PEOPLE OF MI V JEREMY FISHER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 276439
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-000969
JEREMY FISHER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this prosecutor’s appeal, plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted from the circuit
court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. This case is being
decided without oral argument in accordance with MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, when a police officer
opened the front door of a residence and defendant pointed a rifle at him. The charges were
dismissed, however, when the trial court granted a motion to suppress the evidence of what the
police observed in the house, on the ground that that evidence was the product of an unlawful
search. Plaintiff appealed to this Court, which held that the trial court had erred in deciding the
suppression motion without conducting a full evidentiary hearing. People v Fisher, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 20, 2005 (Docket No. 256027).
On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, then again granted the motion to
suppress.
Evidence obtained in the course of a violation of a suspect’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is subject to suppression at trial. People v
Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). See also Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision following a suppression hearing, we review the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error, but review the legal conclusions de novo. See People v
Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 644; 599 NW2d 736 (1999).
-1-
Plaintiff maintains that the police were justified in conducting the warrantless search in
question, insofar as they acted out of concern that someone inside the home might be in need of
medical assistance. Plaintiff thus invokes the emergency-aid exception to the warrant
requirement, whereby a police officer may enter a building to assist someone in need of
immediate aid. People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 25; 497 NW2d 910 (1993); City of Troy v Ohlinger,
438 Mich 477, 483-484; 475 NW2d 54 (1991). However, the scope of the permitted entry is
governed by the emergency. Id. at 484. Accordingly, the police “may not do more than is
reasonably necessary to determine whether a person is in need of assistance, and to provide that
assistance.” Davis, supra at 26.
At the evidentiary hearing, a police officer recounted that a pedestrian had complained to
him and his partner of a man “going . . . crazy,” and that at the location in question, the officer
found defendant “walking around the residence screaming and throwing stuff.” The officer
added that the house had three “smashed out” windows, with broken glass still on the ground.
According to the officer, as he approached the house, he observed some damaged fence posts,
and a parked truck whose front was “smashed.” The officer further testified that there was some
apparently fresh blood on the hood of the truck, on some clothes inside the truck, and on the back
door of the residence. According to the officer, defendant refused to answer a knock, then, when
the police persisted and asked if he needed medical attention, answered with profanity. The
officer described noticing a cut on defendant’s hand. The officer explained that the police
decided to enter the residence, because of indications that there was an injured person on the
premises, and because they did not know if there was anyone else inside. The officer testified
that he opened the front door, upon which defendant pointed a rifle at him.
On cross-examination, the officer admitted that he had not known whether defendant
drove the truck at the scene, how the fence was damaged, or whether anyone in the house
actually needed medical assistance. The officer further admitted that he observed no large
quantity of blood in view, but rather mere drops.
The trial court concluded, “based on what I’ve heard here, I’m even more convinced” that
the search in question was an improper entry, and thus that its duty was to suppress the evidence
of the resulting gun-pointing incident. We agree.
Although there was evidence that there was an injured person on the premises, the mere
drops of blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening injury. This is particularly so
given that the police observed a cut on defendant’s hand, which likely explained the trail of
blood, but also that defendant was very much on his feet and apparently able to see to his own
needs. Because “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed . . . ,” United States v United States Dist Court, 407 US 297, 313;
92 S Ct 2125; 32 L Ed 2d 752 (1972), the trial court correctly recognized that the situation the
police witness described in this case did not rise to a level of emergency justifying the
warrantless intrusion into a residence.
-2-
Plaintiff alternatively argues that, even if the police officer acted unlawfully in forcing
entry into the residence, the evidence of defendant’s assaultive response was nonetheless
admissible.1 However, this argument was not raised below, and therefore is not preserved for
appellate review. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Grant, 445 Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Moreover, an appeal by right following a remand
is limited to issues arising from the remand. People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d
649 (1975). In this case, the scope of the remand was limited to obtaining a decision on the
legality of the warrantless intrusion into the residence on a full evidentiary record. Because the
proper opportunity to raise this alternative argument, even as an unpreserved issue, was in the
first appeal, it is not properly before this Court in the second.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
See People v Daniels, 186 Mich App 77, 82; 463 NW2d 131 (1990) (“the exclusionary rule
does not act to bar the introduction of evidence of independent crimes directed at police officers
as a reaction to an illegal arrest or search” [dictum]). But see People v Dillard, 115 Mich App
640, 642; 321 NW2d 757 (1982) (a defendant who pointed a gun at a police officer in response
to an illegal entry, but who neither fired the weapon nor otherwise caused any injury, acted
reasonably and thus did not commit the crime of felonious assault).
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.