PATRICIA BIALIK V STAMBAUGH TOWNSHIP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA BIALIK,
UNPUBLISHED
April 29, 2008
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 276281
Iron Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003508-AV
STAMBAUGH TOWNSHIP,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of
respondent Stambaugh Township’s Board of Zoning Appeals denying her application for a land
use permit. This matter is being decided without oral argument. MCR 7214(E). We reverse.
This case involves an attempt by petitioner to obtain a land use permit to repair or replace
a boathouse on her property. The boathouse constituted a nonconforming use because it was
located within 75 feet of the normal high water mark, which was prohibited by local ordinance
Article 7, Section 7.3. However, because the boathouse had been constructed well before the
enactment of the zoning ordinances, it enjoyed prior nonconforming use status.
Petitioner is a trustee of the Clarence J. Eusebio Trust, which owns the property where
the boathouse in question was located. The property was originally acquired by petitioner’s
uncle in the mid-1950s, and the boathouse was erected in the late 1950s. After the uncle’s death,
petitioner’s parents acquired the property and maintained the boathouse. The property was
subsequently placed in trust.
The matter of the boathouse was first brought before respondent’s Zoning Board of
Appeals (ZBA) when petitioner sought a variance for construction of a single-family home
within the side lot set-backs. During this meeting, petitioner requested permission to repair the
boathouse because a roof timber had recently fallen. The ZBA agreed to allow repairs but
“without encroachment of height or size of the original.”
Petitioner made plans to begin the repairs in the spring; however, the boathouse roof
completely collapsed during the winter from the weight of extraordinary snowfall. Petitioner
tore down the boathouse in the spring of 2004 and had started to replace it within the footprint of
the original structure when respondent’s zoning administrator issued a stop work order.
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Petitioner applied for a land use permit seeking permission to replace the boathouse. The zoning
administrator concluded that the prior nonconforming use had been discontinued, so he denied
the permit. Petitioner appealed to the circuit court, which remanded the matter to the ZBA for
further proceedings.
The ZBA conducted several meetings on the matter and again denied petitioner’s
application for a land use permit. At the final meeting, several area residents gave testimony as
to the dilapidated condition of the boathouse and that such condition had been present for an
extended period of time. Petitioner provided an affidavit that stated that she had never had any
intent to abandon the boathouse and that a watercraft of some kind had been stored in the
boathouse from the time of its construction until the timber fell, prompting her initial request to
repair the structure. There was no testimony to contradict this affidavit. Nevertheless, the ZBA
concluded that the zoning administrator correctly determined that the prior nonconforming use
had been abandoned; consequently, petitioner was not entitled to rebuild the boathouse.
Petitioner appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Despite
noting that the language of the ordinance, which presumes abandonment after one year of
nonuse, was probably invalid, the trial court found that substantial evidence about the state of
disrepair of the boathouse had been presented to the ZBA, and that the determination that the
boathouse had been abandoned was supported by the evidence. The court declined to redecide
the facts as found by the ZBA.
Petitioner argues that the decision of the ZBA, subsequently upheld by the circuit court,
was contrary to law because there was no showing that petitioner intended to abandon her prior
nonconforming use. We agree.
Pursuant to the zoning enabling act, the circuit court is required to review the record to
determine if the decision of the ZBA complies with the constitution and law of the state, is based
on proper procedure, is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole
record, and represents the reasonable exercise of discretion granted by law. MCL 125.3606(2).
We apply the same factors to our review of the circuit court’s decision. Reenders v Parker, 217
Mich App 373, 378; 551 NW2d 474 (1996). Board findings of fact are entitled to deference,
provided that they are procedurally proper, while the court has authority to decide questions of
law. Macenas v Village of Michiana, 433 Mich 380, 395-396; 446 NW2d 102 (1989).
A prior nonconforming use is a vested right in the use of particular property that does not
conform to zoning restrictions but is protected because it lawfully existed before the zoning
regulation’s effective date. Belvidere Twp v Heinze, 241 Mich App 324, 328; 615 NW2d 250
(2000). Generally speaking, a nonconforming use may not be expanded, and one of the goals of
local zoning is the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. Jerome Twp v Melchi, 184 Mich
App 228, 231; 457 NW2d 52 (1990). Thus, the vested right to continue a nonconforming use
may be lost through abandonment. Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 360; 196 NW2d 778
(1972). “The necessary elements of ‘abandonment’ are intent and some act or omission on the
part of the owner or holder which clearly manifests his voluntary decision to abandon.” Rudnik v
Mayers, 387 Mich 379, 384; 196 NW2d 770 (1972).
In Livonia Hotel, LLC v City of Livonia, 259 Mich App 116, 127-128; 673 NW2d 763
(2003) this Court rejected the validity of an ordinance provision that declared valid
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nonconforming uses1 abandoned solely on the basis of non use for one year. The Court held the
ordinance directly contravened the Dusdal-Rudnik requirement that intent to abandon must
accompany nonuse for a legal abandonment to arise. This Court emphasized the necessity for
showing an owner’s intention to abandon before prior nonconforming use status can be stripped.
Respondent contends that the testimony of area residents as to the condition of the
boathouse was sufficient to infer petitioner’s intent to abandon her prior nonconforming use. We
disagree.
An owner’s intent to intent to abandon a use may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Rudnik, supra at 385. But the Rudnik Court declined to find sufficient evidence of abandonment
in the testimony of the city building inspector that he had observed the property on many
occasions and noted it was vacant and in disrepair. Such testimony did not “clearly manifests
[the owner’s] voluntary decision to abandon” the use. Id. at 384.
In the instant case, in addition to the testimony of area residents as to the condition of the
boathouse, petitioner submitted an affidavit to the ZBA that affirmatively stated that she never
intended to abandon the nonconforming use. In addition, petitioner’s affidavit stated that
watercraft had been stored in the boathouse, except when it was being used in the lake, from the
time it was constructed until the fall of 2003 when a fallen roof timber damaged the canoe
currently being stored there. Some area residents who testified as to the general disrepair of the
boathouse also admitted that they could not see into the boathouse to say for sure that it was not
being used.
The evidence does not support the conclusion that petitioner intended to abandon using
the boathouse. Without such a showing, the elements of abandonment cannot be satisfied.
Rudnik, supra at 384. The trial court erred by upholding the decision of respondent’s ZBA.
We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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The valid nonconforming use at issue in City of Livonia arose from the issuance of a special use
permit under a prior ordinance.
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