PEOPLE OF MI V DEANGELO DIXON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 277301
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000364
DEANGELO DIXON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Donofrio and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit great
bodily harm, MCL 750.84, two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felonious assault, MCL
750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to five to ten years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent
to commit great bodily harm conviction, 12 to 24 years’ imprisonment for each armed robbery
conviction, one to four years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction, and two years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for a new
trial, which the trial court granted. The prosecution appeals by delayed leave granted the trial
court’s order granting defendant a new trial. Because defendant has not demonstrated that
individual or cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial, we reverse the trial court’s order
granting defendant a new trial.
The prosecutor’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting defendant a new trial. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a new trial
for an abuse of discretion. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 648 n 27; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231
(2003). Defendant moved for a new trial on the three grounds: (1) the prosecutor erred by
eliciting testimony from a police officer that defendant did not give a post-arrest, post-Miranda1
statement, (2) defendant was denied due process where the prosecutor elicited testimony that
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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defendant was incarcerated while awaiting trial, and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors
deprived defendant his right to a fair trial.
At trial, during the examination of Officer Kenneth Emerson of the Detroit Police
Department, the prosecutor sought to elicit testimony regarding the address that defendant
provided to the police. The following exchange occurred:
Q. Did you have an opportunity to speak to the Defendant in this case?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Is it true that he did not give a statement regarding the incident; is that
correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Did you take information from the Defendant such as like his vitals, such as,
his height, weight, et cetera?
A. Yes. [Emphasis added.]
A prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence for
impeachment purposes or as substantive evidence of guilt violates a defendant’s due process
rights. People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 573-574; 628 NW2d 502 (2001), citing Doyle v Ohio,
426 US 610; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976) (stating that “Miranda warnings carry an
implicit assurance that silence in reliance on those warnings will not be penalized”). While a
single comment alone may constitute a Doyle violation, a single mention does not automatically
suffice to violate a defendant’s rights when the prosecution does not specifically and expressly
attempt to use the improper comment to impeach the defendant. Id., at 579.
As an initial matter, the record is unclear regarding whether police gave defendant
Miranda warnings before Officer Emerson spoke with him. Even assuming that police had
given defendant Miranda warnings, the record does not support a finding of plain error.
Although the prosecutor’s remark was not inadvertent, there is nothing to suggest that it was a
calculated attempt to interject defendant’s post-Miranda silence into the trial to taint the jury
against defendant. Moreover, it is significant that (1) neither the questioning nor the testimony
insinuated that defendant’s silence implied guilt and (2) the prosecutor did not attempt to use the
comment to impeach defendant. There was no further questioning or argument regarding
defendant’s silence. The fleeting nature of the remark, coupled with the fact that the prosecutor
did nothing to suggest that defendant’s silence was improper, supports a conclusion that the
remark did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Dennis, supra at 575-577 (relying on the fleeting
nature of the improper remark concerning silence to find no due process violation).
In any event, even assuming that defendant’s due process rights were violated by the
impermissible reference to his post-Miranda silence, defendant fails to show prejudice. The
evidence against defendant was considerable and decisive. Two witnesses testified that
defendant robbed and shot at them. When police arrested defendant he was in possession of a
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portion of the stolen goods. On these facts it is not reasonably likely that the outcome of the trial
would have been different had the error not occurred. Defendant fails to establish prejudice.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied due process as a result of the prosecutor’s
elicitation of testimony that defendant was incarcerated while awaiting trial. During the crossexamination of defendant’s girlfriend and alibi witness, Annette Treadwell, the prosecutor
sought to challenge her credibility by asking whether she had regularly spoken to defendant after
the date of the crime. The following exchange occurred:
Q. And you also have a number, don’t you, that is 313 499-5019?
A. Yeah, was my aunt’s number.
Q. And the number that you provided Mr. Glenn [defense counsel], correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve actually used that number to call Mr. Dixon while he is been [sic]
incarcerated; is that correct?
A. Yes. [Emphasis added.]
After defendant objected and moved for a mistrial, the prosecutor explained that her sole
purpose in raising the issue was to show that Treadwell was of questionable credibility because
she had not come forward with the alibi information sooner, even though she regularly spoke to
defendant in the months between the offense and his trial. After extensive discussion, the trial
court instructed counsel to brief the issue and provide case law regarding whether a curative
instruction could remedy the improper reference to defendant’s incarceration. The next day, the
trial court rendered its conclusion that the prosecutor did err, but that the error could be cured
with an instruction.2 The trial court determined that the prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s
incarceration did not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial.
References to a defendant’s incarceration are generally inadmissible. People v Spencer,
130 Mich App 527, 537; 343 NW2d 607 (1983). Preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct
are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial, i.e., whether prejudice resulted. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001). Here, the trial court found, and we agree, that the prosecutor erred by
eliciting testimony concerning defendant’s incarceration. However, the brief and singular
mention of defendant’s incarceration did not prejudice his ability to receive a fair trial. The
2
The trial court gave the following curative instruction:
[T]here has been some testimony that the Defendant may have been in jail or in
custody at some point during these proceedings. As a Defendant under arrest
means in custody, this comment is . . . of no consequence in this case and you
should disregard it during your deliberations.
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reference to defendant’s incarceration was transient, the prosecutor did not expand on the matter
with further questioning, and she did not bring it up in her closing argument. The trial court’s
curative instruction directly addressed the prosecutor’s remark and alleviated any prejudice that
may have resulted. In light of the substantial evidence against defendant, and the relatively
minor effect of the prosecutor’s error, the error did not prevent defendant from receiving a fair
and impartial trial.
Finally, defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. The
cumulative effect of several minor errors may warrant reversal where the individual errors would
not. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). But, in order to reverse
on the basis of cumulative error, “the effect of the errors must [be] seriously prejudicial in order
to warrant a finding that defendant was denied a fair trial.” Id., at 388. Considering that the two
errors were not seriously prejudicial, and the evidence against defendant was strong, defendant’s
cumulative error argument is without merit.
Reversed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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