SHELLY M KRASTES V HASELEY CONSTRUCTION CO INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHELLY M. KRASTES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 10, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
AUTO CLUB OF MICHIGAN,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
No. 276545
WCAC
LC No. 02-000351
HASELEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
RELIANCE INS. CO., and MICHIGAN
PROPERTY & GUARANTY ASSN.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
GRAYCOR SERVICES, AMERICAN RISK
FUNDING INS. CO., FLUOR CORP., and
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO.,
Defendants.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Haseley Construction Company and its workers’ compensation insurers,
Reliance Ins. Co., and Michigan Property & Guaranty Assn., appeal by leave granted the opinion
and order of the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) that reversed the
magistrate’s order stopping the payment of disability benefits to plaintiff Shelly Krastes. We
reverse the WCAC and reinstate the magistrate’s order granting defendants’ petition to stop
payment of benefits.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Haseley Construction employed Krastes as a heavy equipment operator on a construction
site. This work involved repeated movement of her arms, legs, and neck. Krastes applied for
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disability benefits based on an injury that occurred on June 15, 1998, when she was thrown from
a “port-a-john” that was apparently struck by a piece of equipment. She immediately suffered
pain in her neck, right arm, and shoulder. Krastes stopped working on July 8, 1998, because of
the pain. She was treated with physical therapy and medication, and released to work without
restrictions in February 1999. She began working for another employer as a forklift operator and
suffered increased pain in her neck, shoulder, and arm. These symptoms progressed until
Krastes could no longer work as a heavy equipment operator. Krastes subsequently began
receiving psychological treatment for depression.
Krastes applied for disability benefits based on physical and psychological disability. In
July 2002, the magistrate granted Krastes an open award of disability benefits. The magistrate
found that Krastes sustained a disabling physical injury on June 15, 1998, while employed by
Haseley Construction, specifically finding that the injury resulted in a cervical strain or sprain
that developed into a chronic pain disorder and rendered her unable to return to work as a heavy
equipment operator. The magistrate’s findings were based on Krastes’ testimony, medical
records, and deposition testimony from Krastes’ expert physician, Dr. Jacquelyn Lockhart.
Although the magistrate found Krastes disabled based on the injury to her neck and shoulders,
she also found that Krastes had failed to prove a psychiatric disability.
Defendants appealed the magistrate’s July 2002 order to the WCAC, which affirmed the
magistrate’s findings but remanded the matter for the magistrate to evaluate disability and wage
loss according to Sington v Chrysler Corp.1 In January 2005, the magistrate found Krastes
disabled under Sington.
In August 2004, Haseley Construction filed a petition to stop paying Krastes disability
benefits based on the argument that her injuries had healed such that she was no longer
physically disabled from working. Haseley relied on an examination of Krastes by Dr. Paul
Drouillard, DO., and further supported its position with videotapes of Krastes taken by a private
investigator. Those tapes apparently showed Krastes engaged in driving her truck and other
activities. Dr. Drouillard testified at deposition that he examined Krastes on August 7, 2004, and
found no spasm or trigger points, restricted motion, weakness, or atrophy of the cervical spine.
He also found no weakness, instability, or impingement of the rotator cuff. Dr. Drouillard
reviewed x-rays and MRI films of the affected areas and found no objective evidence to support
Krastes’ complaints of pain or a work-related injury. Dr. Drouillard concluded that Krastes
could return to work without restrictions.
Krastes responded, relying on the deposition testimony of Dr. Keith Barbour, who started
treating her in November 2000. Dr. Barbour’s initial diagnosis was that Krastes suffered from
somatic dysfunction, myofascial pain, C-7 radiculopathy, rotator cuff syndrome, sympathetic
pain syndrome, and stress syndrome. Since that time, Dr. Barbour dropped his diagnoses of
rotator cuff syndrome, sympathetic pain syndrome, and thoracic outlet syndrome. Dr. Barbour
maintained that Krastes still suffered from somatic dysfunction and myofascial pain. He
explained that Krastes’ condition was essentially a soft tissue injury and that objective studies
1
Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144; 648 NW2d 624 (2002).
