PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD DANA WENMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 8, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269838
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 05-007037-FC
RONALD DANA WENMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Talbot and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b), and assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89. Defendant was
sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life in prison on each count. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose from an August 8, 2005, murder at a Walgreens drug store
in Jackson, Michigan. Earlier on the same day, an attempted robbery occurred at a nearby
Felpausch grocery store. Both crimes were recorded on the stores’ respective videotape
surveillance cameras. According to testimony at trial, the videotapes depict the perpetrator as a
pony-tailed man wearing a baseball cap with conspicuous tattoos on his forearms. The
Felpausch cashier identified defendant as the perpetrator in a photographic lineup and at trial.
There were no eyewitnesses to the Walgreens murder. However, the trial testimony indicated
that Walgreens videotape depicts the victim being stabbed by the pony-tailed man. When shown
the Walgreens videotape at trial, defendant’s girlfriend identified defendant as the man with the
ponytail. During jury deliberations, the jury requested to view the tapes again, and asked to see
defendant’s tattoos. Shortly after viewing the tapes and the tattoos, the jury returned a guilty
verdict.
Defendant first argues that his Sixth Amendment1 right to counsel was violated when the
Felpausch cashier testified about the photographic lineup. Defendant also asserts that the
photographic lineup was unduly suggestive based on the clothing defendant was wearing in the
photograph. The trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed by this Court
1
US Const, Am VI.
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de novo. People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005); People v Bolduc, 263 Mich
App 430, 436; 688 NW2d 316 (2004). We also review de novo whether defendant was denied
his constitutional right to counsel. See In re Wentworth, 251 Mich App 560, 561; 651 NW2d
773 (2002). We will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit identification evidence unless
we find the decision was clearly erroneous. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650
NW2d 700 (2002).
Defendant contends the photographic line-up was unduly suggestive because he was
wearing an orange prisoner jumpsuit or shirt. This Court has previously indicated “physical
differences among lineup participants do not necessarily render the procedure defective and are
significant only to the extent that they are apparent to the witness and substantially distinguish
the defendant from other lineup participants.” Hornsby, supra at 466. Additionally, “physical
differences generally relate only to the weight of an identification and not to its admissibility.”
Id. The witness had no difficulty in identifying defendant as the individual that attempted to rob
her. When questioned, the witness did not recall how defendant was dressed in the lineup
photograph, believing the photographs in the array provided were black and white, and denied
being influenced by how defendant was dressed. We find that “[n]othing in the record supports a
conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification at the photographic array
as a result of any suggestive influences.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 310; 505 NW2d
528 (1993).
Next, defendant asserts the photographic lineup was improperly conducted because he
was in custody and not provided an attorney. At the time of the photographic lineup, defendant
was in custody as a parole absconder and was identified as a suspect in the Walgreens murder.
Our Supreme Court has stated “[i]n the case of photographic identifications, the right of counsel
attaches with custody.” Kurylczyk, supra at 302. We agree that counsel should have been
appointed to represent defendant during the photographic lineup.
Although we concur that the trial court erred in admitting the lineup identification, the
error was harmless given the testimony by witnesses that identified defendant as the perpetrator
based on their independent observations of the surveillance tapes and, in the case of defendant’s
girlfriend, her close relationship to defendant. The prosecutor played the Felpausch videotape
while the Felpausch cashier was testifying, and she identified the individual shown on the
videotape as defendant. The witness waited on defendant at the drug store counter and had the
opportunity to observe him at close range for several minutes without anything to obstruct her
ability to view him. Her photographic identification of defendant occurred only days after the
murder. The witness also provided a sufficient description of the perpetrator for a forensic artist
to construct a sketch and she independently recalled certain features, such as defendant’s wearing
of eyeglasses, despite their absence in the photograph used for the identification. At no time did
this witness waiver in her identification of defendant as the perpetrator that she observed firsthand and on the store’s surveillance videotape. Consequently, this witness had a sufficient
independent basis for her in-court identification of defendant. People v Anderson, 166 Mich App
455, 478; 421 NW2d 200 (1988). Further, defendant’s girlfriend identified the perpetrator in
both surveillance tapes as defendant. Given the extensive and consistent nature of the
identification testimony, a sufficient independent basis existed for the in-court identification of
defendant by these witnesses.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court’s voir dire was insufficient to determine
whether the potential jurors understood and accepted the core principles governing the
presumption of innocence. The trial court conducted a relatively brief voir dire, and excused
several jurors who indicated that they might have difficulty treating both parties fairly. In
addition to the jurors excused by the court, defendant excused several other jurors using some,
but not all, of his peremptory challenges.2 When the trial court asked whether defendant would
exercise any additional peremptory challenges, defendant’s counsel responded, “We have a jury,
Judge.” By way of this statement, defendant’s counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury,
thereby waiving any challenge to the manner by which voir dire was conducted. People v
Hubbard, 217 Mich App 459, 466; 552 NW2d 493 (1996); see also People v Jenkins, 23 Mich
App 39, 41; 178 NW2d 103 (1970).
