PEOPLE OF MI V NEIL PATRICK BENNETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 8, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274390
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-206697-FH
NEIL PATRICK BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(b). He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL
769.10, to concurrent prison terms of 13-1/2 to 22-1/2 years for each conviction. He appeals as
of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand for resentencing.
Defendant was convicted of engaging in separate acts of digital and penile penetration
with his former girlfriend’s daughter between June 1996 and June 2001. At trial, the prosecutor
presented evidence that defendant’s sexual conduct continued after he moved out of the home
that defendant shared with the victim and his former girlfriend, including one instance of penile
penetration that allegedly occurred when the victim was 13 years old and visiting with defendant
at his mother’s home. The victim testified that she told her mother about the sexual abuse during
a conversation about another female minor. The other minor was permitted to testify at trial,
pursuant to MCL 768.27a, about two occasions in which defendant fondled her. She testified
that defendant fondled her breasts in 1999, while they were inside a camper located in the
backyard of the victim’s home. She further testified that in 2002, after defendant developed a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship with her mother and moved into her home, defendant groped
her breasts and crotch area after she accompanied him to a friend’s home.
On appeal, defendant argues that the admission of the other minor’s testimony violated
his constitutional right to due process and that MCL 768.27a, the statute under which the
evidence was admitted, violates separation of powers principles and, as applied to this case,
constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
Before considering defendant’s claims, we note that this Court considered the
admissibility of the other acts evidence in a prior interlocutory appeal in which this Court, in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, peremptorily reversed the trial court’s order disallowing the evidence
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under MRE 404(b). This Court held that the evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27a,
without regard to MRE 403. People v Bennett, order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 15,
2006 (Docket No. 272110).
As explained in Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259-260; 612 NW2d
120 (2000),
[u]nder the law of the case doctrine, “if an appellate court has passed on a legal
question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus
determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.”
CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454; 302 NW2d 164 (1981).
The appellate court's decision likewise binds lower tribunals because the tribunal
may not take action on remand that is inconsistent with the judgment of the
appellate court. Sokel v Nickoli, 356 Mich 460, 465; 97 NW2d 1 (1959). Thus, as
a general rule, an appellate court’s determination of an issue in a case binds lower
tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals. Webb v Smith
(After Second Remand), 224 Mich App 203, 209; 568 NW2d 378 (1997); see,
generally, 5 Am Jur 2d, Appellate Review, § 605, p 300.
The primary purpose of this doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid reconsidering
matters decided in a single lawsuit. City of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Corrections, 229 Mich App
132, 135; 580 NW2d 475 (1998). The doctrine does not limit an appellate court’s power, but
rather is a discretionary rule of practice. Id. at 135-136. The doctrine only applies to questions
actually decided, implicitly or expressly, in a prior appeal and questions necessary to the decision
where facts remain materially the same. Grievance Administrator, supra at 260; City of
Kalamazoo, supra at 135. But the doctrine need not be applied to create an injustice. People v
Wells, 103 Mich App 455, 463; 303 NW2d 226 (1981). Exceptions have been recognized where
the prior appellate decision would preclude an independent review of constitutional facts or an
intervening change of law occurred. Freeman v DEC Int’l, 212 Mich App 34, 38; 536 Mich 815
(1995). Therefore, in criminal cases, where a court retains authority to grant a new trial in the
interest of justice, the law of the case doctrine does not automatically doom a defendant’s
arguments. People v Herrera, 204 Mich App 333, 340-341; 514 NW2d 543 (1994).
In this case, the trial court initially excluded the other acts evidence, finding that it was
not admissible under MRE 404(b). The trial court also denied the prosecutor’s motion for
reconsideration. This Court peremptorily reversed the trial court’s decision, relying instead on
MCL 768.27a.
We conclude that a proper application of the law of the case doctrine to the circumstances
of this case precludes reconsideration of whether the other acts evidence involving defendant’s
fondling of the other minor is admissible under MCL 768.27a. However, this Court did not
previously consider the constitutional challenges to MCL 768.27a that defendant presents in this
appeal.
Because defendant did not previously challenge the constitutionality of MCL 768.27a in
the trial court or in opposition to the prosecution’s earlier application for leave to appeal, these
issues are unpreserved. See People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993) (an
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objection to evidence on one ground does not preserve an appellate attack on a different ground).
We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant’s separation of powers argument has been rejected by this Court. In People v
Pattison, 276 Mich App 613; 620; 741 NW2d 558 (2007), this Court held that MCL 768.27a
does not infringe on our Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority because it is a substantive rule of
evidence that reflects a legislative intent to give juries an opportunity to “weigh a defendant’s
behavioral history and view the case’s facts in the larger context that the defendant’s background
affords.” See also People v Watkins, 277 Mich App 358; 745 NW2d 149 (2007); MCR
7.215(J)(1). Similarly, Pattison is also dispositive of defendant’s claim that MCL 768.27a is an
invalid ex post facto law. The Court in Pattison, supra at 618-619, held that the statute does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the altered evidentiary standard does not lower the
quantum of proof or value of evidence needed to convict a defendant.
