PEOPLE OF MI V ANTONIO PEREZ-CHICA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276153
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-004731-FC
ANTONIO PEREZ-CHICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver
1,000 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to possess with intent to
deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a and MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). He was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for each offense. Because there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, and defendant was not denied a fair trial by the
trial court’s refusal to sever his trial or seat a separate jury from that of a codefendant, we affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the recovery of ten kilos of cocaine from a black Ford
Explorer in the city of Roseville. Police officers received an anonymous tip that persons from
Phoenix, Arizona may be involved in narcotics trafficking in the Roseville area. While
conducting surveillance of a black Ford Explorer with an Arizona license plate at a Red Roof
Inn, Detective-Sergeant Terence Mekoski observed defendant hand a set of keys to the vehicle to
Jesus Ramon Cottleon,1 who entered the vehicle and sped away. Shortly thereafter, Mekoski
pulled the vehicle over and a K-9 search revealed ten kilos of cocaine in a hidden compartment
at the rear of the vehicle. Defendant’s theory of defense at trial was that he had no knowledge of
the cocaine in the vehicle.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We
disagree.
1
Cottleon was known by an alias, Candelario Herrera.
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When determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction, a court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a
rational finder of fact could conclude that every element of the crime charged was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Sherman-Huffman, 466 Mich 39, 40-41; 642 NW2d 339
(2002); People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). A reviewing court
must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility determinations in support of the jury’s
verdict. Id. at 400.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence that he
knowingly possessed the cocaine. “Possession may be either actual or constructive, and may be
joint or exclusive.” People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 622; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). A
defendant’s mere presence where a certain item is found, however, is insufficient to establish
possession. Id. Rather, there must exist an additional connection between the defendant and the
item. Id. “Constructive possession exists when the totality of the circumstances indicates a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the controlled substance.” Id. In addition,
possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. Id.
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
show that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine. Although he denied knowledge of the
cocaine in the hidden compartment of the Explorer, defendant admitted to the police that he and
co-defendant Jose Martinez purchased the vehicle at a flea market in Arizona. Cottleon testified
that he and co-defendant Rigoberto Cardenas-Borbon followed defendant and Martinez’s
Explorer to the Detroit area from Arizona for the purpose of delivering cocaine pursuant to a deal
that had been arranged. The cocaine was located in the Explorer. After arriving in the Detroit
area, Cottleon went to a Red Roof Inn to pick up the Explorer to deliver the cocaine. Defendant
had been communicating with Cardenas-Borbon via their cell phones. Defendant handed
Cottleon the keys to the Explorer and talked to Cottleon about obtaining drugs for his own
personal use. Cottleon was arrested shortly thereafter. Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the jury’s verdict, the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s knowledge of the
cocaine.
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he conspired to
possess with the intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine. As discussed above, however,
the evidence showed that defendant and his co-defendants traveled to the Detroit area for the
specific purpose of delivering ten kilos of cocaine at the rate of $18,500 a kilo. The
circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties are sufficient to establish a conspiracy. People v
Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Although defendant
correctly argues that the prosecutor was required to prove that the agreement was for the
statutory minimum of 1,000 grams of cocaine as charged, People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629631, 633-634; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), the circumstantial evidence demonstrated that defendant
was aware of the amount of cocaine involved. Cottleon testified that the agreement was to
deliver ten kilos of cocaine. Moreover, the cocaine was located in defendant’s vehicle, which he
drove from Arizona to Detroit. Thus, the circumstantial evidence showed that defendant
conspired to possess with the intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine.
-2-
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony from Martinez regarding the
transportation of illegal immigrants. We disagree.
“We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for a mistrial.”
People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 194; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). A motion for a mistrial
should be granted “ ‘only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and
impairs his ability to get a fair trial.’ ” Id. at 195, quoting People v Ortiz-Kehoe, 237 Mich App
508, 514; 603 NW2d 802 (1999). Thus, absent a showing of prejudice, reversal is not warranted.
People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 390; 605 NW2d 374 (1999).