Further, we note that the trial court did question the jurors, en masse, regarding their
ability to be impartial and fair. After instructing the jury in detail on the burden of proof and
presumption of innocence, the trial court specifically queried the panel regarding their ability to
follow these legal precepts. “The function of voir dire is to elicit sufficient information from
prospective jurors to enable the trial court and counsel to determine who should be disqualified
from service on the basis of an inability to render decisions impartially.” People v Sawyer, 215
Mich App 183, 186; 545 NW2d 6 (1996), citing People v Brown, 46 Mich App 592, 594; 208
NW2d 590 (1973). It is recognized that a trial court “has considerable discretion in both the
scope and conduct of voir dire” and that “trial courts must be allowed wide discretion in the
manner they employ to achieve the goal of an impartial jury.” Sawyer, supra at 186-187
(emphasis in original, internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, given the
content and scope of the trial court’s questioning of the jury panel regarding their ability to be
fair and impartial and to follow the trial court’s instructions, defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the manner of inquiry used by the trial court was deficient.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to use
defendant’s silence during interrogation as substantive evidence of guilt. Defendant initially
filed a motion to suppress any evidence arising from the interrogation. At trial, the prosecutor
sought to introduce testimony from a detective regarding defendant’s failure to respond to
repeated accusations that he committed the crimes during his interrogation. We note that defense
counsel indicated, after consulting with defendant, that he would allow the detective to be
questioned regarding his post-Miranda silence in response to accusations that he committed the
crimes. Before the trial court allowed the jury to hear the proposed testimony, it required the
prosecutor to elicit the testimony outside the jury’s presence. Defendant did not offer any
objection after hearing the preliminary testimony. Consequently, “review is foreclosed unless
the prejudicial effect of the comments was so great that it could not have been cured by an
appropriate instruction, or a failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
People v Rice, 235 Mich App 429, 435; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
2
We note that in order to preserve a jury selection issue for appellate purposes, a party must
generally exhaust its peremptory challenges. People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 59-60; 489
NW2d 99 (1992).
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In this case, the trial court first reviewed the taped interrogation of defendant, finding that
he voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Defendant spoke and conversed with police, but did not respond verbally when
faced with accusations regarding his involvement in these crimes. “This is a case of a defendant
who did not respond to some questions while responding to others during the period of time in
which the trial court found that the state had carried the heavy burden of proving that defendant
had waived his rights.” People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 212; 462 NW2d 1 (1990). Having
found a voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, “[w]e are convinced that in the totality
of these circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant did not invoke his . . .
right to remain silent.” Id. at 211. When defendant did request the presence of counsel,
questioning by police immediately ceased. Consequently, neither the officer’s testimony,
pertaining to defendant’s nonverbal conduct when confronted with accusations during the
custodial interrogation, nor the prosecutor’s reference and elicitation of the officer’s testimony
comprised improper conduct. Rice, supra at 437.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint an expert to testify
about the difficulties inherent in eyewitness testimony. We review this allegation of error for
abuse of discretion. People v Tanner, 469 Mich 437, 442; 671 NW2d 728 (2003).
A trial court must appoint an expert if a defendant demonstrates “a nexus between the
facts of the case and the need for an expert.” Tanner, supra at 442-443. The burden is on the
defendant to demonstrate with specificity the manner in which the expert’s testimony would
assist the defendant’s case. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688-689; 660 NW2d 322
(2002). If the defendant does not fulfill the burden, the trial court need not appoint an expert. Id.
See also MCL 775.15.
Defendant cites to scientific studies pertaining to the fallibility of eyewitness testimony,
and argues that expert testimony was necessary to explain these studies to the jury. However,
defendant fails to make the requisite connection between the studies he cites and the evidence
presented at trial. Our Supreme Court has recognized that under certain circumstances,
eyewitness testimony can be problematic due to the witnesses’ perception, their ability to recall,
and their suggestibility. People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 210-218; 205 NW2d 461, overruled
in part on other grounds People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602; 684 NW2d 461 (2004). Those
concerns are inapplicable where, as here, there were surveillance videotapes that enabled the
jurors to discern for themselves whether defendant was the individual depicted in the tapes. The
proposed expert testimony is neither necessary nor relevant based on the ability of the jurors to
determine whether defendant is the individual seen in the surveillance videos based on their own
observation of this evidence. Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate the necessity of
expert testimony for his defense.
