PEOPLE OF MI V SINACA ANTWON TIMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274209
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 05-010612-FC
SINACA ANTWON TIMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and O’Connell and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction following a jury trial for first-degree
felony murder, MCL 750.316(b), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2), and several other felony counts based the shooting of Ricky Narvaiz, as
defendant attempted to escape from a Bay City apartment after entering to rob Narvaiz.
Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, as well as other concurrent and
consecutive prison sentences. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a singlephotograph identification of defendant as the shooter. To violate a defendant’s due process
rights, a photographic identification must be “so impermissibly suggestive that it gives rise to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92
(1998). Showing a witness a single photograph is considered a suggestive identification
procedure, id., but a suggestive identification procedure is only improper where the totality of the
circumstances indicate a substantial likelihood of misidentification, People v Williams, 244 Mich
App 533, 542; 624 NW2d 575 (2001), citing People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 306; 505 NW2d
528 (1993). Relevant factors to consider include: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the
suspect at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of a prior
description from the victim, (4) the witness’s level of certainty at the time of the pretrial
identification, and (5) the amount of time between the crime and the confrontation. People v
Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304-305; 591 NW2d 692 (1998).
In the present case, a witness was shown a single photograph of defendant by police
officers while the witness was in jail. The officer stated that the identification was only to
eliminate defendant as a suspect. Because we examine the effect of an identification procedure
rather than its justification, see Gray, supra at 114, we find that this was a suggestive
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identification. However, the witness testified that he had shot dice with defendant within weeks
prior to the shooting. He also had an opportunity to observe the assailant inside of the apartment
and while chasing the assailant as he attempted to flee. Indeed, the witness was close enough to
the assailant to throw a bicycle at him. The witness identified defendant at trial as the assailant.
Although the witness was uncooperative with police prior to the identification and gave
inconsistent statements, given how close the witness was to the assailant and that he had met
defendant prior to the shooting, “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, defendant has failed to
show that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Colon, supra at 305. We
conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence that the witness’s identification of
defendant had a sufficiently independent basis and was not based on any suggestiveness
surrounding the photographic identification. Id. Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence
identifying defendant as the shooter, including identification by two other witnesses, both of
whom had met defendant prior to the incident, any error “was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt” such that reversal is not required. People v Willing, 267 Mich App 208, 223; 704 NW2d
472 (2005).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to read
instructions to the jury regarding the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter. We disagree. Although both second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter are “necessarily included” lesser offenses to first-degree murder, People v
Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 541; 664 NW2d 685 (2003); People v Carter, 395 Mich 434, 437-438;
236 NW2d 500 (1975), a court is only required to instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense that
is “necessarily included” in the charged offense when “a rational view of the evidence would
support such an instruction,” Mendoza, supra at 533.
First-degree felony murder is defined by statute as a “[m]urder committed in the
perpetration of” one of several listed felonies, including armed robbery and first-degree home
invasion. MCL 750.316(b). Because the only elements separating first-degree felony murder
from second-degree murder are the predicate felonies, a second-degree murder instruction was
only necessary if a “rational view of the evidence” would support the finding that the perpetrator
did not shoot the victim while perpetrating either offense. We conclude that it does not.
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that defendant entered an apartment
occupied by the victim and others without permission, and that defendant threatened the group
with a gun while taking money and a cell phone from the victim, thereby establishing the
elements for both armed robbery, People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 319; 733 NW2d 351 (2007),
and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). While fleeing the apartment, and while
being pursued by the victim and another man, defendant fired a handgun two or three times. One
of those gunshots struck the victim, killing him. The term “perpetration” in the felony murder
statute is a broader concept than the elements of the predicate felony and includes any murder
committed “during the uninterrupted chain of events surrounding the commission of the
predicate felony . . . .” People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 121; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). Defendant
did not dispute the evidence, but whether he was the perpetrator. Consequently, the only rational
view of the evidence was that the victim’s shooter did so during a first-degree home invasion and
robbery, so that the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder was not required.
Mendoza, supra at 533.
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Manslaughter was similarly not required. “Manslaughter is murder without malice.” Id.
at 534. The element of malice “is negated by the presence of provocation and heat of passion.”
Id. at 540-541. Adequate provocation is “that which would cause a reasonable person to lose
control.” People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 715; 703 NW2d 204 (2005) (internal quotations
omitted). In the present case, there simply was no evidence of any provocation that a reasonable
juror could conclude was adequate. Any claim that the perpetrator was provoked by the
possibility of not escaping after his armed robbery is meritless. “Although defendant was
provoked, in a broad sense, that provocation is not one which we recognize as ‘adequate’ for the
purposes of the law of manslaughter.” See People v Gjidoda, 140 Mich App 294, 298; 364
NW2d 698 (1985). Without any evidence of provocation, no rational view of the evidence
supported a manslaughter instruction. Mendoza, supra at 533.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiff to
introduce six photographs taken during the victim’s autopsy. Defendant argues that the
photographs should have been excluded under MRE 403 because he was willing to stipulate the
cause of death, making the gruesome photographs more prejudicial than probative. Although
gruesome photographs should not be admitted to garner sympathy from a jury, “a photograph
that is otherwise admissible for some proper purpose is not rendered inadmissible because of its
gruesome details or the shocking nature of the crime.” People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 188;
585 NW2d 357 (1998).
The photographs were admitted into evidence as exhibits used by the pathologist who
examined the victim to show the victim’s injuries, both internal and external. They are accurate
reflections of the damage a bullet did to the victim’s body and are gruesome only to the extent
that the subject matter is gruesome. “Gruesomeness alone need not cause exclusion[,]” and
“[p]hotographs are not excludable simply because a witness can orally testify about the
information contained in the photographs.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909,
mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995). Moreover, “[t]he prosecution must carry the
burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant
specifically disputes or offers to stipulate any of the elements.” Id. at 69-70. Given that the
cause of death was an element of the crime, defendant’s offer to stipulate did not remove the
prosecution’s burden to prove it. “The claim that evidence that goes to an undisputed point is
inadmissible has also been rejected in criminal cases.” Id. at 71. We conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion is admitting the evidence. People v Cervi, 270 Mich App 603, 625; 717
NW2d 356 (2006).
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a police
officer to give his opinion concerning the likelihood that a latent fingerprint would be
sufficiently detailed for the state forensic scientist to attempt to match. Again, we disagree. As a
lay witness, the officer’s testimony was governed by MRE 701. This Court interpreted MRE
701 in People v Grisham, 125 Mich App 280, 286; 335 NW2d 680 (1983), holding that “any
witness is qualified to testify as to his or her physical observations and opinions formed as a
result of these observations.” The officer’s testimony was not overly dependent upon scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge and was a conclusion and helped assist the trier of fact
in explaining an absence of fingerprint evidence. Accordingly, the lay testimony was proper.
People v Oliver, 170 Mich App 38, 50; 426 NW2d 898 (1988), mod on other grounds 433 Mich
862 (1989). Even if its admission were error, the error was harmless because the lay witness’s
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testimony was largely cumulative of the testimony of a forensic scientist, and the error was
probably not “outcome determinative.” See People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 180; 712
NW2d 506 (2005).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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