PEOPLE OF MI V JACINTO PENA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275508
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-012514-FC
JACINTO PENA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Smolenski and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of felony murder, MCL 750.316, first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(f), first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316, and
mutilation of a dead body, MCL 750.160. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual
offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to life imprisonment for his murder convictions, 20 to 60
years’ imprisonment for his first-degree CSC conviction, and 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for
mutilating a dead body. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Defendant’s convictions arise from a forcible rape and a related murder. Defendant raped
the victim in his bedroom. When she subsequently screamed and kicked out a window,
defendant threw her to the ground and strangled her, first with his hands and then with her shirt.
He subsequently moved the victim’s dead body to the bathroom, where he shoved his fist into
her vagina, causing damage to her vaginal area. He then went to sleep. On the following day,
defendant turned himself in to the police and confessed to his crimes. Defendant was thereafter
tried and convicted for the rape, murder, and mutilation of the victim’s body.
Defendant argues that the evidence of malice was insufficient to support the felony
murder conviction, and that the evidence was insufficient within the meaning of the criminal
statute to support a finding that he mutilated the victim’s dead body. We review an argument
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, “[t]aking the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, . . . a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 420-421; 646 NW2d 158
(2002).
The elements of felony-murder are: “(1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent
to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with
knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e. malice], (3) while
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committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any” specifically
enumerated felony, here first-degree criminal sexual conduct. People v Smith, 478 Mich 292,
318-319; 733 NW2d 351 (2007). A defendant’s intent to commit the predicate felony does not
per se establish that he had the requisite malice to support a felony-murder conviction; rather,
malice must be specifically proved. People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328, 339; 308 NW2d 112
(1981), citing People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 727-729; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). Malice is the
“intent to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, or wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood
that the natural tendency of a person’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Aaron,
supra at 728-729. Malice is also described as “an intent to create a risk of great bodily harm
with knowledge that such is the probable result.” People v Neal, 201 Mich App 650, 654; 506
NW2d 618 (1993). The facts and circumstances of a killing may lead to an inference of malice,
and “[i]t is for the jury to determine whether the element of malice can be inferred from all the
evidence.” People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 176-177; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). Evidence of
manual strangulation may be used to show that a defendant had the opportunity to consider his
actions before he committed them. See People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 733; 597 NW2d 73
(1999). “[I]t is not a defense to any crime that defendant was, at that time, under the influence of
or impaired by a voluntarily and knowingly consumed alcoholic liquor, drug, including a
controlled substance, other substance or compound, or combination of alcoholic liquor, drug, or
other substance or compound.” MCL 768.37(1).
Here, evidence was presented at trial that defendant admitted to his mother, his girlfriend,
and several police officers that he raped the victim and subsequently strangled her. A forensic
pathologist testified that after 20 seconds of strangulation, a person can lose consciousness, but it
takes several minutes before the oxygen in the brain is sufficiently depleted to cause death. If
defendant’s intent was merely to silence the victim or keep her from kicking out any more
windows, he could have stopped strangling her as soon as she lost consciousness. But evidence
was presented that defendant strangled the victim for several minutes before she died. Moreover,
at some point during the strangulation, defendant released his hands from the victim’s neck in
order to tie her shirt tightly around her neck to complete the strangulation. Considering this
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily
harm, or the intent to cause a risk of great bodily harm with knowledge that such was the
probable result. Defendant’s claimed intoxication during these events is not a defense. MCL
768.37(1). Sufficient evidence of malice was presented to support defendant’s felony murder
conviction.1
With respect to defendant’s mutilation conviction, the mutilation of a dead body is
prohibited by statute, as follows:
1
In reaching our conclusion, we decline to consider defendant’s assertion that a lack of nexus
between the murder and the predicate felony indicates that there was not sufficient evidence of
his malice to sustain a felony murder conviction. Defendant does not support his contention with
the use of authority or any reasoning or explanation. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373,
389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
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A person, not being lawfully authorized to do so, who shall . . . mutilate,
deface, remove, or carry away a portion of the dead body of a person, whether in
his charge for burial or otherwise, whenever the mutilation, defacement, removal,
or carrying away is not necessary in any proper operation in embalming the body
or for the purpose of a postmortem examination . . . shall be guilty of a felony. . .
[MCL 750.160.]
While this statute has not been construed by this Court or our Supreme Court, the Legislature is
presumed to have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed. People v Petty, 469 Mich 108,
114; 665 NW2d 443 (2003). If the wording or language of a statute is unambiguous, no judicial
construction is required or permitted and the statute must be enforced as written. Id.; People v
Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 425; 707 NW2d 624 (2005). Unless the words have been defined
in the statutes, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings, considering the context in
which the words are used. People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151; 730 NW2d 708 (2007);
MCL 8.3a. If the Legislative intent is not apparent from the statute itself, this Court may consult
dictionary definitions. People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 641; 720 NW2d 196 (2006).
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines “mutilation” as the “act of cutting off or
permanently damaging a body part.” To “mutilate” is otherwise defined as “to injure or disfigure
by removing or irreparably damaging parts.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(2001). To “deface” means “to mar the surface or appearance of; disfigure.” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). To “remove” means “to move or shift from a place or
position.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). Thus, according to the plain
language2 of the statute, a person may not cause irreparable or permanent damage or injury to,
change the appearance of, or remove a portion of, the dead body.
