NORMA GRISWATCH V PAUL NIEDZWIECKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NORMA GRISWATCH and DOLORES W.
LIPCHIK,
UNPUBLISHED
April 24, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 275188
Presque Isle Probate Court
LC No. 04-007955-ML
PAUL NIEDZWIECKI,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds,
their claim of a breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs challenge that order and an additional order
dismissing their claims involving incapacity and involving the scope of authority under a 1978
power of attorney. This action involved a dispute to the proper title of real property, a 120-acre
farm currently titled solely in defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
This action arose well after the decedent, the mother of plaintiffs and of defendant’s late
wife, Edith Niedzwiecki, added Edith in 1972 as a joint tenant of the farm, which the decedent
solely owned. The decedent was incapable of caring for herself for some time following her
husband’s death, and it is undisputed that Edith and defendant cared for her for well over 20
years before her death in 1999. In 1978, the decedent executed a power of attorney in favor of
Edith with respect to the farm. In 1992, Edith added defendant as a joint tenant of the farm.
Edith passed away in 1995, and plaintiffs contend that they are entitled, under intestate
principles, to a portion of the farm because, but for the addition of defendant as a joint tenant in
1992, the property would have transferred to them.
Plaintiffs filed suit and alleged incompetency of the decedent and undue influence and
breach of fiduciary duty by Edith, along with an additional claim that Edith acted beyond the
scope of authority granted in the power of attorney. Following a bench trial, the court found that
plaintiffs failed to carry their burden with regard to the decedent’s being incompetent at the time
the power of attorney was executed. The court also concluded that the power of attorney was
broad enough to allow Edith to add defendant as a joint tenant. After a second bench trial, the
court concluded that plaintiffs’ remaining claims were barred by the three-year limitations period
in MCL 600.5805(10).
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Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the power of attorney was
broad enough to allow Edith to add defendant as a joint tenant of the property. We disagree.
After a bench trial, a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo. MCR 2.613(C); Novi v Robert Adell Children’s Funded
Trust, 473 Mich 242, 249; 701 NW2d 144 (2005). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a
review of all the evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990).
A power of attorney is to be interpreted according to principles governing the law of
agency. Vanderwall v Midkiff, 166 Mich App 668, 677; 421 NW2d 263 (1988). Generally, a
power of attorney “should be strictly construed” and it “cannot be extended by construction.”
Long v City of Monroe, 265 Mich 425, 427; 251 NW 582 (1933). Document language is given
its plain and ordinary meaning, and a court may refer to a dictionary when terms are undefined.
English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 263 Mich App 449, 471-472; 688 NW2d 523
(2004). However, a power of attorney should be interpreted to effectuate the intent of the
parties, and if the obvious purpose of the instrument is to give the attorney the broadest possible
power in dealing with the principal’s real estate, that purpose should be effectuated. See
Continental Nat’l Bank v Gustin, 297 Mich 134, 148; 297 NW 214 (1941).
The power of attorney, in part, provided Edith with the authority “to sell, mortgage, rent,
and manage” all the real estate owned by the decedent. “Manage” means “to take charge of;
supervise.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Evidence at trial indicated
that Edith added defendant as a joint tenant to allow him to care for the decedent in the event
Edith predeceased the decedent. This is consistent with the authority to “manage” the property,
because it would have allowed defendant, as a joint title holder, to enter into any necessary
transactions involving the property that were required for the decedent’s wellbeing. Indeed, the
power of attorney document indicates, in broad language, that Edith possessed the power to
“generally act in the premises as effectually as” could the decedent. The power to effectually act
is the power to produce an intended effect. See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(1996) (defining the adjective “effectual”). Under the circumstances, and given all the language
of the power of attorney document, we conclude that no error occurred concerning the authority
granted to Edith.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in applying a three-year limitations period
instead of the 15-year limitations period in MCL 600.5801(4). Whether a particular limitations
period applies to a party’s action presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Detroit v 19675
Hasse, 258 Mich App 438, 444; 671 NW2d 150 (2003). Here, the gravamen of the complaint
was plaintiffs’ attempt to quiet title in the farm. Because the allegedly harmed interest involved
real property, we agree that the 15-year statute of limitations period applies, rendering this action
timely. See Adams v Adams (On Reconsideration), 276 Mich App 704, 710-711, 719; 742
NW2d 399 (2007).
The trial court did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims regarding breach of
fiduciary duty and undue influence because it relied exclusively on the three-year limitations
period as an affirmative defense. As In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68, 75; 658 NW2d 796
(2003), quoting Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW 77 (1976), observes, a claim of undue
influence requires that the plaintiff show
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“that the grantor was subjected to threats, misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud,
or physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower volition, destroy free
agency and impel the grantor to act against his inclination and free will. Motive,
opportunity, or even ability to control, in the absence of affirmative evidence that
it was exercised, are not sufficient.”
A presumption of undue influence arises when there is evidence of the following:
“(1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship[1] between the grantor
and a fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary, or an interest represented by the fiduciary,
benefits from a transaction, and (3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence
the grantor’s decision in that transaction.” [Karmey, supra at 73, quoting Kar,
supra at 537.]
In these circumstances, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption. In re
Peterson Estate, 193 Mich App 257, 260; 483 NW2d 624 (1991). Whether this presumption has
been rebutted is a question fact. Id. at 262.
As for breach of fiduciary duty, in the power of attorney context, “an agent may engage
in self dealing if the principal consents and has knowledge of the details of the transaction.” In
re Estate of Cummin, 474 Mich 1117, 1117; 712 NW2d 447 (2006). Further, a change in the
principal’s mental status does not affect the agent’s authority to transfer the property if the
principal had consented to the transaction with knowledge of its details. Id. Depending on the
factual circumstances, self-dealing may arise when the transaction involves a relative of the
agent. See, e.g., Thiel v Cruikshank, 96 Mich App 7, 10-12; 292 NW2d 150 (1980) (concluding
that a transaction involving the personal representative of the estate and his son constituted
improper self-dealing).
This Court’s role is to review the trial court’s decision but not to make factual findings.
Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 34 n 12; 609 NW2d 567 (2000). Because these
claims involve factual disputes that the trial court has yet to address, we remand for further
proceedings.
Plaintiffs finally argue that the trial court erred in finding that they did not carry their
burden of showing that the decedent was incompetent at the time she executed the power of
attorney. This issue has been waived because plaintiffs’ counsel agreed as much following the
first bench trial. Roberts v Mecosta Co Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 64 n 4; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). In
any event, the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. While there was substantial
evidence to show that the decedent was not self-sufficient and required constant care from the
early 1970s until her death, there was insufficient evidence relating to her mental capacity at the
1
A fiduciary relationship exists between the grantor and grantee of a power of attorney. In re
Conant Estate, 130 Mich App 493, 498; 343 NW2d 593 (1983).
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time the power of attorney was executed so as to establish that she was incompetent. See
Persinger v Holst, 248 Mich App 499, 503, 507; 639 NW2d 594 (2001).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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