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were within normal limits. Dr. Barbour noticed significant improvement in Krastes’ ability to
relax her arm and neck muscles, and believed that her condition was slowly improving over time.
However, Dr. Barbour found that Krastes still showed symptoms consistent with his earlier
findings and maintained the same restrictions on her that he had imposed in 2000.
The very same magistrate who had originally found Krastes to be disabled reviewed the
competing medical evidence and the videotape, and, relying on Dr. Drouillard’s testimony,
concluded that Krastes was no longer disabled as a result of her 1998 injury, explaining as
follows:
I find the evidence establishes the plaintiff’s disability ended as of August 7,
2004, the date of Dr. Drouillard’s examination. In reaching my conclusion, I find
the testimony of Dr. Drouillard to be more persuasive than that of Dr. Barbour,
and I rely on his findings and conclusions. I note that plaintiff sustained a soft
issue injury almost seven years prior to this hearing. All of objective studies have
been negative and even Dr. Barbour conceded that many of his initial diagnoses
have resolved. He also conceded that plaintiff’s ongoing complaints were
significantly affected by her stress and emotional problems. I find it significant
that Dr. Barbour’s diagnoses are based, in part, on plaintiff’s subjective
complaints, as was his testimony as to the necessity and extent of physical
restrictions. However, his testimony as to plaintiff’s physical restrictions was not
consistent with her activity demonstrated on the videotape and thus causes this
magistrate to question the reliability of his conclusions. While plaintiff does not
perform any significant physical activity, she is shown getting into her truck and
turning her head without any apparent hesitation, activities that Dr. Barbour felt
would be difficult for plaintiff to perform. Having considered the testimony of
both medical experts, I find Dr. Drouillard’s findings and opinions more
persuasive than those of Dr. Barbour and I accept his testimony as to the lack of
any ongoing physical limitation. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to recoup any
benefits paid to plaintiff after August 7, 2004, the date disability ended.
The magistrate granted Haseley Construction’s petition to stop payment of benefits in June 2005.
Krastes appealed the magistrate’s June 2005 order to the WCAC, arguing, in pertinent
part, that the magistrate’s conclusion that Krastes was no longer disabled was not supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence. The WCAC reversed the magistrate’s order,
rejecting Dr. Drouillard’s testimony that Krastes was no longer disabled on the ground that he
had only examined her in August 2004. Specifically, because Dr. Drouillard had not examined
Krastes at the time she was originally found to be disabled, the WCAC concluded that “he had
no understanding of what plaintiff’s condition had been at the time she was found to be disabled”
and “was unable to explain how, if at all, her condition had changed.” The WCAC criticized the
magistrate’s rejection of Dr. Barbour’s testimony, stating as follows:
The magistrate rejected Dr. Barbour’s opinions, finding them to be
unreliable.
Interestingly, Dr. Barbour provides the only evidence of
improvement, or “change of condition,” in this record. However, even though Dr.
Barbour testified that he is seeing gradual improvement in plaintiff’s emotional
condition, he does not believe that she has recovered sufficiently from a physical
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standpoint, to be able to return to her former work as a heavy equipment operator.
Dr. Barbour’s testimony does not provide the requisite evidence, either.
