IN RE MAHQUAN DESHAWN PENDLETON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re MAHQUAN DESHAWN PENDLETON,
Minor.
RUPERT K. MANN and GERALDINE M.
MANN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 14, 2008
Petitioners-Appellants,
v
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and
CHERYL COCHRAN,
No. 278964
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000634-AO
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners appeal as of right from the trial court’s opinion and order dismissing their
petition to adopt their great-nephew, MahQuan Deshawn Pendleton, whose parents’ parental
rights were terminated.1 Petitioners challenge the trial court’s determination that the
superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI), an agency within the Department of
Human Services (DHS), did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in denying consent to petitioners
to adopt MahQuan.2 We affirm.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to uphold the MCI’s decision to withhold
consent to adopt to determine whether the court “applied correct legal principles.” This Court
reviews for clear error the trial court’s determination that MCI’s decision was not arbitrary and
capricious. Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234-235; 559 NW2d 342 (1996).
1
MahQuan’s date of birth is April 25, 2002.
2
The superintendent granted consent to adopt to MahQuan’s foster mother, Cheryl Cochran.
The superintendent granted consent to petitioners to adopt MahQuan’s two biological sisters who
had been placed with petitioners after they were removed from their parents’ care.
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Because the parental rights of MahQuan’s parents were terminated, the MCI must
consent to an adoption. MCL 710.43(1)(b). The trial court may not grant a petition for adoption
absent the required consent. MCL 710.45(1). A petitioner who is denied consent may file a
motion in the trial court “alleging that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and
capricious.” MCL 710.45(2). The court must uphold the denial of consent to adopt unless the
“court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary
and capricious . . . .” MCL 710.45(7).
The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is the “most demanding standard applied
in civil cases.” In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995).
Evidence is clear and convincing when it “‘produces in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the
factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.’ . . . Evidence may be uncontroverted, and yet not be ‘clear
and convincing.’ . . . Conversely, evidence may be ‘clear and convincing’ despite
the fact that it has been contradicted.” [Martin, supra at 227, quoting In re Jobes,
108 NJ 394, 407-408; 529 A2d 434 (1987).]
The “arbitrary and capricious” test is also well defined.
“Arbitrary is: ‘[Without] adequate determining principle . . . Fixed or arrived at
through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or adjustment
with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, . . . decisive but
unreasoned.’
Capricious is: ‘[Apt] to change suddenly; freakish; whimsical; humorsome.’”
[Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 678-679; 358 NW2d 856 (1984), quoting
United States v Carmack, 329 US 230, 243; 67 S Ct 252; 91 L Ed 209 (1946), and
Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 703, n 17; 238 NW2d 154 (1976).]
This Court has described the appropriate standard for judicial review in adoption
proceedings as follows:
The fact that the Legislature in drafting the statute limited judicial review
to a determination whether consent was withheld arbitrarily and capriciously, and
further required that such a finding be based upon clear and convincing evidence,
clearly indicates that it did not intend to allow the probate court to decide the
adoption issue de novo and substitute its judgment for that of the representative of
the agency that must consent to the adoption. Rather, the clear and unambiguous
language terms of the statute indicate that the decision of the representative of the
agency to withhold consent to an adoption must be upheld unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the representative acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. Thus, the focus is not whether the representative made the
“correct” decision or whether the probate judge would have decided the issue
differently than the representative, but whether the representative acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in making the decision. Accordingly, the hearing
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under § 45 is not . . . an opportunity for a petitioner to make a case relative to why
the consent should have been granted, but rather is an opportunity to show that the
representative acted arbitrarily and capriciously in withholding that consent. It is
only after the petitioner has sustained the burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the representative acted arbitrarily and capriciously that
the proceedings may then proceed to convincing the probate court that it should
go ahead and enter a final order of adoption.
Because the initial focus is whether the representative acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, the focus of such a hearing is not what reasons existed to authorize
the adoption, but the reasons given by the representative for withholding the
consent to the adoption. That is, if there exist good reasons why consent should
be granted and good reasons why consent should be withheld, it cannot be said
that the representative acted arbitrarily and capriciously in withholding that
consent even though another individual, such as the probate judge, might have
decided the matter in favor of the petitioner. Rather, it is the absence of any good
reason to withhold consent, not the presence of good reasons to grant it, that
indicates that the representative was acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
[In re Cotton, 208 Mich App 180, 184-185; 526 NW2d 601 (1994) (emphasis
added).]