The record reveals that defendant shoved his fist into the victim’s vagina after he moved
her dead body from his bedroom to the bathroom. The victim had large lacerations, tears, and
bruises that were consistent with a fist or some other human or foreign object being inserted into
the victim’s vagina. Considering these facts together and in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant irreparably
damaged and disfigured the victim’s vagina when he shoved his fist inside her after she died.
Defendant next argues that his confessions were coerced and not voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances, including a failure to Mirandize3 him. The only issue considered
2
Because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we decline to adopt
defendant’s more restrictive definition of mutilation for which he finds support in this Court’s
cases related to the common-law tort for mutilation of a dead body. See Dampier v Wayne Co,
233 Mich App 714, 729; 592 NW2d 809 (1999) (defining mutilation as the “active incision,
evisceration, or dismemberment of a dead body”). We are not persuaded that this tort definition
has become a technical, common-law definition, which should affect our analysis of the criminal
statute. We note that other defendants have been criminally convicted of this crime where they
burned a dead body. People v Williams, 265 Mich App 68, 70; 692 NW2d 722 (2005). Burning
does not involve cutting, eviscerating, or dismembering a body.
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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during the Walker4 hearing below was whether defendant’s confession was coerced by promises
of leniency. Therefore, that is the only question preserved for appeal. We review a trial court’s
ultimate decision on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545,
563; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). However, we will “not disturb a trial court’s factual findings with
respect to a Walker hearing unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly
erroneous where we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. With respect to defendant’s unpreserved allegations of error related to the admission of his
statements to police, he may obtain a reversal of his conviction where the error was plain and
affected his substantial rights. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
A defendant’s confession must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted
by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence . . . .’” People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621,
632; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). Whether defendant was promised leniency is determined from the
defendant’s point of view by considering “whether defendant is likely to have reasonably
understood the statements in question to be promises of leniency.” People v Conte, 421 Mich
704, 739-740; 365 NW2d 648 (1984). Furthermore, to make a defendant’s confession
involuntary, the promise of leniency has to be one “relied upon by the defendant in making his
decision and one that at least in part prompted the defendant to confess.” Id. at 741.
Whether a defendant’s confession was otherwise voluntary is determined by examining
the conduct of the police. People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373; 662 NW2d 856 (2003).
“The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made.” Id. at 374. Several
factors should be considered, including:
the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of
his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the
statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a
magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured,
intoxicated or drugged or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the
accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused
was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id. at
373-374.]
Each factor should be considered, and none of the factors is determinative. Id. at 374. Where
defendant is in custody during interrogation, he must “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently”
waive his Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to an attorney before any of his
statements obtained during the custodial interrogation can be used against him. Akins, supra at
564. A person is in custody where the “person has been formally arrested or subjected to a
restraint on freedom of movement or of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” People v
4
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195, 197; 568 NW2d 153 (1997). Once a defendant is in custody
and has been instructed about his rights, the police are not required to reread his rights every time
they question him. People v Littlejohn, 197 Mich App 220, 223; 495 NW2d 171 (1992).
Here, after a de novo review of the entire record, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake when it found that defendant’s claims that he was
promised leniency were fabricated and otherwise unsupported by the objective evidence
available on the record. There was no objective evidence on the record that Detective McGee
ever talked to defendant, let alone had the time to promise defendant leniency in exchange for his
confession. Defendant was escorted from the lobby of the police department to the interview
room by Officer Zabriskie. Officer Zabriskie did not leave until Detectives Jorgensen and
DeVries arrived to question defendant. Furthermore, we will not disrupt on appeal the trial
court’s determination that defendant’s story was not credible. People v Noble, 238 Mich App
647, 657; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
Furthermore, we do not believe that any plain error exists with respect to the
voluntariness of defendant’s confessions. Both confessions were made without substantial
questioning from police officers. Defendant came, with his family, to the police station before
the police were aware that a crime had been committed, and stated that he had “murdered
someone.” Defendant was instructed of his Fifth Amendment rights as soon as Officer Zabriskie
understood that defendant intended to confess to a murder. During defendant’s subsequent
recorded statement, he admitted he was already informed of his rights, and then signed a waiver
of those rights. The five-minute delay during the recorded interview, before defendant was
reinstructed of his rights, does not automatically make his confessions involuntary because
defendant had been previously advised of his Miranda rights. Littlejohn, supra at 223.
Furthermore, although defendant admitted to drinking and taking cocaine during the previous
night, defendant did not appear drunk during his statements, his speech was not slurred, and he
was able to stand. Finally, defendant was not in custody for long before making his statements.
There was no evidence that he was deprived of food, water, sleep, or medical attention, or that he
was threatened or coerced in any manner. See Shipley, supra. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court did not commit plain error when it admitted defendant’s
confessions into evidence.
Finally, defendant argues that his dual convictions for both first-degree felony murder
and the predicate CSC felony violate his right to be protected from double jeopardy. We agree.
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant may not be convicted of, and sentenced for, both
felony murder and its underlying felony. See People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218; 581 NW2d
744 (1998). When a defendant is convicted and sentenced for both felony murder and the
predicate felony, the underlying felony conviction and sentence must be vacated. Bigelow, supra
at 220-221. Therefore, we vacate defendant’s first-degree CSC conviction and sentence.
Additionally, defendant’s separate convictions and sentences for first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder arising from the death of one victim are
improper. Bigelow, supra at 220. On remand, the trial court shall modify the judgment of
sentence to reflect a single conviction and sentence of first-degree murder, supported by two
different theories. See People v Joezell Williams, 475 Mich 101, 103; 715 NW2d 24 (2006).
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Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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