The WCAC also found that the magistrate had misinterpreted the private investigator’s
videotape, explaining:
While we usually defer to the magistrate on issues of credibility, we do not
necessarily defer on review of exhibits themselves. This is because the magistrate
is in no better position to review or interpret an exhibit which comes to the
Commission in the same form. (Unlike the magistrate’s ability to observe the
demeanor of live witnesses.) The magistrate stated that plaintiff’s activity on the
videotape was not consistent with her testimony or the physical restriction
testified to by Dr. Barbour. Our review of the videotape does not leave us with
the same impression. Dr. Barbour and plaintiff testified that she could not return
to her former work as a heavy equipment operator because of the climbing
involved, and also the repetitive head turning. The video does show plaintiff
turning her head to fasten her seatbelt, but it is not a repetitive motion. It is also
not a particularly swift motion. The video does show that plaintiff wears her
seatbelt abnormally, consistent with her testimony. The video also shows plaintiff
moving very slowly. It shows her watching her mother unload bags into a truck,
rather than pitching in to help. She explained that she could not lift the bags to
help. There is nothing in this record to contradict her explanation, and we find
that segment of the video to be of particular significance in supporting her
testimony of ongoing problems.
Defendants now appeal the WCAC’s order.
II. Physical Impairment
A. Standard Of Review
Defendants argue that the WCAC overstepped its authority to conduct a limited
administrative review of the magistrate’s decision and instead substituted its interpretation of the
evidence. In Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, the Michigan Supreme Court explained
that although the WCAC reviews the magistrate’s findings for compliance with the substantial
evidence standard in accordance with MCL 418.861a(3),2 the judiciary’s review of the WCAC’s
findings is designed to ensure the integrity of the administrative process.3 Thus, if there is any
2
MCL 418.861a(3) states as follows:
[F]indings of fact made by a worker’s compensation magistrate shall be
considered conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material,
and substantial evidence on the whole record. As used in this subsection,
“substantial evidence” means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.
3
Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 701; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).
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evidence supporting the WCAC’s factual findings, then the courts must treat the WCAC’s
factual findings as conclusive.4 However, the WCAC must not misapprehend its administrative
appellate role in reviewing decisions of the magistrate.5 In other words, the courts should affirm
a decision of the WCAC,
[i]f it appears on judicial appellate review that the WCAC carefully examined the
record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the
magistrate, did not “misapprehend or grossly misapply” the substantial evidence
standard, and gave an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the
magistrate[.][6]
Misapprehension of its administrative appellate role includes, for example, engaging in de novo
review.7
B. Applying The Standards
Our review of the WCAC’s opinion shows that although it carefully reviewed the record,
it afforded little or no any deference to the magistrate’s decision and did not conduct the limited
review provided by MCL 418.861a(3). Instead of reviewing the magistrate’s findings to ensure
that they were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the entire record,
the WCAC substituted its own assessment and interpretation of the evidence in the record.
Although the magistrate relied on Dr. Drouillard’s deposition testimony that Krastes currently
had no disabling condition, the WCAC discounted and disregarded Dr. Drouillard’s testimony
based on the notion that since Dr. Drouillard had not examined Krastes during the time she was
found to be disabled, he could not now give an opinion that her condition had improved to the
point where she was no longer disabled. Such reasoning is entirely specious. The magistrate
found Krastes disabled in 2002 from a physical injury suffered in 1998. When faced with
evidence from 2004 indicating that Krastes was no longer physically impaired, a reasonable
mind could certainly conclude that Krastes’ prior injury had healed or resolved to the point
where she was no longer disabled. Further, the WCAC chose to substitute its interpretation of
the videotape evidence for the magistrate’s interpretation. Although the magistrate pointed out
that the videotape showed Krastes moving her neck and upper body without difficulty, the
WCAC instead found significant portions of the videotape which it believed were consistent with
an ongoing disability, such as Krastes’ slow movement and failure to assist her mother in lifting
bags.
In sum, we conclude that the WCAC misapprehended or grossly misapplied its standard
of review when it reversed the magistrate’s order stopping disability benefits. Instead of
4
Id. at 709-710.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 703, quoting Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 269; 484 NW2d 227 (1992).
7
Id. at 703.
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reviewing the WCAC’s findings under the substantial evidence standard, it impermissibly
conducted a de novo review and substituted its own findings for those of the magistrate.
Accordingly, we reverse the WCAC’s opinion and order and reinstate the magistrate’s
order granting defendants’ petition to stop payment of benefits.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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