PEOPLE OF MI V ANGELO DONYA LAMB
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 3, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277145
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-012707-01
ANGELO DONYA LAMB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Owens and Schuette, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the third
degree, MCL 750.520d(1)(a), and criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree, MCL
750.520e(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced to 30 to 180 months for CSC III, and to time served
for CSC IV. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the trial
court precluded him from cross-examining complainant about her stepfather’s sexual assault of
defendant’s girlfriend approximately six months before alleged incidents in this case. Defendant
argues that the evidence would have established that complainant might have fabricated her
allegations in retaliation for the accusation against her stepfather. We disagree.
A primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination.
Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 678; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986); Douglas v
Alabama, 380 US 415, 418; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965). “L]imitation[s] on crossexamination that prevent[] a defendant from placing before the jury facts from which bias,
prejudice, or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of
the constitutional right of confrontation.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 644; 588 NW2d
480 (1998). However, “the right of cross-examination does not include a right to cross-examine
on irrelevant issues.” “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about . . .
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” People v Adamski, 198 Mich App
133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993), quoting Van Arsdall, supra at 679.
While complainant’s credibility was a relevant issue, the stepfather’s assault would not
have had any significant tendency to make her credibility more or less probable, and was
-1-
therefore not relevant. See MRE 401; People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785
(1998). At best, if at all, the assault was only marginally relevant since its probative value, if
any, was so low that introduction of the evidence would be a waste of time. See People v
Osantowski, 274 Mich App 593, 609; 736 NW2d 289 (2007). No one disputed that the assault
on defendant’s girlfriend occurred. However, there is only conjecture, unsupported by a
reasonable view of the undisputed facts, to suggest that long after this event complainant might
have wanted to retaliate against defendant’s girlfriend or her family by fabricating a charge
against defendant. She was supportive when defendant’s girlfriend told her of the assault, and
took action consistent with protecting defendant’s girlfriend. In fact, complainant’s report
resulted in the stepfather being banished from her household. Simply put, there was no
foundation for a challenge to complainant’s credibility on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