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, defendant
asserts that counsel’s performance was inadequate because counsel (1) had a conflict of interest
regarding defendant, (2) should have objected to the voir dire, (3) should have objected to the
testimony and argument concerning the interrogation, and (4) should have presented an alibi
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instruction.3 Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee
criminal defendants the right to counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. This
constitutional right includes the requirement that counsel present a reasonable defense. People v
Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 460; 719 NW2d 579 (2006). A defendant seeking relief from a judgment
on the ground that counsel was ineffective must demonstrate that “counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521
NW2d 797 (1994). Even if counsel’s performance fell below the requisite standard, reversal is
warranted only if the defendant can show that the trial result was unreliable, and that there is a
reasonable probability the result would have been different but for counsel’s errors. People v
Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
Based on our determination, supra, that no error occurred in voir dire, error cannot be
ascribed to counsel’s failure to raise objections during this procedure. See People v Fike, 228
Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998) (counsel is not required to make a futile objection).
In addition, we note that defendant did not present any argument in his motion for a Ginther
hearing regarding his assertion on appeal that the failure to object to testimony pertaining to his
post-Miranda silence constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, defendant
has forfeited this assertion of error, and we review it only for plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1990). Having already
determined that the detective’s testimony was admissible, there was no error in counsel’s failure
to object. Fike, supra at 182.
Defendant next asserts counsel was ineffective due to the existence of a conflict of
interest. Notably, defense counsel’s law partner was assigned to represent defendant’s father in a
competency hearing on October 6, 2005. However, the matter was withdrawn on October 25,
2005, before the law partner met defendant’s father or any hearings were held. Although
arrested on August 11, 2005, counsel was not the original attorney assigned to represent
defendant. It was not until November 2005, that defense counsel was assigned by the court to
represent defendant because of the withdrawal of his initial counsel. Consequently, defense
counsel and his law partner did not concurrently provide legal representation for defendant and
his father. Counsel for defendant and his law partner both testified that they did not have
extended conversations pertaining to defendant’s father, that neither perceived the existence of a
conflict, and that defense counsel would have done nothing different in his questioning of
defendant’s father at trial. Neither the fact that his father subsequently gave inculpatory
testimony at defendant’s trial nor the law partner’s subsequent reassignment to represent
defendant’s father after defendant’s sentencing had been completed is sufficient to support a
claim regarding the existence of a conflict of interest. See People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 556;
581 NW2d 654 (1998).
We also agree with the trial court that the decision not to request or provide an alibi
instruction comprised a matter of trial strategy. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58; 523
3
The trial court held a Ginther hearing regarding defendant’s claim of the existence of a conflict
of interest, improper voir dire and failure to present an alibi instruction. People v Ginther, 390
Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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NW2d 830 (1994). Defendant did testify that he was out-of-town when the murder occurred.
Defense counsel procured a detective to investigate defendant’s alibi. The detective could not
locate the individual defendant alleged he was with at the time of the murder and all of the
locations identified by defendant were determined by the detective to be vacant and/or
abandoned buildings. Defense counsel determined that presenting the alibi instruction would
only highlight the inconsistencies between defendant's testimony and the testimony of his father
and his girlfriend concerning defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the crimes. Further, defense
counsel was unable to procure any substantiation or evidence to support defendant’s proffered
alibi. Our Supreme Court has previously held that defense counsel’s failure to present an alibi
defense and related instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where the
alibi evidence is weak or non-existent. People v Esters, 417 Mich 34, 56; 331 NW2d 211
(1982). Consequently, defense counsel’s decision to not present an alibi instruction comprised
legitimate trial strategy, which cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
In addition, at the Ginther hearing defense counsel acknowledged that although he
believed he could ethically permit defendant to testify concerning the alleged alibi based on the
internal consistency of defendant’s testimony, he did not personally believe the alibi testimony.
Defense counsel’s ethical concern regarding defendant’s veracity in the presentation of his alibi
supports his decision to not present an alibi instruction. The refusal of an attorney to knowingly
facilitate or assist in the presentation of perjured testimony or a similarly false claim is consistent
with his ethical obligations and, therefore, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
See People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 303 n 16; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).
Finally we reject defendant’s final argument that cumulative errors in the trial warrant
reversal. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). The only error
noted is the failure of defendant to have counsel during the photographic lineup. However, that
error was harmless in light of the evidence adduced at trial. There exist no additional or other
errors to aggregate to support defendant’s argument for reversal. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich
App 434, 454; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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