Defendant argues that the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory and constituted
inadmissible other acts evidence under MRE 404(b). The challenged evidence, however, was
properly admissible as part of the res gestae of the offenses. The facts and circumstances
surrounding an offense are properly admissible as part of the res gestae. People v Bostic, 110
Mich App 747, 749; 313 NW2d 98 (1981); People v Shannon, 88 Mich App 138, 146; 276
NW2d 546 (1979). Upon the prosecutor’s questioning, Martinez admitted during crossexamination that he and defendant had “smuggled illegal aliens” with them in the Explorer from
Arizona to the Detroit area. MRE 404(b) does not preclude the admission of evidence intended
to give the jury an intelligible presentation of the full context in which disputed events occur.
People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), reh den 454 Mich 1211 (1997). The
four illegal immigrants were in an adjoining room at the Red Roof Inn when defendant and
Martinez were arrested. Thus, the evidence was part of the res gestae of the offenses.
Moreover, at the time that Martinez testified, testimony had already been presented that
defendant admitted to the police that he had transported illegal immigrants from Arizona in his
vehicle. The trial court instructed the jury not to consider such evidence in rendering its verdict.
In addition, defense counsel conceded in his opening statement that defendant admitted bringing
the illegal immigrants to the Detroit area. Accordingly, Martinez’s admission on crossexamination did not prejudice defendant, and a mistrial was therefore not warranted. Wells,
supra at 390.2
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s refusal to sever
his trial or seat a separate jury from that of co-defendant Martinez. We again disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion to sever the
trials of multiple defendants. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994),
amended 447 Mich 1203 (1994).
2
Defendant further argues that the prosecutor elicited “other” irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
that was also inadmissible prior bad acts evidence. He does not identify, however, the “other”
evidence to which he refers. Accordingly, we cannot properly analyze his argument. A
defendant “may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims . . . .” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d
342 (2004) (citation and quotations omitted).
-3-
“Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant provides the court
with a supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly, affirmatively, and fully
demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary
means of rectifying the potential prejudice.” Hana, supra at 346. Absent such a showing or an
indication that the requisite prejudice actually occurred at trial, this Court will affirm a trial
court’s decision denying a motion for severance. Id. at 346-347. In order to show that his
substantial rights will be prejudiced if separate trials are not granted, a defendant must establish
that his defenses and his co-defendants’ defenses are “not only inconsistent, but also mutually
exclusive or irreconcilable.” People v Cadle (On Remand), 209 Mich App 467, 469; 531 NW2d
761 (1995). Severance should be granted when defenses are antagonistic, i.e., when it appears
that a co-defendant may testify to exculpate himself and incriminate the defendant. People v
Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 152-153; 505 NW2d 889 (1993). In lieu of complete severance, a
court may use separate juries. Hana, supra at 351. The dual-jury procedure should be evaluated
using the same factors set forth above regarding motions for separate trials. Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to sever his
trial because his defense and that of Martinez were not mutually exclusive or irreconcilable.
Martinez testified that he was not aware of the cocaine hidden in the Explorer and that he merely
agreed to transport the illegal immigrants to Chicago from Arizona in exchange for $4,000. He
maintained that he and defendant did not stop in Chicago and continued traveling to the Detroit
area so that defendant could collect money that was owed him. Defendant argues that this
testimony was antagonistic and irreconcilable with his defense that he came to Michigan so that
the Explorer could be repaired. Detective Carlos Lopez testified, however, that defendant had
told him that he came to the Roseville area to get his car fixed and pick up some money. In
addition, Martinez testified that he and defendant gave the Explorer to Cottleon at the Red Roof
Inn because Cottleon was going to take the vehicle to have the transmission fixed. Martinez
further testified that he and defendant waited at the Red Roof Inn for someone to bring money
for defendant. Therefore, the defenses of defendant and Martinez were not mutually exclusive or
irreconcilable such that separate trials were warranted. Cadle, supra at 469. For the same
reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to swear a separate jury for
defendant’s case.3 Hana, supra at 351.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
3
In addition to concerns about conflicting defense theories, defendant argues that separate juries
should have been used because of “Bruton concerns.” Although defendant cites Bruton v United
States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968), he fails to explain or elaborate the
basis for his argument. As previously stated, a defendant may not announce a position and leave
it for this Court to discover and rationalize its basis. Matuszak, supra at 59.
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