PEOPLE OF MI V CALEB KELLY WESTCOTT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274677
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003542-FH
CALEB KELLY WESTCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third
offense (OWI-3d), MCL 257.625(1), and was sentenced to two to five years’ imprisonment. He
appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
In the early morning of April 29, 2006, defendant crashed his sister’s car, rolling it over
and landing upside down in the front yard of a home. Defendant was apprehended at the scene
after getting out of the car and attempting to run away. His blood alcohol level registered .17.
Defendant was tried before a jury and was found guilty of OWI-3d, which carries a maximum
sentence of five years.
Defendant was 20 years old at the time of the offense and had six prior misdemeanor
convictions, including two prior drunk driving convictions in 2005. He was unsuccessfully
discharged from probation on both drunk driving offenses. He also had two convictions for
driving with a suspended license, MCL 257.904(3)(a). At the time of instant offense, he had
been out of jail for only a few months for a prior drunk driving conviction and was driving on a
suspended license. While the current case was pending, but prior to sentencing, he was picked
up for being a minor in possession of alcohol in violation of MCL 436.1703(1).
The sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence range of 0 to 17 months.
The trial court departed upward from that recommendation and sentenced defendant to two to
five years in prison. In doing so, the trial court cited defendant’s prior convictions (especially
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the alcohol-related convictions), poor performance on probation, and the circumstances
surrounding the instant case.
Defendant thereafter moved for resentencing on the ground that the departure from the
guidelines was based on judge-found facts, which he did not admit to, thus violating his Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). The trial
court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court’s departure from the sentencing
guidelines violated his constitutional rights. We disagree.
This Court reviews questions of constitutional law de novo. People v Harper, 479 Mich
599, 610; 739 NW2d 523 (2007), cert pending. Under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 476, 490; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d
435 (2000). The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the states’ criminal sentencing schemes
conform to this rule. Id. The rule includes exceptions for the fact of prior convictions and any
facts admitted by the defendant. Id. at 488; Blakely, supra at 303.
Our Michigan Supreme Court recently determined in Harper, supra at 637, that, under
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
a sentence in the intermediate sanction range. Under an indeterminate scheme, a defendant
receives a minimum and maximum sentence. The maximum sentence is not judicially
determined but rather is set by statute. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 160; 715 NW2d 778
(2006). The sentencing judge ascertains the minimum portion of a defendant’s indeterminate
sentence by calculating the minimum sentence range under the statutory sentencing guidelines,
which consider the circumstances of the crime as well as the defendant’s criminal history. When
the sentencing guidelines range is in an intermediate cell, defendant has a statutory right to a
minimum sentence as an intermediate sanction, conditioned on the absence of substantial and
compelling reasons to depart upward. Harper, supra at 637. However, because the maximum
sentence is always the maximum penalty under the law, and in Michigan a defendant may only
be released before the maximum term at the discretion of the parole board, MCL 791.234; MCL
791.235, defendant does not have a constitutional right to an intermediate sanction. Harper,
supra. The intermediate sanction cell determines the defendant’s minimum guideline range and
not the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict or guilty plea. Thus, “the sentencing
judge may exercise his statutorily granted discretion to depart upward on the basis of facts not
found by the jury.” Harper, supra at 637-638.
In light of the holding in Harper, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated when
the trial court exceeded the minimum sentence recommendation of the sentencing guidelines.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court did not have valid substantial and compelling
reasons for departing from the intermediate sanctions and therefore violated his due process
rights. We disagree.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that a factor exists in support of a
departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines range. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247,
264; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Further, the Court reviews de novo whether the findings are
objective and verifiable. Id. Finally, the Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
determination that the factors are substantial and compelling reasons for departure from the
sentencing guidelines. Id.
Under Michigan’s sentencing guidelines act, a court must impose a sentence within the
appropriate sentence range. MCL 769.34(2); People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438-439; 636
NW2d 127 (2001). A defendant’s recommended minimum sentence range under the guidelines
is determined on the basis of the defendant’s record of prior convictions, the facts surrounding
his crime, and the legislatively designated offense class. If the upper limit of the recommended
minimum sentence range is eighteen months or less, as it was in this case, the court must state on
the record that a substantial and compelling reason exists to commit the defendant to the
Department of Corrections. MCL 769.34(4)(a). An intermediate sanction may include a jail
term of twelve months or less, but does not include a prison term. Id.; MCL 769.31(b); People v
Stauffer, 465 Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d 869 (2002).
A substantial and compelling reason exists only in exceptional cases, and is an objective
and verifiable reason that “keenly or irresistibly grabs” the attention of the reviewing court and is
of considerable worth in deciding the length of a sentence. Babcock, supra at 258 (citing People
v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62, 67-68; 528 NW2d 176 [1995]). Departure may not be based on “an
offense characteristic or offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the
appropriate sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record,
including the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been given inadequate
or disproportionate weight.” MCL 769.34(3)(b).
The trial court found that the guidelines did not adequately reflect defendant’s multiple
alcohol-related convictions, his poor probation record, or the facts surrounding this case, i.e.,
driving while intoxicated and with a suspended license within two months of release from jail for
a prior drunk driving offense, and rolling over a car on someone’s front lawn. Prior related
convictions can serve as a substantial and compelling reason to depart upward from the
sentencing guidelines. People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 536-537; 675 NW2d 599 (2003).
Further, a defendant’s conduct while on probation can be considered a substantial and
compelling reason for departure. People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 565; 697 NW2d 511 (2005).
In the instant case, the trial court’s stated reasons for departure were objective and
verifiable. At the age of 20, defendant already had a history of alcohol-related convictions. The
punishments imposed, generally in the form of probation, costs and fines, did not effectively
deter defendant from his recidivism. The fact and circumstances of this case show that defendant
continues to be a danger to the community. Based on defendant’s prior alcohol-related
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convictions and the failure of probation as a deterrent, the trial court clearly believed probation
would again be ineffective in keeping defendant from driving while impaired and posing a
danger to the community.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this is an exceptional case
and that substantial and compelling reasons existed to depart from the recommended minimum
sentence range of the sentencing guidelines. The upward departure was justified by defendant’s
record of repeated drunk driving, of driving while his license was suspended, of alcohol-related
convictions and of probation violations.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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