PEOPLE OF MI V BENNIE LEE BRYANT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 6, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Nos. 270900; 271156
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 05-010650-01;
05-005274-01
BENNIE LEE BRYANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and O’Connell and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These cases were consolidated in the trial court and tried before a single jury. Defendant
appeals as of right his subsequent convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(1) (victim under 13), aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i, and assault and battery,
MCL 750.81. Defendant was sentenced to 100 months to 30 years in prison for the first-degree
sexual assault conviction, one to five years in prison for the aggravated stalking conviction, and
three days in prison for the assault and battery conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s criminal sexual conduct conviction arises from the sexual penetration of the
victim, his daughter, in 1990. According to the victim, she was five years old at the time, and
while she and defendant were alone in the house, defendant asked her if she wanted to watch a
movie. They went into defendant’s bedroom, and defendant played a pornographic movie on the
television. They both got into bed and the victim fell asleep. When she awoke, defendant was
lying on top of her covering her mouth with his hand. He then removed her clothing and put his
penis in her vagina. The victim testified that this went on for about an hour or an hour and a
half. The victim testified that she then walked to a neighbor’s house alone and stayed with the
neighbor for about a day. She claimed that she told no one about the incident until she was
thirteen years old, and, at that time, she received her first medical examination for sexual assault.
No medical records were introduced at trial.
Defendant’s assault and battery and aggravated stalking convictions arise from events in
April 2005, fifteen years after the sexual assault. The victim testified that, on three occasions,
she encountered defendant, who was driving a van, as she was walking to work in the morning.
The first time she saw him, she ran to work. The second time she saw him, she ran into an
abandoned building, and defendant searched for her but did not find her. The third time, on
April 27, 2005, she started to run, but fell. Defendant approached on foot and started kicking
her. The victim testified that police happened upon the scene, apprehended defendant, and asked
-1-
the victim if she wanted to go to the hospital. However, the victim declined and went to work.
When she left the scene, defendant was still in the police car.
The victim’s foster mother testified that on April 29, 2005, and May 1, 2005, while she
lived with the victim, anonymous notes arrived at her home. The anonymous letters were
threatening, offensive, and sexually explicit.1 They expressly referred to the writer’s sexual
abuse of the victim when she was young and included details about the abuse and a complaint
that the victim was “stolen” from the writer by the foster care system. The notes were signed,
“guess who.” A handwriting expert compared copies of the notes with samples from defendant’s
hand and pointed out every similarity between letters and groups of letters she found. The
similarities covered almost every letter of the alphabet and included several groups of letters.
She testified that there were more similarities than differences between the samples.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to investigate several issues to determine whether they could have
helped him at trial. We disagree. “Whether a person has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge must first find the facts, then
must decide whether those facts establish a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and questions of constitutional
law de novo. Id. at 484-485.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. In order to demonstrate that counsel's
performance was deficient, the defendant must show that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. In so
doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
1
Specifically, the note of April 29, 2005, stated:
Dear bitches of this house: Starting with [the victim], when I raped you it felt so
good. Your mom went away to rehab, I had a ball with your pussy while you
were crying help to your dumb ass brothers and sisters. I cut a piece of your
asshole so I could fit it in and your damn foster parent – wherever she is she
kidnapped [sic] you from me. Wait till tomorrow. You think I kicked your ass
the other day, just wait until I see you, see you tomorrow. From guess who.
The second note stated:
Dear bitches of this house: [The victim] do you remember when you were about
four when I made you suck my dick, I just felt that you should know – you should
have knowed [sic] stop having these punk ass niggers call my house. Next
motherfucker call my house I’m coming to yours, keep my dick in your mouth
and shut up. From guess who.
-2-
performance constituted sound trial strategy. [People v Riley (After Remand), 468
Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003) (citations omitted).]
“Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the
benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999)
(citations omitted). “Failure to make a reasonable investigation can constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005), lv
pending 477 Mich 1303 (2007). However, the defense counsel’s onus to investigate carries with
it the discretion to determine when a particular investigation is no longer fruitful or a particular
defense will not be beneficial. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690-691; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
It bears noting at the outset that defense counsel was the last in a long line of rejected
attorneys who had been appointed to manage defendant’s case. One of the attorneys who had
recently been assigned to the case before trial had zealously acted on defendant’s adamant
assurances that he had not written the threatening notes. In response, former counsel obtained
the handwriting expert that was actually used by the prosecutor at trial to demonstrate
defendant’s authorship of the notes. Defense counsel was also faced with defendant’s
determination to orchestrate, from jail, his witnesses and their trial testimony. The tapes of his
jail conversations with his witnesses damaged his witnesses’ credibility more than anything else
the prosecution raised on cross-examination. In other words, defendant’s proactive and
overconfident approach to his defense invariably led to detrimental, if not disastrous, results to
his case. Moreover, defendant testified on his own behalf at trial, and his testimony stood in
stark contrast to the victim’s. Defendant flatly denied the sexual contact that the victim alleged,
and he flatly denied following her or ever kicking her in the street. The jury chose to believe the
victim. Under the circumstances, defendant has the difficult task of demonstrating that the jury’s
credibility determination was distorted by his trial counsel’s poor conduct rather than properly
forged in their impressions of his demeanor and their interpretation of the evidence.
