JENNIFER L SMITH V STEVEN J CARRICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIFER L. SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
April 24, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274282
Barry Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000387-DO
STEVEN J. CARRICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, defendant appeals as of right the May 23, 2006, judgment of
divorce, challenging the trial court’s division of property. He also appeals the trial court’s order
denying his motion for new trial or an amended judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
In reviewing a trial court’s property distribution, we first review the trial court’s factual
findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151; 485 NW2d
893 (1992). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207
(1990). If we uphold the trial court’s factual findings, we must decide whether the dispositive
ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Sparks, supra at 151-152. We will affirm the
dispositive ruling unless we are left with a firm conviction that the distribution was inequitable.
Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 7; 706 NW2d 835 (2005).
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in finding the entire value of his 1974 MG
motor vehicle to be a marital asset. We agree.
A judgment of divorce must include a determination of the property rights of the
divorcing parties. MCR 3.211(B)(3); Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App 619, 627; 671 NW2d 64
(2003). In determining the property rights of the parties, the trial court must first determine
which, if any, assets are separate and which assets are marital assets. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich
App 490, 494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). Generally, marital assets are divided between the parties,
while each party retains his or her separate assets with no invasion from the other party.
McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 177, 183; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). Defendant purchased the
1974 MG in 1992, six years before he married plaintiff. Accordingly, the car was not a marital
asset. It was not purchased with assets earned during the marriage. See Byington v Byington,
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224 Mich App, 103, 110; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). The trial court clearly erred when it found the
1974 MG to be a marital asset. Sparks, supra.
However, a party’s separate estate may be invaded when “the other spouse ‘contributed
to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property.’” Reeves, supra at 490,
quoting MCL 552.401. Defendant admits that the value of the 1974 MG increased during the
marriage, and that he invested marital money into it. Accordingly, the increase in the value of
this vehicle is a marital asset. See Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 292-293; 662 NW2d 111
(2003). Defendant testified that, when he married plaintiff in 1992, the value of the car was
$8,000, and plaintiff presented no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because the trial court
valued the 1974 MG at $10,000 at the time of trial, the trial court should only have included
$2,000 of the car’s value1 as part of the marital estate. We reverse the trial court’s finding that
the 1974 MG was a marital asset, and remand for an appropriate adjustment to the judgment.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted plaintiff
property adjustments totaling $24,000. Defendant argues that, had the trial court considered all
of the relevant property distribution factors, it would have realized that an equitable distribution
of the marital estate required adjustments in his favor.
The trial court’s goal in distributing the marital estate is to reach an equitable distribution
of the property in light of all the circumstances. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 423; 664
NW2d 231 (2003). To reach an equitable distribution, a trial court should consider nine factors:
(1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital
estate, (3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties,
(6) necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties,
(8) past relations and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity.
[Sparks, supra at 159-160.]
Although each factor will not be relevant to every case, when a factor is relevant, the trial court
shall make specific findings of fact regarding it. Id. at 159-160.
The record indicates that the trial court knew it should consider the Sparks factors
because it listed them, and stated that it was required to consider them before making
adjustments to the marital property. However, the trial court only made specific factual findings
regarding the second factor. Thus, while there was evidence regarding the duration of the
marriage, along with the ages, health, life status, necessities and circumstances, and earning
abilities of the parties, the trial court made no factual findings regarding these factors. Moreover,
from our review of the record, it is clear that the trial court relied on these factors when it
1
We reject plaintiff’s argument that, during the course of the parties’ marriage, the value of the
1974 MG increased from $500 to $10,000. Plaintiff’s assertion that, after defendant sold the
car’s Roover V8 engine for $7,500, the value of the MG dropped $7,500 is speculation and
conjecture. She presented no evidence to the trial court regarding the value of the MG after the
engine was removed.
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distributed the marital estate. The trial court stated that, given the financial and physical
contributions to the marital home, the length of the marriage, and the Sparks factors, an equitable
distribution of the marital estate required an adjustment of $24,000 in favor of plaintiff.
A trial court’s distribution of the marital estate is intimately related to its factual findings.
Sparks, supra at 162 n 31. Without the necessary findings of fact, we cannot reasonably
determine whether the trial court’s adjustment of $24,000 in favor of plaintiff was equitable
under the circumstances. McNamara, supra at 189. Because the trial court failed to make
factual findings regarding the relevant Sparks factors, we remand for further factual findings.
See McNamara, supra at 186-187.
Defendant next claims the trial court erred “as a matter of law” in denying his motion for
new trial or an amended judgment. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
Coble v Green, 271 Mich App 382, 389; 722 NW2d 898 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the result is outside the range of principled outcomes. Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151,
158; 732 NW2d 472 (2007).
Two days after the judgment of divorce was signed by the trial court, defendant allegedly
learned at a regularly scheduled employees’ meeting that, as of December 31, 2005, the value of
the shares in his employee stock ownership program (ESOP) had decreased from $177 to $156
per share. In his motion for new trial, defendant requested that the trial court reduce the value of
the ESOP assigned to him and, thereby, increase the amount of money plaintiff was required to
pay him.
To receive a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, under MCR
2.116(A)(1)(f), a party must prove: “(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was
newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could
not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the
new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial.” People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692;
664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotations omitted). “If the facts stated in the motion for a new trial or
to amend the judgment do not appear on the record of the action, the motion must be supported
by affidavit.” MCR 2.611(D)(1).
Defendant’s affidavit, along with the May 31, 2006, letter from his employer, Dickinson
Press, establish that Dickinson Press did not inform its employees of the reduced stock value
until May 25, 2006. However, defendant’s affidavit and the letter do not establish when
Dickinson Press learned of the reduced value. Defendant failed to present the trial court any
affidavit from a Dickinson Press employee with knowledge of the independent audit and
valuation, indicating that the valuation had not yet been completed by April 24, 2006, the date of
trial. Because defendant did not present the trial court with an affidavit establishing that the
decreased stock value was not available at the time of trial, and could not have been obtained by
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defendant through contact with his employer,2 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for new trial. Coble, supra. Defendant failed to show that he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the decreased value of his stock at
trial. Cress, supra.
In his fourth and final issue, defendant argues that the trial court erred “as a matter of
law” when it failed to grant him adjustments in his favor under Sparks. Because we have
determined above to remand to the trial court for further factfinding on the Sparks factors, this
issue is moot. Ewing v Bolden, 194 Mich App 95, 104; 486 NW2d 96 (1992).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
2
Although defendant’s attorney told the trial court at the hearing on defendant’s motion that the
independent audit and valuation were not completed by the time of trial, the attorney’s comments
were insufficient to support defendant’s motion. The statements were not made in an affidavit,
as required. MCR 2.611(D)(1).
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