IN RE HOPKINS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JANIYAH MARIE HOPKINS
and CAMRON TYLER HOPKINS, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 10, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 279750
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-706711-NA
SHAWANNA HOPKINS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Shawanna Hopkins appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to her minor children, Janiyah Marie Hopkins and Camron Tyler Hopkins under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).1 We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
Janiyah became a temporary court ward when Hopkins’ grandmother sought to terminate
Hopkins’ guardianship. Hopkins was 16 years old at that time. Hopkins utilized numerous
services, including a mother-baby residential center, a daytime learning center and nights with
her sister, Job Corps, and alternative education high schools. She was jailed twice, but the
charges were dropped, and she was asked to leave the learning center because she violated rules
and had altercations with peers. Camron was removed at birth when Hopkins was again living
with her grandmother and searching for stable housing and employment. Testimony indicated
that she delayed in obtaining prenatal care and she admitted she did not complete required drug
screens.
1
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide
proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent).
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II. Statutory Grounds For Termination
A. Standard Of Review
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that the petitioner has proven at
least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.2 We review
for clear error a trial court’s decision terminating parental rights.3 A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.4 We give regard to the special opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.5
B. Analysis
Hopkins argues that petitioner Department of Human Services (DHS) should have
offered more assistance because she was young and a court ward when these proceedings began.
DHS generally must make reasonable efforts to rectify the problems that led to adjudication,6
consistent with the general policy favoring preservation of families.7 If DHS failed to make
reasonable efforts, the failure to do so may prevent DHS from establishing statutory grounds for
termination.8 Some respondents may require extra assistance,9 but assistance is not unlimited.10
For two years, Hopkins was involved in various residential and nonresidential programs
intended to address her problems, but she was dismissed because of physical and verbal
altercations and failure to follow rules. Although there were sometimes delays that were not
Hopkins’ fault, she was offered adequate services and simply was unwilling or unable to take
advantage of them. A parent’s failure to comply with the parent/agency agreement is evidence
of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the child.11
2
MCL 712A.19b(3); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Sours, 459 Mich
624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
3
MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours, supra
at 633.
4
In re JK, supra at 209-210.
5
MCR 2.613(c); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989).
6
MCL 712A.18f; In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
7
MCL 712A.1(3).
8
See In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 67-68, 70; 472 NW2d 38 (1991).
9
Id.
10
In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27-28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
11
In re JK, supra at 214; In re Trejo, supra at 360-363, 361, n 16.
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The trial court did not err when it found clear and convincing evidence that Hopkins
failed to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication and was not reasonably likely to rectify
such conditions within a reasonable time.12 There was no evidence regarding how long Hopkins
could remain with her grandmother. She obtained a restaurant job just a few weeks before the
termination hearing and had no history of maintaining employment or staying in a job training
program. She also failed to complete drug screens and delayed in obtaining prenatal care during
her second pregnancy. She had sufficient time to demonstrate financial and emotional stability
and was unable to do so. The same evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Hopkins
failed to provide proper care and custody and was not reasonably likely to within a reasonable
time.13
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for
termination of Hopkins’ parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.
III. Best Interests Determination
A. Standard Of Review
Once a petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights, unless the trial
court finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
interests.14 There is no specific burden on either party to present evidence of the children’s best
interests; rather, the trial court should weigh all evidence available.15 We review the trial court’s
decision regarding the child’s best interests for clear error.16
B. Analysis
Hopkins argues that the trial court erred in its best interests analysis because of the
children’s young ages. We disagree.
Although Hopkins had a bond with her daughter,17 this was outweighed by the children’s
need for stability two years after the eldest child was removed from Hopkins’ care.18 Hopkins
faced difficult challenges because of her age and lack of parental support; however, the trial
court was required to determine what was in her children’s best interests. We conclude that the
12
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
13
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
14
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 350.
15
In re Trejo, supra at 354.
16
Id. at 356-357.
17
See In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 301; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
18
In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
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trial court did not clearly err when it held that termination was not clearly against the children’s
best interests and terminated Hopkins’ parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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