SANITARY DISPOSAL SERVICES INC V WEST MICH WASTE REDUCTION LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANITARY DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2008
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
WEST MICHIGAN WASTE REDUCTION, LLC,
No. 276580
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003095-CK
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Smolenski and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this contract dispute, defendant appeals as of right the February 6, 2007 trial court
order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. We affirm.
Plaintiff Sanitary Disposal Services, Inc. d/b/a Sunset Waste Services (Sunset) owns and
operates a landfill in Ottawa County. Sunset is a subsidiary of Allied Waste Industries, Inc.
(Allied). Sunset accepts refuse in various forms such as dirt, roofing material, and household
garbage. Customers hauling refuse into the landfill are charged different prices depending on the
form and amount of refuse. A customer is generally charged a lower price for hauling ground
roofing material, known as grindings or fluff, than for other forms of refuse because grindings
are more valuable to the landfill.
Defendant West Michigan Waste Reduction, LLC (WMWR), a refuse removal company,
is owned and operated by Bryan Hall. In 2001, WMWR began hauling refuse into Sunset’s
landfill. According to Hall’s testimony, Sunset agreed to charge WMWR between $12 and $16
per ton for hauling grindings into the landfill if WMWR used Sunset’s landfill exclusively. Hall
understood that WMWR would be charged higher prices for other forms of refuse.
Hall testified that in August of 2002, Sunset began charging WMWR $28 per ton for
grindings. According to Hall, Sunset breached its initial agreement with WMWR by raising the
price for grindings. Nonetheless, WMWR continued hauling refuse into Sunset’s landfill over
the next three years. Additionally, Hall admitted that other local landfills charged between $24
and $27 per ton for grindings in 2002. Sunset employee Robert Carr testified that Sunset raised
the prices it charged WMWR more than once between 2001 and 2005. He also admitted that
Sunset charged its sister company, a refuse removal company owned by Allied, a lower price for
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hauling grindings than it charged WMWR. Carr testified, however, that Sunset periodically
raised the prices it charged all of its customers to cover the cost of operating the landfill.
The billing records submitted by the parties show that in 2004, Sunset charged WMWR
$16 per ton on 17 occasions, $20 per ton on four occasions, and $24 per ton on only one
occasion. In 2005, Sunset charged WMWR $20 per ton on 19 occasions. Contrary to Hall’s
assertion, there is no indication in the records that Sunset charged WMWR $28 per ton. The
records reflect that WMWR was charged for hauling roofing materials into the landfill, but the
records do not state whether the materials were reduced to grindings. Hall testified that 90
percent of the refuse WMWR hauled into the landfill was made up of shingles. Contrary to
Sunset’s assertion on appeal, however, Hall did not indicate whether the shingles were ground.
Between 2001 and 2005, WMWR failed to pay all of the bills issued it by Sunset and
developed an arrearage in the amount of $59,699.05. Sunset filed its complaint alleging breach
of contract in March of 2006 and WMWR filed a counterclaim alleging “tortuous” [sic]
interference with business relations and prospective advantages. Sunset subsequently moved for
summary disposition on its breach of contract claim and WMWR’s counterclaim. The trial court
granted Sunset’s motion in a February 6, 2007 order.
I
WMWR argues that the trial court erred in granting Sunset’s motion for summary
disposition. We review a grant or denial of summary disposition de novo on the basis of the
entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). When reviewing a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, we consider all of the
evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at
119-120. Summary disposition should be granted only where the evidence fails to establish a
genuine issue regarding any material fact. Id. at 120. The non-moving party may not rely on
mere allegations or denials, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing
a genuine issue of fact for trial. McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 115; 469
NW2d 284 (1991).
A.
First, WMWR argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on
Sunset’s breach of contract claim. We disagree. The essential elements of a valid contract are:
(1) parties competent to contract; (2) proper subject matter; (3) legal consideration; (4) mutuality
of agreement; and (5) mutuality of obligation. Hess v Cannon Twp, 265 Mich App 582, 592; 696
NW2d 742 (2005). “The party asserting a breach of contract has the burden of proving its
damages with reasonable certainty, and may recover only those damages that are the direct,
natural, and proximate result of the breach.” Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App
505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003).
In this case, it is undisputed that a valid contract existed between the parties, whereby
Sunset allowed WMWR to haul refuse into its landfill and WMWR agreed to pay Sunset for its
services. WMWR does not challenge the accuracy of Sunset’s billing records or claim that it has
paid any portion of Sunset’s claim. Rather, WMWR asserts that Sunset breached the parties’
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contract by increasing the price it charged WMWR for hauling grindings into the landfill.
WMWR specifically asserts that the parties agreed to the price of $12 per ton for grindings, that
WMWR relied on that price, and that “the relationship became a joint venture.”1
We are unpersuaded by WMWR’s assertion. Although Sunset initially charged WMWR
between $12 and $16 per ton for grindings, Sunset did not agree to maintain that price
indefinitely. Each party was free to negotiate the price of Sunset’s services at any time. Sunset
asserts that over the course of four years, it raised the prices it charged all of its customers in
order to cover the cost of operating the landfill. WMWR does not challenge this assertion and
admits that other local landfills charged prices equal to or higher than those charged by Sunset.
Moreover, WMWR’s assertion that a joint venture existed between the parties is without merit.