Defendant first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the victim’s
medical records pertaining to the alleged assault and failing to hire a medical expert to explain
them. Defendant points to three medical records that came to light during the post-trial
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, defendant’s trial counsel testified that defendant
had told him that the victim had been examined at a hospital and the results would be favorable
to defendant. He testified that he knew about a 1998 medical examination, but was not aware of
a 1991 examination. Counsel testified that he decided not to seek any additional records because
he did not know what they would show and feared uncovering evidence damaging to the defense
that could be used by the prosecutor.
The records obtained by post-trial counsel are nearly indecipherable and none of them
places defendant in a kind, fatherly light. First, there is an emergency room record from
Children’s Hospital of the Detroit Medical Center, dated November 8, 1991. Under “Diagnosis,”
the report reads “Alleged Physical Abuse.” Dr. Patrice Harold testified at the post-trial
evidentiary hearing that the report includes the following notation: “Vaginal: No laceration,
bruising, hymen intact.” However, she also testified that the size of the victim’s vagina when
she was five could mean that the victim suffered extremely painful sexual penetration that would
-3-
not destroy the hymen. The alleged conduct, at this point, could have occurred one year or more
before the examination, which also affected the examination’s ability to detect the abuse. Worse
for defendant, the report demonstrated a much speedier response to alleged sexual abuse than
originally anticipated: less than one year compared with the eight-year delay presumed and
argued at trial. The report also contains claims that the victim had been “beaten up” by her
sixteen-year-old brother, and reflects the allegation that he had apparently been “putting needles
in her legs.” It refers to photographs taken of the injuries as well as x-rays of her facial bones.
Without including these volatile 1991 records, defendant’s trial counsel was able to elicit
that the victim underwent a physical examination for sexual abuse in 1998, and that the
prosecutor, who had the burden of proof, did not present any of those records into evidence.
Without the records, defense counsel adeptly argued that the case was not brought to light for
eight years, and then only after family strife had divided the home. With this void in the
prosecutor’s proofs, defense counsel indirectly attacked the victim’s claims that she was an
extremely young child who suffered extreme and prolonged sexual contact. Defense counsel
repeatedly argued that such contact would have required medical attention, and yet none was
sought for eight years, and nothing was presented that indicated that the 1998 examination found
anything amiss. Under the circumstances, defendant fails to demonstrate that the presentation of
the 1991 medical records would have provided an additional defense or otherwise altered the
outcome of trial, even if they had been fully available to defense counsel and correctly
deciphered. See Riley, supra; People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793
(1990).
The other records shed even more light on the grim situation facing defendant’s trial
counsel. The second record is dated October 30, 1998, and it plainly refers to an event of sexual
abuse that was less than three weeks old. The report states that the victim, a thirteen-year-old
female, presented with claims of sexual abuse. The victim described in detail how she awoke
with her clothes off and how her legs were wet with a white substance. Contrary to defendant’s
adamant assertions, there is no indication that this record referred to the events in 1990 rather
than a separate, more recent, event in 1998. The report reflects that the patient initially refused a
pelvic exam, but then states that the victim’s hymen was thickened and that her rectum lacked
any scarring. The third report is dated December 3, 1998, and it appears to state that the pelvic
region did not indicate any traumatic force and that there was no evidence of tears or other
injury. However, that report also refers to the other report that reflects a recent accusation of
sexual assault. Dr. Harold did not address all the contents of the records, but she affirmatively
stated that the records were inconsistent with sexual abuse. On cross-examination, she conceded
that an adult male could penetrate a five-year-old girl’s vagina deeply enough to cause extreme
pain, but not enough to tear the hymen or cause other noticeable damage.
The record reflects that counsel was aware of a 1998 allegation of abuse that had received
medical attention and that the examination did not substantiate any claims of sexual assault.