The trial court properly applied the statutory standard of review. At the close of the
hearing, the trial court correctly noted that the legal question was whether “there was good
reason to withhold consent,” not a de novo review of whether the decision was in the best
interests of the child. The court “focused on whether there was the absence of any good reason
to withhold consent.” In its written opinion, the court reiterated that it did not have the authority
to conduct a de novo review and determine what placement would be in the child’s best interests.
Rather, it was bound to uphold MCI’s decision unless petitioners established by clear and
convincing evidence that the superintendent acted arbitrarily and capriciously in withholding
consent to adopt. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the superintendent provided good
reason to grant consent to the foster mother and, therefore, withhold consent from petitioners.
The trial court’s application of the standard of review is consistent with Cotton, supra at
184-185. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the superintendent of MCI.
It must uphold the agency’s decision unless the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
Consistent with Cotton, the trial court considered whether there was good reason to withhold
consent, not whether there was good reason to grant consent, to determine if the superintendent
of MCI acted properly.
The trial court properly determined that the superintendent’s decision was not arbitrary
and capricious. Petitioners contend that the superintendent’s decision was arbitrary or without
reason because he failed to conduct an independent investigation into Catholic Social Services of
Wayne County’s (CSS) mismanagement of MahQuan’s case or to contact the competing families
to make an independent decision regarding MahQuan’s best interests. Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, the superintendent did conduct an independent review into CSS’s management of the
case. He met with or spoke to all the CSS workers involved in this case. During these meetings,
the superintendent questioned the CSS employees about the conflicting recommendations, the
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factors supporting each recommendation, and the reason the case had been handled in this
manner.
Further, the superintendent was entitled to rely on the investigative reports prepared by
CSS officials rather than conducting an independent investigation into MahQuan’s best interests.
In Cotton, supra at 186, the superintendent did not conduct an independent investigation into the
child’s best interests before deciding whether to grant consent to adopt. However, an
investigation was conducted and the superintendent’s decision “was based upon the results of
that investigation and the recommendation of the staff members involved.” Id. This Court found
that the superintendent did not act arbitrarily and capriciously because the decision was based on
the evidence gathered in the investigation. Id.
Moreover, the superintendent followed the mandates of the DHS adoption services
manual in making his decision. The manual provides that both foster parents and relatives “must
be given special consideration” in making an adoption determination.3 The manual provides that
“[r]elatives who express an interest in adopting the child shall be given consideration ahead of
recruited families who have no relationship with the child.” However, the manual also
recognizes that when a child has been in a foster care placement for over a year the child is
entitled to the continuation of that relationship:
Special emphasis must be placed on maintaining the relationship between the
child and the foster parents, which has existed for 12 months or longer. Unless
there are exceptional circumstances (such as reunification of siblings in an
adoptive home or placement with a relative with whom the child has a
relationship), the continuity of this relationship must be given special
consideration. When exceptional circumstances exist, these circumstances must
be evaluated, along with the continuity of the child’s relationship with the foster
parents and in light of the child’s needs identified it the child’s adoption
assessment.
***
When relatives and foster parents are interested in adopting the same child, both
must be assessed. If both are approved based on policies that apply to adoptive
applicants, the reasons for selection of prospective parents for the child must be
documented and based on which family meets the best interests criteria developed
for the child as reflected in the child’s adoption assessment. [Adoption Services
Manual, pp 2-3.]
MahQuan had been in his foster mother’s care for over 12 months and, therefore, the
superintendent was required to give “special emphasis” to continuing that relationship. He
recognized that there existed exceptional circumstances given that relatives with whom
MahQuan’s siblings had been placed also wanted to adopt the child. Both families were assessed
3
Family
Independence
Agency
Adoption
Services
<http://www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/cfa/ 732-30.pdf>, pp 1-2.
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Manual,
available
at
by CSS. In the end, the superintendent determined that it was in MahQuan’s best interests to be
adopted by his foster mother. This decision was supported by evidence gathered in the
investigation. MahQuan was placed with the foster mother when he was only 19 months old and
he is now almost six years old. MahQuan has formed a mother-child bond with his foster
mother. He has been raised with his foster mother’s two daughters, not his biological sisters. He
has formed a close sibling bond with his adoptive sisters. The reasons that could support
granting consent to petitioners are irrelevant. There exists good reason to withhold consent from
petitioners and grant consent in the foster mother’s favor. Accordingly, the trial court was
constrained to find that the superintendent’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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