IN RE DENNIS FREDERICK SCHNEIDER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DENNIS FREDERICK
SCHNEIDER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 28, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278694
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-444341-NA
ELIZABETH SIKORA,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Owens and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. FACTS
Dennis was removed from respondent’s home in July 2005. He had missed at least 70
days of school in the 2004 to 2005 school year, and a truancy petition had been filed. Dennis
also suffered from encopresis and enuresis and lived in an extremely cluttered home where he
slept on a corner of the couch. Respondent, diagnosed with various mental health problems, had
refused services other than therapy, and she mostly treated herself and Dennis with natural
remedies. The court took jurisdiction and entered an order of disposition in September 2005.
Respondent was required to: (1) demonstrate proper self-control and responsibility for emotions,
including improving self-monitoring, having healthy relationships, communicating appropriately,
participating in individual therapy, and undergoing psychological and psychiatric evaluations
and following recommendations; (2) demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, including
attending parenting classes and visitations and interacting well with Dennis; (3) refrain from
substance abuse; (4) maintain responsible and supportive relationships with peers and family; (5)
maintain an adaptive level of functioning and understand personal and family treatment needs;
(6) have safe and suitable housing, including cleaning and organizing her home; (7) demonstrate
an appropriate understanding and acceptance of the child’s temperament, developmental
requirements, and needs; (8) maintain weekly contact with the worker; (9) attend all court
hearings; and (10) follow through on all court recommendations. After 22 months, the trial court
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found some improvements but noncompliance with the most important requirements of the
treatment plan.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there was clear and
convincing evidence to support termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(g), and (j). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it
finds that termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo,
supra at 353. We review the trial court’s findings for clear error. MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours
Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
B. Analysis
We find no clear error in the trial court’s findings. Sours, supra at 633. Respondent did
take parenting classes, attend visitation and court hearings regularly, maintain contact with the
worker, declutter parts of her home, and attend psychological and psychiatric evaluations and
individual and family therapy. She also tried to some extent to follow through with the
recommendations of the court and mental health professionals. However, she fell short in the
most significant areas that would impact her ability to properly care for Dennis. She was late to
most visitations and talked with Dennis about inappropriate topics. For a substantial time, she
shared her house with an unsuitable partner and could not extricate herself from the relationship
or the partner from her house. Parts of her house remained cluttered or inaccessible, and she had
substantial mental health issues. The evidence was clear and convincing that respondent could
not, within a reasonable time, provide proper care and custody for Dennis. She staunchly refused
to take medication for her mental health problems for any length of time, although every
counselor, psychologist, and psychiatrist recommended medication. The orders of disposition
required respondent to follow all medical and mental health treatment recommendations and
incorporated the recommendations of the Clinic for Child Study into respondent's treatment plan.
These recommendations included medication. The need for medication was repeatedly shown
by respondent's improper behavior in court, at visitations, and with caseworkers.
Respondent notes that the referee opposed the filing of a termination petition, based upon
respondent’s perceived compliance with her Parent Agency Agreement and Dennis’s significant
attachment to her. Evidence at the final hearings, however, showed a significant lack of
compliance and failure to benefit from services. A parent must not merely “go through the
motions” but must benefit in order to provide a proper home for the child. In re Gazella, 264
Mich App 668, 676; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Failure to comply with a court-ordered treatment
plan is evidence of neglect. Trejo, supra at 360-361 n 16. Here, respondent excused or denied
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her tardiness at visitations and her part in Dennis’s missing so much school, and denied that she
was mentally ill, bipolar, anxious, unstable, or depressed. She did not believe in medication for
herself or Dennis. Dennis was clearly adversely affected by respondent’s behavior, and there
was no real likelihood that she would change. The evidence clearly and convincingly supported
termination of respondent’s parental rights to Dennis under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).
As for MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), this subsection was not argued in petitioner's closing
argument or mentioned by the court in its findings. That portion of the order terminating
parental rights under subsection (j) was not supported by any findings and should be vacated.
Any error in finding subsection (j) is harmless, however, because clear and convincing evidence
of only one statutory ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Powers, 244 Mich
App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
Further, respondent objects to the trial court’s consideration of possible adoptive homes
for Dennis. The court may not compare the relative merits of a foster or relative home with the
parent’s home in assessing compliance with the statutory factors. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214215 n 21; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). However, determination of a child’s best interests may include
consideration of availability of suitable alternate homes. See In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225
Mich App 505, 520; 571 NW2d 750 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds Trejo, supra at
353-354. The court here stated that it would never compare the parent’s home with a prospective
adoptive home, and appears to have looked into the possibility of adoption only in considering
the best interests of the child. Therefore, we find no reversible error.
III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
We also reject respondent’s argument that the trial court clearly erred in its best interests
determination.
A. Standard of Review
Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence,
the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it finds from the whole record that termination
clearly is not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 353. The trial court’s
decision on best interests is reviewed for clear error. Trejo, supra at 356-357.
B. Analysis
We also find no clear error in the trial court’s findings on the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 353, 356-357. Determination of Dennis’s best interests was a
difficult question because of the child’s bond with, and attachment to, his mother. Respondent
and Dennis loved each other very much. Dennis opposed adoption and did not want respondent's
parental rights terminated. However, Dennis was only 11 years old and was not old enough or
mature enough to know what was best for him. Under his mother’s care, he was frequently sick
and missed much school, was not permitted to take prescribed medications, had few friends, wet
and soiled his pants, and lived in reprehensible conditions. These problems were a direct result
of respondent's mental illness, which she steadily refused to treat with medication. Her choices
adversely impacted the child’s health and well being, and the child’s welfare must take
precedence. Dennis spent nearly two years in foster care. While respondent made some
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improvements, the real changes in attitude and motivation necessary for her to adequately care
for Dennis did not occur. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in its best interests ruling.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
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