PEOPLE OF MI V CALVIN CORTEZ CRAIG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273052
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003489-01
CALVIN CORTEZ CRAIG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right following his conviction by a jury of assault with intent to
commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (CSC II), MCL 750.520g(2). Defendant
was sentenced to 40 to 60 months in prison. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). We affirm defendant’s conviction, but remand this case to the trial
court for resentencing.
Defendant’s conviction arises from an incident that took place at his home between he
and his stepsister’s 15-year-old friend. According to the testimony, defendant and the victim
were left alone in the basement of his home for a period of time while his stepsister, who also
lived at the home, talked on the telephone upstairs. During that time period, defendant allegedly
grabbed the victim, pulled her pants down, and placed his penis near her vagina. Defendant’s
stepsister came back into the room at that point, and defendant released the victim.
On appeal, defendant first contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
and that his conviction must be reversed as a result. We disagree.
Whether counsel was ineffective is ultimately a question of law, which we review de
novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Where, as here, no
Ginther1 hearing was held, and no new trial requested, review is limited to errors apparent on the
record. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
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People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 625; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). To
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under current
professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the
result of defendant's trial would have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613
NW2d 694 (2000); People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 129; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).
Defendant asserts that during the direct examination of the defense’s only witness,
Pavielle Deramus, Ms. Deramus testified that she lied about when the incident between
defendant and the victim occurred, deciding with the victim to state that the incident occurred the
same weekend that another friend was assaulted. According to defendant, the testimony that
defendant allegedly assaulted another female was prejudicial and his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to this statement or address it in a sidebar or separate record.
However, the testimony does not clearly indicate that defendant assaulted Marquenette.
Rather, Ms. Deramus testified that she previously stated that the victim was assaulted “the same
weekend that Marquenette’s assault happened.” There is no reference to defendant in connection
with Marquenette’s assault.
Moreover, the statement offered by Ms. Deramus was not in direct response to the
question posed by defense counsel. Counsel simply asked Ms. Deramus why she originally lied
to her family about when the incident happened. Ms. Deramus responded that if she and the
victim had told the truth about the date, it would have been questioned why the victim kept
coming over. She thereafter went on to give the date they agreed to say it happened as the “same
weekend that Marquenette’s assault happened.” Defense counsel then moved on, focusing his
questions on the fact that the victim stayed the night at Ms. Deramus’s home on at least one other
night after the incident occurred. Because there was no clear implication that defendant
assaulted Marquenette, defense counsel may well have considered it sound trial strategy to not
object to or otherwise address the testimony so as to preclude undue focus on the testimony or to
avoid drawing out any further testimony clarifying whether it was defendant who was alleged to
have assaulted Marquenette. “This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel
regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's competence with the benefit of
hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Defendant has failed
to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence upon him, as the
trial court exceeded the sentencing guidelines but did not state that it would be doing so, and had
no substantial and compelling reasons to exceed the sentencing guidelines. We agree that
resentencing is warranted.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines, this court
reviews for clear error the trial court's finding that a particular factor in support of departure
exists. People v Young, 276 Mich App 446, 448; 740 NW2d 347 (2007). Whether a factor is
objective and verifiable, however, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo, and this
Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court's determination that the objective and
verifiable factors in a particular case constitute a substantial and compelling reason to depart
from the sentencing guidelines. Id.
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As a general rule, the trial court must impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines,
unless substantial and compelling reasons exist to depart from the guidelines. MCL 769.34(3).
The reason for the departure must be articulated by the trial court on the record. Id. To constitute
a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the guidelines, a reason must be objective
and verifiable, must irresistibly attract the attention of the court, and must be of considerable
worth in deciding the length of the sentence. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 257; 666 NW2d
231 (2003). To be objective and verifiable, the factors must be actions or occurrences that are
external to the mind, and that are capable of being confirmed. People v Abramski, 257 Mich App
71, 74; 665 NW2d 501 (2003).
A substantial and compelling reason will exist only in exceptional cases. Young, supra, at
449-450. A trial court may not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender
characteristic that is already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range
unless the court finds from the facts contained in the record that the characteristic has been given
inadequate or disproportionate weight. MCL 769.34(3)(b); Young, supra at 450.
Here, the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum term range of 7 to 23 months.
The trial court, however, sentenced defendant to 40 to 60 months in prison. In imposing
sentence, the trial court stated that defendant took advantage of the circumstances in assaulting
the victim and, given that another young lady accused him of a similar assault, it appeared he had
a design to molest the two young ladies. The trial court also made clear, however, that it was not
using the allegation of a second assault as a basis for the sentencing. The trial court also referred
to “how [young persons] may be affected mentally” from being molested and concluded by
stating that defendant could probably be a danger to society. The court then sentenced defendant
to 40 to 60 months acknowledging that it was exceeding the guidelines “for reasons stated.”
The “reasons stated” for the trial court’s departure are not entirely clear. The only real
reasons arguably articulated for the departure were that defendant took advantage of the
circumstances to proceed with his assault, and that the victim may have been mentally affected
by the assault. To the extent that the “circumstances taken advantage of” were the victim’s
youth or her relationship as his stepsister’s friend, that factor was already taken into
consideration in the scoring of OV 10 at ten points. The mental effect of the assault was also
taken into consideration in the scoring of OV 4 at ten points. As the court did not state that
either factor was given inadequate or disproportionate weight, it cannot base its departure from
the guidelines on these factors. Young, supra. We also do not find that trial court’s general
statement that defendant could probably be a danger to society a substantial and compelling
reason for an upward departure of nearly twice the guidelines. Because the trial court did not
provide a substantial and compelling reason for the departure on the record, a remand for
resentencing is necessary.
We affirm defendant’s conviction, but remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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