “a little weird.” Indeed, the prosecutor points to the victim’s testimony that he was
confused about what happened and that he did not think that he should have engaged in such
conduct. But that actually undermines petitioner’s position because it actually supports the
conclusion that the victim could appreciate the social or moral significance of his actions.
On the other hand, the limited expert testimony that was presented regarded the
evaluation of the victim for the need for special education services at school, with no such need
being found. There was no testimony to the effect that the victim was easily manipulated or
controlled. Indeed, a school evaluation presented by petitioner as an exhibit concluded that
while the victim “has some characteristics of Asperger’s Syndrome, these are not impacting
extensively on his ability to progress within the general curriculum without special education
services.”
In sum, we do not believe that petitioner presented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could reasonably conclude that the victim was mentally incapable. However, because a
conviction for CSC-3 does not require such a finding because of the victim’s age, the jury’s
adjudication of responsibility on that charge was adequately supported. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court erred in setting aside the adjudication of responsibility for thirddegree criminal sexual conduct instead of the adjudication on first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Therefore, on remand, the trial court shall enter an order reinstating the adjudication for
CSC-3 and setting aside the adjudication for CSC-1.
Because of our resolution of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the “mentally
incapable” element, we need not consider whether there was sufficient evidence regarding
personal injury.
Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence under
MCL 768.27a(1). We disagree. That statute provides that where a person is charged with an
offense that is included in the Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCL 28.722, with a minor victim,
evidence that the accused committed another offense against the minor that is included in the Sex
Offenders Registration Act is admissible if it is relevant.
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Respondent raises a number of arguments regarding why the evidence should have been
excluded. First, respondent argues that the evidence should have been excluded under MRE
404(b). But this Court has specifically held that MRE 404(b) does not apply where evidence is
admitted under MCL 768.27a. People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 618-619; 741 NW2d 558
(2007). Similarly, we reject respondent’s argument that the evidence should have been excluded
as more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403. MCL 768.27a clearly requires the admission
of all such evidence that is relevant. MRE 403 is a rule that provides for the exclusion of
relevant evidence if it is more prejudicial than probative. Accordingly, we conclude that MRE
403 is not applicable to evidence admitted under MCL 768.27a.
Next, respondent argues that the allegations regarding the prior conduct were not
substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence. They were, however, supported by the
testimony of the victim in the prior incident. That testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to
determine whether or not the incident happened and to determine the weight to be accorded those
allegations.
Finally, respondent argues that admission of the evidence violated the corpus delicti rule.
Because this was not evidence of respondent’s confession to the charged crime, the corpus delicti
rule is inapplicable. See People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 180-181; 740 NW2d 534
(2007).
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. While it
does appear that at least some, if not all, of the complained of testimony was, in fact,
inadmissible hearsay, any error was harmless. The same evidence was introduced through other,
proper means. Therefore, the hearsay testimony was at most cumulative and not particularly
significant in light of the surrounding testimony. Because it was not outcome determinative, it
does not merit reversal. People v Osantowski, 274 Mich App 593, 607; 736 NW2d 289 (2007).
Finally, respondent argues that he was denied a fair trial because of an intemperate and
prejudicial remark by the prosecutor referring to respondent as a sexual predator. Respondent,
however, has not preserved this issue for appeal by a timely objection and we are not persuaded
that plain error has occurred. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Respondent’s adjudication for first-degree criminal sexual conduct is reversed and the
matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an adjudication of responsibility for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct and the entry of a new order of disposition as appropriate. In all other
respects, this matter is affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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