During trial, defense counsel carefully argued the case in this light–no physical or medical
evidence substantiated the allegations of severe abuse–without raising the possibility that the
1998 examination was the product of a fresh set of accusations or occurrences. The record
reflects that defendant was also aware of a full investigation of the 1998 allegations of abuse, and
he knew that the prosecutor decided not to charge defendant. Counsel testified at the post-trial
hearing that the 1998 records would not have been relevant to the incident that allegedly
-4-
occurred in 1990 and that he did not want to draw the jury’s attention to another alleged incident
of abuse.
Clearly, the decision to leave well enough alone regarding the 1998 investigation and
medical records was a matter of trial strategy. Placing the victim’s claim of repeated abuse
before the jury had serious risks of backfiring, especially considering that defense counsel could
harp on the prosecutor’s lack of direct evidence without raising anything else that might damage
the case. Similarly, even if deciphered and ultimately used as appellate counsel advocates, the
1991 medical records would not have added much, if anything, to the defense. Instead, they
would have demonstrated that the victim pursued her allegations of abuse relatively quickly and
before most of the later claims of unfair parental treatment had tarnished her credibility. The
records also undermined defendant’s theory that the victim reported a series of fictional events,
because the 1991 records appear to reflect a very real beating at the hands of a much older
brother. Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to demonstrate deficient performance by
counsel’s failure to obtain the 1991 medical records or by his decision to avoid the 1998 medical
records, and defendant further fails to persuade us that the claimed deficiencies had any effect on
the outcome of his trial.
Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain police records of
an investigation conducted in response to allegations of sexual abuse made by the victim in 1998.
Particularly, defendant argues that defense counsel should have obtained the results of a
polygraph examination administered to defendant in 1998, the denial of a warrant request in
1999, and a letter written by an investigator stating that the 1998 investigation had been closed
without charges being filed. However, defendant fails to demonstrate how any of these items
would have survived rudimentary challenges to their admissibility, and he fails to account for the
fact that raising the issue of the investigation in 1998 would have necessarily raised the issue of
the victim’s later allegations of abuse.
Whatever benefit defendant could have potentially gained in undermining the victim’s
credibility by bringing forth the documents, he most certainly would have lost in limiting the
case to a single, potentially exaggerated or misremembered, fifteen-year-old incident belatedly
asserted by a twenty-year-old estranged daughter under highly questionable circumstances.
Defendant would also have destroyed the illusion that the allegations lay essentially dormant for
seven years until after the victim attempted, unsuccessfully, to reconcile with defendant. These
strong arguments did not carry the day, but they would not have existed at all if defendant had
raised issues regarding a second accusation and a second legal defense in 1998. Defendant’s
argument also ignores evidence that a prosecutor had discussed the polygraph issue with his trial
attorney and informed him that, before the successful polygraph examination in 1998, defendant
had allegedly failed a polygraph examination following the 1990 incident.2 Presenting a record
2
The context of the prosecutor’s arguments underscores another problem with the 1998
investigation and polygraph examination. The victim’s accusations in 1998 were much more
vague about whether she experienced any sexual penetration by defendant. Instead, she
described awaking to find evidence that defendant had apparently ejaculated on her legs. In this
context, defendant’s ability to pass a polygraph regarding his sexual penetration of the victim is
(continued…)
-5-
of the 1998 investigation to the jury also would have drawn more attention to defendant’s
attempts to orchestrate his defense, because then his tape-recorded allusions to his earlier,
successful defensive efforts would have had an even better defined and more insidious context.
Under the circumstances, defendant fails to demonstrate that any of the documents regarding the
1998 police investigation, even if somehow admissible, would have ultimately helped his
defense against the alleged events of 1990.
Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that
defendant was not arrested until May 10, 2005, which defendant argues would have impeached
the victim’s testimony that defendant was arrested immediately following the alleged physical
assault on April 27, 2005. However, defense counsel extensively argued the lack of police
corroboration for the victim’s account of the unusual events, and he elicited from the officer in
charge that the interview following defendant’s arrest did not occur until May 10, 2005. Under
the circumstances, defendant fails to indicate how his trial counsel could have done more to
“prove” that the events never transpired because of the delay between the street fight and his
actual arrest. As the trial court pointed out, an individual may be taken into custody without
being booked and without any report issuing. Therefore, defendant fails to persuade us that the
jury would not have convicted him but for defense counsel’s inadequate performance.
Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the distance the
victim claimed to have walked after the alleged assault and to present this evidence to the jury.
He argues that the distance from defendant’s house, where the alleged assault occurred, to the
house to which the victim claimed to have walked was 1.4 miles, so it was impossible that a fiveyear-old child would have walked that far alone after suffering from such an egregious assault.
