MICHAEL J BOUSQUETTE V MEEDER DIMENSION & LUMBER CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL J. BOUSQUETTE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 8, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MEEDER DIMENSION & LUMBER
COMPANY and MICHIGAN ASSOCIATION OF
TIMBERMEN SELF INSURERS’ FUND,
No. 274373
WCAC
LC No. 05-000227
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J, and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate
Commission (WCAC), unanimously reversing a magistrate’s open award of benefits. The
WCAC determined that the magistrate had erred in failing to apply Rakestraw v General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc, 469 Mich 220; 666 NW2d 199 (2003), to plaintiff’s claim based on
an alleged April 2003 back injury. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Subsection 301(1) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) provides that
“[a]n employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment
by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as
provided in this act.” MCL 418.301(1). In Rakestraw, supra at 231, our Supreme Court held
that “[w]here a claimant experiences symptoms that are consistent with the progression of a
preexisting condition, the burden rests on the claimant to differentiate between the preexisting
condition, which is not compensable, and the work-related injury, which is compensable.”
[Emphasis in original.] “[W]here the symptoms complained of are equally attributable to the
progression of a preexisting condition or a work-related injury, a plaintiff will fail to meet his
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose ‘out of and in the
course of employment;’ stated otherwise, plaintiff will have failed to establish causation.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Therefore, “as a practical consideration, a claimant must prove that the
injury claimed is distinct from the preexisting condition in order to establish ‘a personal injury
arising out of and in the course of employment’ under § 301(1).” Id. at 231-232.
The WCAC is required to consider a magistrate’s findings of fact conclusive if they are
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the entire record. MCL
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418.861a(3); Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 698-699; 614 NW2d 607
(2000). A magistrate’s conclusions of law are not similarly conclusive on the Commission. See,
e.g., Michales v Morton Salt Co, 450 Mich 479, 489-490; 538 NW2d 11 (1995); Fraley v
General Motors Corp, 199 Mich App 280, 282-283; 500 NW2d 767 (1993). Further, “[t]he
WCAC enjoys statutory authority to make independent findings of fact, regarding issues that
have been addressed or overlooked by the magistrate, as long as the record is sufficient for
administrative review and does not prevent the WCAC from reasonably exercising its reviewing
function without resort to speculation.” Mudel, supra at 730. “As long as the WCAC is
presented with a record that allows it to intelligently make its own factual findings, the
Legislature has declared that the WCAC is free to do so.” Id. at 711.
The magistrate’s causation analysis was limited to his finding that the testimony of
plaintiff’s co-workers established that it was “more probable than not that Plaintiff suffered the
injury that he testified to on April 24, 2003.” Although the magistrate summarized the medical
opinions in his statement of facts, he failed to harmonize these conflicting opinions, observing
only that “[w]e have differences in the opinions between Dr. Helle and Dr. Hyatt over the
etiology of Plaintiff’s injury and disability.”
The WCAC adopted the magistrate’s statement of facts, but reversed the award of
benefits on the basis that the magistrate legally erred in failing to apply Rakestraw’s “medically
distinguishable” standard. The WCAC accepted that the testimony of plaintiff’s co-workers
established that plaintiff complained that his back hurt after he lifted some bags at work, but
concluded that this testimony was insufficient to establish that plaintiff suffered an injury to his
back medically distinguishable from his pre-existing disc abnormalities. The crucial issue
whether plaintiff suffered such an injury was addressed by the medical testimony, and there was,
in fact testimony to support either position. The magistrate, however, failed to choose between
the medical opinions, and, consequently, the WCAC exercised its statutory authority to assess
the medical evidence. After reviewing the evidence, the WCAC concluded that plaintiff had not
satisfied his burden of proof.
“As long as there exists in the record any evidence supporting the WCAC’s decision, and
as long as the WCAC did not misapprehend its administrative appellate role (e.g., engage in de
novo review; apply the wrong rule of law), then the judiciary must treat the WCAC’s factual
decisions as conclusive.” Id. at 703-704. This Court continues to review questions of law
involved in any final order of the WCAC under a de novo standard of review. Mudel, supra at
697 n 3, citing DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). A
decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if it is based on erroneous legal reasoning or the
wrong legal framework. DiBenedetto, supra at 401-402.
There was no error by the WCAC in exercising its administrative appellate role that
requires correction by this Court. The WCAC correctly applied the rule of law from Rakestraw
to the facts at bar. The factual premise for applying Rakestraw’s “medically distinguishable”
requirement is present because the record contains testimony both in support of and against the
conclusion that plaintiff suffered a work injury, as distinguished from an exacerbation of
symptoms consistent with the progression of his pre-existing back condition. Specifically, Dr.
Hyatt testified that plaintiff’s condition was caused by the failed October 2002 L4-5 fusion and
that the April 2003 lifting incident, while it may have resulted in exacerbation of plaintiff’s back
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pain, did not result in any new condition. In contrast, Dr. Helle testified that plaintiff re-injured
his back both symptomatically and pathologically during the April 2003 lifting incident at work.
The co-workers’ testimony did not shed light on this question. It established only that
plaintiff experienced pain that he attributed to his employment, rather than yard work. Contrary
to plaintiff’s argument, the co-workers’ testimony and Dr. Helle’s causation opinion does not
render Rakestraw inapplicable. The magistrate was still required to determine whether plaintiff
suffered an injury that was medically distinguishable from his preexisting condition.
Further, the WCAC committed no legal error in examining the medical opinions to apply
the “medically distinguishable” rule to the facts at bar. The lay testimony in the record neither
addressed nor satisfied plaintiff’s burden under Rakestraw to prove that he suffered an injury to
his back medically distinguishable from his pre-existing disc abnormalities. Because the
magistrate declined to choose between the medical opinions, the WCAC had statutory authority
to make independent findings of fact on the medical evidence the magistrate failed to address.
See Mudel, supra at 718, 730.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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