ALLIANCE BANCORP V SELECT MORTGAGE LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLIANCE BANCORP,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SELECT MORTGAGE, L.L.C., KHALIL &
COMPANY, a/k/a KHALIL COMPANY
ACCOUNTING & TAX SERVICES, ZAHIYA
KHALIL, MOHAMMED KHALIL, KALIL F.
KHALIL, a/k/a KAL KHALIL, CHRIS DIXON,
a/k/a CHRISTINE L. SANDERS, SOUSAN
HAMAD, TAYLOR TITLE COMPANY, TARIQ
HAMAD and MARGARET MESSINA,
No. 274853
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-429635-CB
Defendants,
and
MOUFEDA KHALIL, ZARIFA KHALIL,
ZAHIYA HASSAN and FAYEZ REAL ESTATE,
L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Sawyer and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants, Kalil F. Khalil (“Khalil”) and Tariq Hamad (“Hamad”), defrauded multiple
mortgage companies out of over $15 million. Plaintiff, Alliance Bancorp (“Alliance”),1 was
defrauded out of $596,250 and was granted default judgments against Khalil and Hamad and two
companies Khalil and Hamad owned, Select Mortgage, L.L.C. (“Select”), and Taylor Title
Company (“TTC”). Given that Khalil, Hamad, Select and TTC were uncollectible, Alliance
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Alliance filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in July 2007.
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claimed that Khalil fraudulently transferred assets to appellees and sought to have the transfers
set aside pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA, MCL 566.31 et seq). The
lower court granted summary disposition in favor of appellees and dismissed Alliance’s
complaint against all remaining defendants. Alliance appeals by leave granted.
Alliance argues that the trial court erred by determining that the UFTA did not apply to
the instant case and by granting summary disposition to appellees. We disagree. A trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468
Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) should
be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 246; 631 NW2d 760 (2001).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ.
West v GMC, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Additionally, issues of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. Griffith v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich
521, 525-526; 697 NW2d 895 (2005).
Before 1998, Michigan followed the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA). The
UFCA was replaced by the “similar” UFTA in 1998. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp v Luptak, 243
Mich App 560, 567; 625 NW2d 385 (2000). Michigan adopted the UFTA without substantive
changes from the model UFTA drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. See MCL 566.31; Estes v Titus, 273 Mich App 356, 372; 731 NW2d 119
(2006).
Under the UFTA, a creditor can bring a cause of action alleging that a transfer was
fraudulent under either MCL 566.34 or MCL 566.35. A UFTA cause of action under MCL
566.34 is appropriate where the debtor made the transfer with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud any creditor of the debtor, or without receiving reasonably equivalent value. Szkrybalo v
Szkrybalo, 477 Mich 1086, 1086; 729 NW2d 233 (2007). A UFTA cause of action under MCL
566.35 is appropriate where the creditor’s claim against the debtor arose before the fraudulent
transfer and the debtor was insolvent or did not receive a reasonably equivalent value, or if the
transfer was made to an insider, the debtor was insolvent and the transferee knew the debtor was
insolvent. Estes, supra at 377 n 5. Although Alliance did not specify under which statute it was
suing, the particular statute is not relevant since the specific issue is whether Khalil, under the
UFTA, could transfer stolen money.
The UFTA defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and
includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” MCL
566.31(l); Estes, supra at 375 n 4. “Asset” means property of a debtor, and “property” is
anything that may be the subject of ownership. MCL 566.31(b); MCL 566.31(j).
Alliance claims that as soon as its money was deposited into Khalil and Hamad’s TCF
Account, Khalil and Hamad acquired a right to possess the money. Therefore, Alliance claims
that Khalil had “an interest in an asset” that was sufficient for making a transfer of the asset.
However, a thief’s stolen money is not “subject to ownership” because a thief has no title in the
property that he steals. Restatement (Second) Torts, s 229 cmt d (1965). The Sixth Circuit held
that, pursuant to Michigan law, stolen funds are not property of a debtor’s estate. In re
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Newpower, 233 F3d 922, 931 (CA 6, 2000). As one expert proclaims, “A thief does not
ordinarily become the owner of the property he steals; he has mere possession. . . . There is no
basis for a constructive trust as to the stolen property in the hands of the thief because of his lack
of a property interest.” Bogert, Trust & Trustees, s 476 at 119 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp 1999).
Furthermore, “own” means “to rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to,” and
an “interest” is “a legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in
property” (Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed)) (emphasis added).
Michigan cases interpreting the UFTA include Estes, supra at 356, and Mathers
Investors, LLC v Larson, 271 Mich App 254; 720 NW2d 575 (2006). In both cases, the debtor
owned the assets before transferring them to another entity. Furthermore, in UFCA cases, the
debtor transferred his own property or his interest in property. See, e.g., LaBour v Bergin, 334
Mich 437; 54 NW2d 710 (1952) (debtor fraudulently contributed his earnings to mortgage held
in the entireties); McCaslin v Schouten, 294 Mich 180; 292 NW 696 (1940) (same); Foodland
Distributors v Al-Naimi, 220 Mich App 453; 559 NW2d 379 (1996) (debtor business owner
restructured personal debt and fraudulently imposed $400,000 debt on business); Doe v Ewing,
205 Mich App 605; 517 NW2d 849 (1994) (debtor transferred his ownership in corporation’s
shares to himself and his wife in the entireties).
We hold that the UFTA does not contemplate transfers of stolen money, and
consequently, appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The UFCA and UFTA were
implemented to give recourse to creditors against debtors that made otherwise legal transfers of
property. Without such statutes, creditors would have no recourse against debtors that attempted
to shield their assets by transferring them. On the other hand, where assets are acquired illegally
and transferred to third parties, creditors can pursue possessory causes of action such as
constructive trusts, equitable liens, or statutory conversion, MCL 600.2919a.
Alliance also attempts to argue that it is possible not all of the money Khalil transferred
was stolen. However, throughout the lower court proceedings Alliance asserted in each written
motion and motion hearing that the transferred funds were stolen. This Court need not address
issues first raised on appeal. Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444
Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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