RODNEY MCCORMICK V LARRY CARRIER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RODNEY MCCORMICK,
UNPUBLISHED
March 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 275888
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-083549-NI
LARRY CARRIER,
Defendant,
and
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Jansen and Davis, JJ.
DAVIS, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)
should not be granted where the evidence shows a genuine question of some material fact.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). My reading of the evidence
reveals enough of a factual question that this case should not have been taken from the jury.
As the majority explains, under MCL 500.3135, our Supreme Court stated in Kreiner v
Fisher, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), that a plaintiff must show an “objectively
manifested impairment” that affects his or her “general ability to lead his or her normal life” in
order to recover in tort for an injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident. In this case the injury
is undisputed: plaintiff’s left ankle was broken, and plaintiff required two surgical procedures to
repair the injury. The issue here is whether the injury may affect “the course or trajectory of the
plaintiff’s normal life.” Kreiner, supra at 131.
The majority finds the latter requirement unmet because plaintiff is no longer under any
physician-imposed medical restrictions, has returned to work, continues to fish and golf, and
admitted at his deposition that his life was “painful, but normal.” Certainly, these facts are one
side of the equation. However, the evidence also shows that plaintiff’s work plays a very large
role in his life, and he is “at another duty” because his employer evaluated plaintiff’s physical
condition and, on that basis, did not consider him capable of performing his prior duties.
Plaintiff’s doctor and an independent doctor both found some indication of degenerative joint
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disease in his ankle. Although plaintiff’s restrictions might be pain-based, they are not merely
self-imposed. See Kreiner, supra at 133 n 17. In fact, Kreiner did not hold that a doctor must
provide an expert medical opinion regarding plaintiff’s life, but rather that whatever effect an
injury has had on the plaintiff’s life must be determined objectively. Additionally, Kreiner held
that the entirety of the plaintiff’s life must be reviewed.
Therefore, I find two reasons why this case should not have been disposed of by a motion
for summary disposition. First, the entire “trajectory” of plaintiff’s life must be considered – but
plaintiff’s life is not yet over, and there is enough evidence in the record to show that he faces at
least the possibility of future problems. Second, there is also evidence in the record that
plaintiff’s life is not, in fact, normal, and that this has been objectively and independently
determined by two doctors and plaintiff’s employer. This is not a case devoid of competent
evidence in support of either party’s position, and plaintiff should have been permitted to submit
what evidence there is to examination and evaluation by the trier of fact.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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