IN RE SANYO WILLIAMS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SANYO WILLIAMS, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 280305
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-122290-NA
TASWALA MECOLE WILLIAMS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(g), and (j). For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
On appeal, respondent argues that the requisite statutory grounds for termination were not
established by clear and convincing evidence. To terminate parental rights, the trial court must
find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has
been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d
520 (1999). If a statutory ground for termination is established, the trial court must terminate
parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in
the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d
407 (2000). The trial court’s decision terminating parental rights is reviewed for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); Trejo, supra at 355-357; Sours, supra at 632-633. A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Deference is to be given to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.
MCR 2.613(C); Miller, supra at 337.
The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The trial court correctly noted that respondent had severe deficits and
could not take care of herself, much less a child. The trial court also correctly found that
respondent’s mental illness rendered her unable to parent. The record indicates that, due to
mental illness, respondent’s level of functioning was far below that of an average person and that
-1-
she could not care for a child. Respondent did not take her prescribed medication regularly and
was often depressed. When living on her own, respondent maintained poor hygiene and was
accused of stealing. Respondent needed instruction and supervision to manage daily living
skills, which demonstrated that she could not provide proper care for Sanyo.
Respondent’s mental illness also interfered with her ability to make good decisions.
Respondent’s poor decisions impacted Sanyo even while he was still in utero. For example,
when pregnant with Sanyo, respondent refused a caesarian section even after doctors informed
her she would lose her baby unless she had the surgery. This type of poor decision-making
prompted respondent’s sister to petition the court to appoint her permanent guardian of
respondent.
Respondent’s mental illness also caused her involuntary hospitalization on several
occasions, most recently in April 2007. The need for involuntary commitment in April 2007
demonstrated that respondent’s mental illness remained out of control. Unless respondent could
properly manage her mental illness, she could not provide proper care of Sanyo.
Further, respondent never demonstrated an ability to care for Sanyo. Respondent’s
relationship with Sanyo was limited. She never provided money for Sanyo’s support and only
purchased two outfits, a pair of tennis shoes and socks for him since birth. Respondent was also
emotionally removed from Sanyo, inquiring about him in an odd and detached way.
Additionally, respondent could not provide proper care and custody because she was
without independent housing and income. Prior to the permanent custody hearing, respondent
had been living with her mother in a two-bedroom home for approximately one month.
Respondent claimed she had her own “place” before she moved in with her mother, but she was
not working to be able to afford the rent. Respondent’s lack of memory and clarity regarding her
living situation prior to moving in with her mother revealed her limited mental capacity.
Respondent also argued there was a small amount of testimony regarding her propensity
to harm Sanyo. Thus, she claimed termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
was clearly erroneous. With respect to termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), much of the
same evidence concerning MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) also clearly established that, in light of
respondent’s capacity and conduct, a reasonable likelihood existed that Sanyo would suffer harm
if returned to respondent’s care. Respondent’s acute psychosis, which impaired her capacity to
make informed decisions and rendered her unable to understand the consequences of her choices,
would likely result in her making decisions that would harm Sanyo. Respondent’s unstable and
unknown living situation following Sanyo’s birth and her inability to maintain independent
housing, jeopardized Sanyo’s safety and security. Additionally, respondent’s use of cocaine and
failure to address her substance abuse posed a risk of harm to Sanyo.
Respondent argued there was no evidence she had ever been offered services or given a
chance to prove she could parent Sanyo. Because the case proceeded under an original petition
for termination of parental rights, a treatment plan for respondent and reasonable efforts for
reunification were not required. MCL 712A.19b(4); MCR 3.977(E). A service plan need not be
directed at reunification. MCL 712A.18f(3)(d).
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.