Whether a joint venture existed is a question for the trial court. Berger v Mead, 127 Mich App
209, 214; 338 NW2d 919 (1983). “A joint venture is an association to carry out a single business
enterprise for a profit.” Id. The elements of a joint venture are: (1) an agreement indicating an
intention to undertake a joint venture; (2) a joint undertaking; (3) a single project for profit; (4) a
sharing of profits and losses; (5) contribution of skills or property by the parties; and (6)
community interest and control over the enterprise. Id. at 214-215. “The key consideration is
that the parties intended a joint venture.” Id. at 215. There is no evidence that the parties in this
case intended a joint venture. The parties did not undertake a single business enterprise by
entering into the service agreement at issue, they did not share in profits or losses, and they did
not share control over the alleged enterprise.
Because there is no material factual dispute concerning WMWR’s failure to pay Sunset
the price for services rendered, we find that the trial court properly granted summary disposition
to Sunset on its claim for breach of contract.
B.
Next, WMWR argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its counterclaim for tortious
interference with business relations and prospective advantages. Again, we disagree. “‘The
elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are the existence of a valid business
relationship or expectancy, knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
defendant, an intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy, and resultant damage to the plaintiff.’” Mino v
Clio School Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003), quoting BPS Clinical
Laboratories v BCBSM (On Remand), 217 Mich App 687, 698-699; 552 NW2d 919 (1996). The
plaintiff must allege “the intentional doing of a per se wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act
with malice and unjustified in law” for the purpose of invading the business relationship. CMI
Int'l, Inc v Intermet Int'l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002) (quotations and
citations omitted). “‘To establish that a lawful act was done with malice and without
1
In its answer to the complaint, WMWR also raised the statute of frauds, accord and satisfaction,
lack of consideration, and lack of privity as affirmative defenses. Because WMWR failed to
raise these defenses on appeal, we decline to address them. MCR 7.212(C)(7); Silver Creek Twp
v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99-100; 631 NW2d 346 (2001).
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justification, the plaintiff must demonstrate, with specificity, affirmative acts by the defendant
that corroborate the improper motive of the interference. Where the defendant’s actions were
motivated by legitimate business reasons, its actions would not constitute improper motive or
interference.’” Mino, supra at 78, quoting BPS Clinical Laboratories, supra at 699.
At his deposition, Hall testified that WMWR had at least four major customers, including
Ken Bird Roofing, F & M Home Improvement, West Michigan Construction, and Diekevers
Roofing. According to Hall, WMWR was forced to reduce the prices it charged its customers for
hauling refuse when Sunset increased the price for grindings. Hall claimed that WMWR’s
customers threatened to contract with Sunset’s sister company, which charged lower prices for
hauling refuse, if WMWR did not lower its prices. WMWR now asserts that Sunset intentionally
raised the price it charged WMWR for hauling grindings into the landfill and gave Sunset’s sister
company a more favorable price so that the sister company could “steal” WMWR’s business.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to WMWR, we find that the trial
court properly granted summary disposition to Sunset with regard to WMWR’s counterclaim for
tortious interference. Even assuming that WMWR had a business relationship with the four
companies named by Hall, there is no evidence that Sunset was aware of their alleged
relationship. Hall admitted that he never provided Sunset with any information regarding
WMWR’s customers. Hall simply asserted, without supporting evidence, that Sunset could have
discovered the identity of WMWR’s customers by following its refuse trucks. Moreover,
WMWR failed to establish that Sunset intentionally interfered with WMWR’s alleged business
relationships by committing a per se wrongful act or a lawful act with malice or without
justification. As previously discussed, Sunset raised the price it charged WMWR for legitimate
business reasons, namely to cover the cost of operating the landfill. Furthermore, there is no
evidence supporting WMWR’s assertion that the price Sunset charged its sister company for
grindings was improper. Sunset personnel testified that the landfill charged all of its customers
different prices depending on the volume and type of refuse each customer hauled into the
landfill. WMWR’s assertion on appeal that it had an “exclusive contract” to haul grindings into
the landfill is also meritless. While Hall testified that he believed WMWR was the only
company hauling grindings into the landfill, he admitted that he only defined the arrangement
between WMWR and Sunset as exclusive because WMWR agreed to use Sunset’s landfill
exclusively. Finally, there is no evidence in the record, other than Hall’s general assertion that
WMWR lost money after Sunset raised its prices, regarding WMWR’s damages. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of WMWR’s counterclaim for tortious interference.
II
WMWR further argues that the trial court erred in granting Sunset’s motion for costs and
attorney fees pursuant to MCR 2.313(C). We decline to address this issue for lack of
jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party from
“a final judgment or final order of the circuit court.” MCR 7.203(A)(1). MCR 7.202(6) defines
a “final judgment” or “final order” in a civil case as “the first judgment or order that disposes of
all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties,” or “a postjudgment
order awarding or denying attorney fees and costs.” An appeal of right in a civil case must be
filed “within 21 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” MCR 7.204(A)(1)(a).
In this case, the trial court entered its final order granting Sunset’s motion for summary
disposition on February 6, 2007 and WMWR filed an appeal as of right on February 27, 2007.
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The trial court entered its postjudgment order awarding Sunset costs and attorney fees on May 4,
2007. WMWR could have appealed the trial court’s May 4, 2007 order, but did not do so.
Consequently, this Court is without jurisdiction to review this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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