We note, however, that this Court’s earlier peremptory order is inconsistent with the
decision in Pattison to the extent that this Court stated that the other acts evidence in this case
was admissible under MCL 768.27a and that the statute “precludes exclusion of the evidence
under an MRE 403 analysis.” In Pattison, supra at 621, this Court cautioned trial courts “to take
seriously their responsibility to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its undue
prejudicial effect in each case before admitting the evidence. See MRE 403.” Although an
intervening change in the law is a recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine, Pattison
did not change any law, but rather interpreted the applicable law. Therefore, we decline to
revisit this interpretative issue under the law of the case doctrine. Freeman, supra at 38.
We similarly decline to address whether the application of MCL 768.27a in this case
violated defendant’s right to due process. Not only is this issue unpreserved, it does not appear
in defendant’s statement of facts and he devotes a single, short paragraph to this issue with no
analysis and little citation to relevant authority. A party cannot assert a position and then leave it
to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject that position. People v Traylor, 245 Mich
App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001), or to unravel and elaborate for him his arguments. Mudge
v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998).
Next, we consider defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because trial counsel did not file a response to the prosecutor’s prior interlocutory
application for leave to appeal the trial court’s ruling excluding the other acts evidence. We note
that this Court previously denied defendant’s motion to remand for a Ginther1 hearing on this
issue for failure to persuade the Court of the necessity of a remand at that time. We similarly
find no basis for a remand. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a).
Limiting our review to mistakes apparent from the record, defendant has not met his
burden of establishing the requisite deficient performance and prejudice necessary to succeed on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d
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People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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713 (2007); People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 456-457; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). We decline
to presume prejudice because this case does not involve the complete denial of counsel at a
critical stage. Frazier, supra at 243. Unlike the situation in United States ex rel Thomas v
O’Leary, 856 F2d 1011 (CA 7, 1988), in which there was no response to a state’s appeal from an
evidentiary ruling, trial counsel in this case submitted a copy of his trial court response to the
prosecutor’s evidentiary motion in lieu of filing an answer to the prosecutor’s application for
leave to appeal. Therefore, we must presume that counsel was effective, and defendant has the
burden of showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Frazier, supra at 243;
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Even if trial counsel should have presented a specific argument concerning MCL 768.27a
in response to the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, because defendant has failed to
establish any reasonable probability that application of this statute would have resulted in the
exclusion of the other acts evidence, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot succeed. Frazier, supra at 243.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
erroneously scored 15 points for offense variable (OV) 10, MCL 777.40. In general, “[a]
sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored, provided that
evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414,
417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). But we review questions of law involving the interpretation of the
sentencing guidelines de novo. Id.
The instructions for OV 10 (exploitation of victim’s vulnerability) state that 15 points
should be scored if predatory conduct was involved. MCL 777.40(1)(a). The statute defines
“predatory conduct” as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary purpose of
victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). The timing and location of a sexual assault may constitute
evidence that a defendant engaged in preoffense predatory conduct. People v Witherspoon, 257
Mich App 329, 336; 670 NW2d 434 (2003).
The record discloses that the trial court relied solely on an uncharged act, which occurred
after defendant moved out of the victim’s home, to determine that 15 points should be scored for
OV 10. Although there are circumstances where uncharged conduct may be considered in
scoring the offense variables, the legislative intent expressed in the statutory language is
determinative of this issue. See People Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 101; 712 NW2d 703 (2006).
Where statutory language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain meaning and apply the
statute as written. People v Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004). Because the
scoring of OV 10 must be based on preoffense conduct, not other uncharged offenses not
involving the conviction offenses, we conclude that the trial court committed an error of law by
scoring 15 points for OV 10 on the basis of a separate, uncharged offense.
We reject the prosecutor’s argument that the trial court’s scoring decision may be
affirmed because it reached the right result for the wrong reason similar to Witherspoon, supra,
and People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321; 690 NW2d 312 (2004). Unlike this case, both of those
cases involved conduct related to the conviction offense. Although the prosecutor argues that the
circumstances surrounding the digital penetration offense of which defendant was convicted
support a 15-point score for OV 10, defendant is entitled to be sentenced in conformity with the
law, and the trial court’s error affects the appropriate guidelines range. Accordingly, we remand
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for resentencing, without prejudice to the trial court considering whether preoffense conduct
supports a score of 15 points for OV 10. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-92; 711 NW2d 44
(2006).
Affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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