Although it is true that defense counsel did not elicit testimony about the actual distance the
victim claimed to have walked, he challenged her credibility on this point by eliciting that the
distance was substantial and suggesting that the victim’s account did not make sense because she
would have been in “dire need of some kind of medical attention.” Counsel’s failure to present
evidence and argument concerning the specific distance the victim claimed to have walked did
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, defendant argues that counsel’s errors, considered cumulatively, produced a trial
that was fundamentally unfair. Because none of the claimed instances of ineffective assistance
constitute professional error, and because defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to
his defense in any event, we reject his argument for cumulative error. People v Daoust, 228
Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Defendant next argues that he was denied due process because the prosecution failed to
disclose material evidence that was favorable to defendant. We disagree. To establish that a
prosecutor has committed a violation of the policies set forth in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83,
87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), a defendant must establish:
(…continued)
not nearly as persuasive as if the polygraph had been taken in 1991. Again, it was well within
defense counsel’s discretion to decide whether to expose a jury to all these details or leave them
as unfilled voids subject to the jury’s skepticism.
-6-
(1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the
defendant did not possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it
with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable
evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different. [People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).]
With regard to the medical records, defendant has not established what evidence the state
possessed, much less that it withheld any record that would have benefited defendant. The
prosecutor testified that the November 8, 1991, record from Children’s Hospital was in her file,
and that she gave defense counsel the opportunity to inspect the file. Likewise, any other scraps
of medical records from other sources were reportedly in the file.
This leads to the second problem with defendant’s arguments. Even assuming that the
state possessed medical records that were favorable to him, defendant has not shown that he
could not have obtained this evidence with reasonable diligence or that the prosecutor prevented
its discovery. On the contrary, the prosecutor testified that when defense counsel took over the
case from his predecessor, he received everything the previous attorney had already obtained,
including materials the prosecutor had delivered. The prosecutor also met with defendant’s new
counsel to go over discovery in an effort to avoid delaying the trial. At that time, she gave
defense counsel her entire file, including the partial medical records she had obtained from the
victim’s caretakers, and allowed him to make copies of anything he wanted. She did not keep
track of the documents defense counsel copied and did not know whether he had copied
anything. All the records at issue came from one hospital, so a record request to that hospital
should have led to any records that defendant desired.
Defendant also alleges that the prosecution withheld several documents pertaining to the
1998 investigation into allegations that defendant sexually abused the victim. These include a
letter written by the initial investigating officer, dated February 8, 1999, stating that the
investigation had been closed and no charges were being filed against defendant. Defendant also
claims he was barred access to the victim’s first statement to police made on December 5, 1998,
the results of the polygraph examination administered to defendant on February 9, 1999, and the
investigating officer’s case notes, which refer to the prosecution’s denial of a warrant after the
1998 investigation. However, trial counsel clearly testified that he believed that all the events
transpiring after 1998 were related to a second incident of sexual misconduct, so they were not
relevant to the case. This explained why counsel never sought the records of the 1998
investigation and did not receive any records of that investigation. In addition, he said that
defendant told him that he took a polygraph examination during the investigation, but did not tell
him that he had passed. Counsel testified that he had not attempted to obtain the polygraph
examination and the result. Under the circumstances, defendant can only speculate that the
prosecution would have withheld this documentation from defense counsel, if defense counsel
had requested it.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor withheld two reports from the Family
Independence Agency. However, the allegation simply lacks any factual support. At the
evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that the reports were in the prosecutor’s file, so
defense counsel had the opportunity to see them before trial. She testified that she and defense
counsel had a specific conversation about the first report. Defendant does not dispute that the
-7-
second report was in the file. Under the circumstances, we reject defendant’s argument that he
could not have obtained these documents through the exercise of reasonable diligence or that the
prosecution suppressed this evidence.
Defendant’s final argument is that he was denied due process because there was a sixyear delay “in bringing charges after investigating the case.” We disagree. “Before dismissal
may be granted because of prearrest delay there must be actual and substantial prejudice to the
defendant’s right to a fair trial and an intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage.”
People v Crear, 242 Mich App 158, 166; 618 NW2d 91 (2000). Defendant alleges that he was
prejudiced by the delay because any opportunity to form an explanation for the events had
gradually eroded over time. However, defendant does not specify which witnesses have become
unavailable as a result of the delay, or explain how their testimony would have been beneficial to
his defense. See id. at 166-167. “Without specific references to instances of prejudicegenerating occurrences, and without specific allegations of actual prejudice resulting therefrom,
the prosecution would be at an insuperable disadvantage indeed in attempting to show how such
unspecified prejudice was in fact justified. We will not put the cart before the horse.” People v
Loyer, 169 Mich App 105, 120; 425 NW2d 714 (1988). In this case, defendant has failed to
allege specific “instances of prejudice-generating occurrences,” id., so he has failed to meet his
burden of establishing actual and substantial prejudice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.