PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY ALLEN PIESKE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273291
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC Nos. 04-001612-FC
04-001663-FC
04-001664-FC
JEFFREY ALLEN PIESKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case has been remanded by our Supreme Court for consideration as on leave
granted. Defendant, acting in propria persona, challenges those portions of the judgments of
sentence requiring him to pay court costs of $1,280 and appointed counsel costs of $600 in each
case. We vacate those portions of the judgments requiring defendant to pay court costs and to
reimburse the county for appointed counsel costs, and remand this matter to the trial court for
consideration of defendant’s ability to make payment to reimburse the county for appointed
counsel costs.
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery, MCL 750.531, contained in
three separate files. On November 10, 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve
concurrent terms of 7 to 30 years in prison, and to pay court costs of $1,280 and $600 in
appointed counsel costs in each case. Subsequently, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to
correct a clerical error, but denied the motion for resentencing.
This Court denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal; however, our
Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded this matter to this Court for
consideration as on leave granted of the issue whether the trial court “properly imposed court
costs and attorney fees on the defendant.” The application was denied in all other respects.
A person who was afforded appointed counsel might be ordered to reimburse the county
for the costs of that representation, if such reimbursement can be made without substantial
hardship. A court need not make specific findings on the record regarding the defendant’s ability
to pay, but must provide some indication that it considered the defendant’s financial situation
prior to ordering reimbursement. The amount ordered to be reimbursed must be related to the
defendant’s foreseeable ability to pay. A court must afford the defendant notice and an
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opportunity to be heard prior to ordering repayment for appointed counsel expenses. People v
Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 251-255; 690 NW2d 476 (2004); see also MCR 6.005(B).
In 316 PA 2005, the Legislature enacted MCL 769.1k, which became effective on
January 1, 2006, and which provides in pertinent part:
(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or if the court
determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, both of the
following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of judgment of
guilt is deferred pursuant to statute or sentencing is delayed pursuant to statute:
(a) The court shall impose the minimum state costs as set forth in section
1j of this chapter.
(b) The court may impose any or all of the following:
(i) Any fine.
(ii) Any cost in addition to the minimum state cost set forth in subdivision
(a).
(iii) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.
(iv) Any assessment authorized by law.
(v) Reimbursement under section 1f of this chapter.
Prior to the enactment of MCL 769.1k, a trial court could require a convicted defendant
to pay court costs only if such a requirement was expressly authorized by statute. People v
Antolovich, 207 Mich App 714, 716; 525 NW2d 513 (1994); People v Jones, 182 Mich App 125,
126; 451 NW2d 525 (1989).
We vacate that portion of each judgment that requires defendant to pay costs in the
amount of $1,280. Defendant failed to object to the orders requiring him to pay court costs;
therefore, our review is for plain error. Reversal is warranted only when a plain error resulted in
the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). The armed robbery statute does not authorize a trial court to order a defendant to
pay court costs. MCL 750.531. MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(ii) now authorizes the imposition of court
costs in a case such as this one; however, that statute was enacted after sentencing occurred in
this case. To require defendant to pay court costs would change the punishment and inflict a
greater punishment than the law attached to the crime of bank robbery when the offenses were
committed. We conclude that requiring defendant to pay court costs would violate the federal
and state constitutional prohibitions against the imposition of ex post facto laws. US Const, art
1, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10. See also People v Dolph-Hostetter, 256 Mich App 587, 596597; 664 NW2d 254 (2003).
We vacate that portion of each judgment that requires defendant to reimburse the county
$600 for appointed counsel costs, and remand this matter with instructions that the trial court
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consider defendant’s ability to pay and, if appropriate, enter a separate order directing defendant
to reimburse the county.1 Defendant failed to object to the orders requiring him to pay appointed
counsel costs; therefore, our review is for plain error. Carines, supra. A review of the
sentencing transcript shows that the trial court gave no indication that it considered defendant’s
ability to pay prior to ordering reimbursement. A remand for further proceedings is necessary.
Dunbar, supra at 251-255.
We vacate that portion of each judgment of sentence requiring defendant to pay court
costs in the amount of $1,280. We also vacate that portion of each judgment of sentence
requiring defendant to pay the county $600 in appointed counsel costs, and remand this matter to
the trial court for reconsideration of defendant’s ability to reimburse the county for the cost of his
appointed counsel. We affirm the judgments in all other respects. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
1
In People v Arnone, Monroe Circuit Court Docket No. 05-034540-FH, the trial court ordered
the defendant to reimburse the county for appointed counsel costs. The defendant sought
delayed leave to appeal (Docket No. 271028), and in an order entered on August 7, 2006, this
Court denied the delayed application. The defendant sought leave to appeal to our Supreme
Court. In an order entered on March 30, 2007, our Supreme Court ordered the Monroe County
Prosecuting Attorney to answer the question and to address, inter alia, whether Dunbar, supra,
and People v Nowicki, 213 Mich App 383, 386-388; 539 NW2d 590 (1995) (in which this Court
held that a defendant’s obligation to reimburse the county for appointed counsel expenses is
independent of the sentence imposed in a criminal case) were correctly decided. In an order
entered on June 20, 2007, our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, vacated that
portion of the judgment of sentence that ordered the defendant to reimburse the county for
attorney fees, and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on the issue that considered
the defendant’s ability to pay. Our Supreme Court noted that if the trial court concluded that the
defendant had the ability to make payment, reimbursement was to be mandated in a separate
order, and not in the judgment of sentence. People v Arnone, 478 Mich 908; 732 NW2d 537
(2007). Our Supreme Court issued its order in Arnone, supra, after MCL 769.1k was enacted;
however, the defendant in Arnone, supra, was sentenced prior to the enactment of the statute.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the enactment of MCL 769.1k now enables a trial court
to include an order for reimbursement in the judgment of sentence, Arnone, supra, indicates that
in a case in which sentencing occurred prior to the enactment of MCL 769.1k, any order of
reimbursement should be entered separately from the judgment of sentence.
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