IN RE MILES-COOPER/MILES MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ANGEL MILES-COOPER,
TIONNE MILES, and NA’IA MILES, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 281056
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-000080-NA
PHILIPPA MILES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LARRY SULLIVAN and ROOSEVELT
POLLARD,
Respondents.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent Miles appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental
rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h), (j), and (l). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 450; 592
NW2d 751 (1999). Respondent physically abused her minor nephew and failed to protect her
own children from physical and sexual abuse. She was serving a prison sentence for two counts
of second-degree child abuse and had three years left to serve on her sentence. Because of her
incarceration, she was unable to participate in services designed to rectify her poor parenting
skills. Even after her release from prison, it would be necessary for respondent to participate in
services for nine months to a year before reunification could be considered. Also, respondent’s
parental rights to another child were previously terminated after the child became a court ward.
Respondent’s reliance on Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich. 97, 114; 92 NW2d 604 (1958),
overruled on other grounds by In re Hatcher, 443 Mich. 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993), for the
-1-
proposition that petitioner was required to prove, and the trial court was required to find, that she
would neglect her child for the long-term future is misplaced. Fritts predates the enactment of
§ 19b(3), which sets forth the criteria for termination. Further, petitioner was not required to
afford respondent an opportunity for rehabilitation before seeking termination under § 19b(3)(l).
That subsection does not impose such a requirement and a court cannot “judicially legislate by
adding into a statute provisions that the Legislature did not include.” In re Wayne Co
Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 482, 486; 591 NW2d 359 (1998).
Finally, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000);
MCL 712A.19b(5). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to
the children. Id. at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
