PEOPLE OF MI V RASHEID HOUZE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274470
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-018757-FH
RASHEID HOUZE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, third
offense, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 24 to 120 months each for the felon-inpossession and CCW convictions, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
State Trooper Dennis McCunkin, working as part of a drug interdiction team, noticed that
the passenger in a vehicle driven by defendant was not wearing a seatbelt. Upon checking the
license plate, he discovered that the vehicle was registered to defendant and another man,
Leonard Poe, for whom there were two arrest warrants. McCunkin stopped the vehicle. When
he approached the window of defendant’s vehicle, McCunkin noticed a strong odor of burnt
marijuana. When asked for his driver’s license, defendant stated that it had been suspended.
McCunkin asked defendant to step out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for driving
without a license. He placed defendant in the police car. While conducting an inventory search,
Trooper Barker found a fully loaded .32 caliber revolver in the vehicle, under the dashboard,
sandwiched in a tangle of wires on the hump between the areas for the driver’s and front
passenger’s feet, with the handle facing the driver. The gun was partially concealed. Officer
Dickenson noticed that carpeting on the passenger side floorboard was pulled up and, upon
pulling it back, discovered a large amount of money bundled in a rubber band. The gun and the
money were approximately 10 to 12 inches apart. While McCunkin was observing the search,
defendant motioned for him to come back to the police car. When he did so, defendant
spontaneously stated that the money the police had found was his. McCunkin asked about the
gun, but defendant did not say anything else. The troopers subsequently discovered a large
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amount of marijuana “shake,” i.e., seeds and stems, in the back of the vehicle and in the front
seat.
According to the passenger in the vehicle Candace King, defendant’s girlfriend at the
time of trial, Poe agreed that defendant could use the car and picked them up. Poe was smoking
marijuana at the time and passed some to defendant. Poe drove to the place where he was
dropped off, at which point the defendant got into the driver’s seat. King did not see defendant
put the money under the carpet. She did not see or know about the gun or the money.
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of evidence that
marijuana and money were discovered in the vehicle because the evidence was irrelevant to the
weapons charges and was highly prejudicial.
This Court reviews preserved claims of evidentiary error for an abuse of discretion.
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Defendant’s unpreserved claim that
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting the evidence is reviewed under the plain error
test of People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999):
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be
met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3)
and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings. “It is the defendant rather than the Government who
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Finally, once a
defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the
plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or when an error “‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” [Id., p 763
(citations omitted).]
Convictions of the charged offenses required proof that defendant, rather than the coowner of the vehicle or the passenger, possessed the weapon. Defendant admitted to the police
that the money hidden in the vehicle belonged to him. The prosecution established a link
between the money, drugs, and possession of a firearm. According to Trooper McCunkin, a
large amount of cash, a loaded gun, and the smell of marijuana were consistent with drug
trafficking because people who are affiliated with smuggling narcotics, stolen property, and
money more than likely carry firearms for protection. He also testified that the majority of
significant money seizures involve twenty-dollar bills because most small drug sales are for paid
by ten- or twenty-dollar bills. The money seized from defendant’s vehicle, totaling $1,650,
included 52 twenty-dollar bills. The evidence of the money and the marijuana was relevant to
establishing defendant’s possession of the firearm, and the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 401; MRE 403. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion, and the prosecutor’s admission of the evidence was not plain error.
Defendant also claims that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s elicitation of
testimony concerning defendant’s silence after McCunkin asked about the gun, and that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of
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constitutional error for plain error affecting substantial rights pursuant to Carines, supra, p 763.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “overcome the strong
presumption that his counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under the circumstances.”
People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Defendant must also demonstrate
that counsel’s deficient performance “was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial.”
Id.
Defendant waived his right to remain silent by initiating the conversation with Trooper
McCunkin. His subsequent failure to answer McCunkin’s question concerning ownership of the
gun was not an invocation of the right to silence, and therefore, evidence of his failure to respond
was admissible at trial. People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 211-212; 462 NW2d 1 (1990); People
v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 436; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Because the evidence was admissible, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. People v Milstead, 250 Mich
App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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