JOSEPH EDWARD MOSKWA III V ROGER JOHN GRACIK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH EDWARD MOSKWA, III and NANCY
ANN MOSKWA,
UNPUBLISHED
May 1, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 277439
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 04-033960-CK
ROGER JOHN GRACIK,
Defendant,
and
ALMONT TOWNSHIP and PAUL M. WILCOX,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: White, P.J., and Hoekstra and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants Almont Township and Paul Wilcox appeal as of right the trial court’s order
granting appellees’ motion for relief from a previous order granting summary disposition in
favor of appellants. We affirm in part and reverse in part. This appeal is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This action arises out of appellees’ purchase of a newly constructed house in Almont
Township. The house was subsequently discovered to have numerous construction and building
defects.1 Wilcox, the building inspector for Almont Township, was required to conduct
inspections of the house prior to issuing a certificate of occupancy.
The claims against Almont Township and Wilcox were dismissed as the result of a
summary disposition motion asserting governmental immunity as a bar to appellees’ claims.
However, appellees were allowed to amend their complaint to include allegations of gross
negligence. Appellants renewed their motion for summary disposition on the basis that Almont
1
The house was constructed by defendant Gracik, who is not a party to this appeal.
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Township was a governmental agency performing a governmental function and that Wilcox’s
actions were not grossly negligent. Based on appellees’ apparent failure to produce sufficient
evidence of gross negligence to overcome governmental immunity, the trial court again granted
summary disposition in favor of Almont Township and Wilcox. The issue as to whether
appellants’ conduct was the proximate cause of appellees’ damage was not addressed in
appellants’ renewed motion.
Following the second entry of summary disposition in favor of Almont Township and
Wilcox, the State of Michigan commenced an investigation into the Township’s building
inspection practices. The investigation was triggered by complaints from appellees and other
homeowners in the area. As a result of the investigation, the director of the Bureau of
Construction Codes and Fire Safety issued a recommendation to withdraw authority for Almont
Township (and therefore Wilcox) to inspect or certify homes. The recommendation was based
on evidence accumulated during the investigation that showed substantial defects in the policies
and practices of Almont Township leading to failures of its building inspector, who was doubted
to be familiar with the current building code or to even have inspected certain areas of appellees’
home at all. The Construction Commission adopted the recommendation and issued a notice of
intent to withdraw construction code authority to the Township.
Appellees filed a motion for relief from the order granting summary disposition in favor
of appellants. Appellees’ motion asserted that this newly discovered evidence demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and as such, the renewed summary disposition
motion had been improperly granted. The trial court granted appellees’ motion and reinstated
their claims against Almont Township and Wilcox.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment or order for an
abuse of discretion. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 404; 651 NW2d
756 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that is not within
the range of principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d
809 (2006).
A trial court may relieve a party from a judgment or order upon motion within a
reasonable time, not to exceed one year, on the basis of newly discovered evidence. MCR
2.612(C)(1)(b), (C)(2). Four requirements must be met for newly discovered evidence to support
a motion for postjudgment relief: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, must be
newly discovered; (2) the evidence must not be merely cumulative; (3) the party moving for
relief must be found not to have been able to produce the evidence with reasonable diligence;
and, (4) the newly discovered evidence must be such that it is likely to change the result. South
Macomb Disposal Auth v American Ins Co, 243 Mich App 647, 655; 625 NW2d 40 (2000).
Appellees have clearly satisfied the first three criteria. The investigation by the State
which produced the evidence relied upon by appellees to support their motion for relief did not
commence until after the dismissal of this case. This evidence was not in existence at the time
the renewed motion for summary disposition was decided. Thus, the evidence was newly
discovered, not merely cumulative, and could not have been produced by appellees with
reasonable diligence. However, the parties dispute whether the newly discovered evidence
satisfied the final requirement.
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Appellants contend that the evidence was not likely to change the result because
appellees would still be unable to demonstrate that the alleged gross negligence on the part of
Wilcox and Almont Township was the proximate cause of their damage. Appellants further
contend that without this showing, appellees’ claims would be barred; therefore, the outcome
would remain the same. However, as noted above, the issue of proximate cause was not
addressed in appellants’ renewed motion for summary disposition. Moreover, the issue of
proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury. Helmus v Michigan Dep’t of
Transportation, 238 Mich App 250, 256, 604 NW2d 793 (1999).
In order to prevail, appellees are required to demonstrate that the outcome of the motion
for summary disposition would likely change as a result of the newly discovered evidence. In
order to do so, appellees have to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The trial court initially granted appellants’ renewed motion for summary disposition because
appellees failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as
whether the gross negligence exception applied. In light of the substantial evidence supplied by
appellees regarding the questionable policies and practices uncovered by the State investigation,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to appellees’ claims of gross negligence as to Wilcox and, thereby allowing the
reinstatement of appellees’ claims against Wilcox.
Appellants also argue that the outcome was unlikely to change as to Almont Township
because the newly discovered evidence does not negate the fact that the Township is immune
from tort liability as a governmental agency engaged in the exercise of a governmental function.
We agree.
Unless a narrow statutory exception applies, a governmental agency is immune from tort
liability if the agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL
691.1407(1). A governmental function is defined as “an activity that is expressly or impliedly
mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local ordinance, or other law.” MCL
691.1401(1)(f). State law provides local units of government the enabling authority to
administer and enforce recognized model building codes within their political boundaries. MCL
125.1507 et seq. Because the performance of inspections was authorized by statute, Almont
Township was engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, and because
appellees have not claimed that a statutory exception applies in this case, Almont Township is
immune from tort liability.2
While it is true that the State investigation resulted in a notice of intent to withdraw
authority for Almont Township to perform building inspections, the newly discovered evidence
provided by appellees in their motion for relief does not contradict the fact that the Township
was a governmental agency engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function at
2
The statutory gross negligence exception to governmental immunity applies to employees and
agents of governmental agencies, but not the agencies directly. See Gracey v Wayne Co Clerk,
213 Mich App 412, 420; 540 NW2d 710 (1995), abrogated on other grounds American
Transmissions, Inc v Attorney Gen, 454 Mich 135 (1997).
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the time appellees’ claims arose. Nor did any of the newly discovered evidence provide a basis
for a claim that one of the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity is applicable to the
present case. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellees’ motion for
relief from the previous order and allowing the reinstatement of the claims against Almont
Township. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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