IN RE MICHAEL LEE WILDE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MICHAEL LEE WILDE, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 281520
Van Buren Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-011968-NA
ROBIN WILDE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RON WILDE,
Respondent.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Robin Wilde appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.
This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s determination that a statutory ground for
termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, she argues only that
termination of her parental rights was contrary to the child’s best interests. In re IEM, 233 Mich
App 438, 451; 592 NW2d 751 (1999).
Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, “the court shall order
termination of parental rights . . . unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the
child is clearly not in the child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5). This means that “[o]nce a
ground for termination is established, the court must issue an order terminating parental rights
unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best
interests.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The trial court’s
decision regarding the child’s best interests is reviewed for clear error. Id. at 356-357.
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The evidence showed that the child has severe psychological problems that have hindered
his placement in a foster home. In light of those problems, the work necessary to overcome
them, and the child’s strenuous objection to termination, the court concluded at a prior hearing
that termination would hinder his progress in treatment or even cause regression. Unfortunately,
maintaining the parent-child bond did not help, and the child made minimal progress and was
still not ready for placement in a foster home. Because the continued existence of the parentchild relationship caused the child to hold out hope of reunification despite the fact that he would
not be returning to either parent’s home, professionals believed that removing the distraction
created by the uncertainty of the child’s legal status would allow him to focus on his treatment
and become better socialized with the hope that he could be placed in a foster home and
ultimately adopted.
Upon finding that a statutory ground for termination was established, the trial court was
not required to find that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests as a prerequisite for termination, but rather was required to terminate respondent’s
parental rights unless doing so was clearly contrary to the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 357, 364 n 19. Because the evidence no longer showed that
termination was clearly contrary to the child’s best interests, the trial court did not err in
terminating respondent’s parental rights to the child. Id. at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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