PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIE RASHAWN BROWN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273062
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003491-FH
WILLIE RASHAWN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 2-1/3 to 30
years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On October 5, 2005, Jackson City Police Officer Sergio Garcia was working undercover
trying to purchase drugs on the streets of Jackson. He drove by a party store and saw an
occupant of a car nod towards him as he drove past. Garcia turned his vehicle around and parked
on the street in front of the party store. When defendant walked over to Garcia’s vehicle, Garcia
said he was looking for a rock of crack cocaine.
Defendant instructed Garcia to move his vehicle up the street. After Garcia did so,
defendant asked him some questions before selling him a rock of crack cocaine for $20. During
the transaction, Garcia was looking up at defendant as he stood at the driver’s window of
Garcia’s car. Lighting was dim due to the time of night and distance from the nearest street
lamps. The whole transaction took less than two minutes.
After the purchase, Garcia radioed a description of what defendant was wearing and what
direction he was going to the nearby surveillance unit and marked patrol cars. According to
Officer Rucinski, who was in a marked patrol car, the description was that the seller was a black
male, approximately 19 years old, wearing a red baseball cap, a red t-shirt, and a sports jersey.
Garcia’s radio description did not include defendant’s height, weight, hair, or any
mention of facial hair. Nevertheless, Rucinski testified that defendant fit the description and that
he was the only person who fit the description that night. Rucinski then stopped defendant,
spoke to him, searched him, and took his photograph. Officer Garcia saw the pictures of
-1-
defendant later on the night of the incident, and he positively indicated that the pictures were of
the same person that sold him the crack cocaine.
On appeal, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel did not move to suppress the identification procedure, which he claims
was unduly suggestive. We disagree. The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a
mixed one of fact and constitutional law. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d
342 (2004). “The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its
constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo.” Id. “In order to merit reversing a criminal
conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his trial
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial,
thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 354; 619
NW2d 413 (2000). To prevail, defendant must “show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for that deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Matuszak, supra at 57-58.
Defendant claims trial counsel was ineffective because he did not move to suppress the
identification procedure by Officer Garcia. Garcia’s identification of defendant consisted of
viewing photographs of defendant on the night of the incident, and confirming that the
photographs were of the same person that sold him the cocaine earlier that night. Defendant
argues that the photographic lineup with only his pictures was unduly suggestive, and therefore,
violated his constitutional rights.
A photographic identification procedure may be found unduly suggestive and therefore
improper if, in light of all the circumstances surrounding the identification, there is a substantial
likelihood of misidentification. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302, 306; 505 NW2d 528
(1993). Factors to consider when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [Id., 306.]
In this case, Officer Garcia viewed defendant in dim light because of the time of day and
distance from the nearest streetlight, but the viewing was done in close proximity to one another,
with defendant standing at the driver’s window of Garcia’s car. The close proximity and contact
of this transaction lasted approximately two minutes. Further, Garcia was a trained police officer
and participated in the controlled buy with knowledge that he would have to be attentive to
identify the seller at a later time. Additionally, defendant fit the description given by Garcia over
the radio just after the sale took place, defendant was stopped shortly thereafter, and the
photographs of defendant were taken at the time of that stop.
The final two factors include a high level of certainty by Garcia that his identification
was accurate, and a short length of time between the crime and confrontation with Garcia
viewing the photos on the same night that the controlled buy took place.
The totality of the circumstances in this case does not lead to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification, and the process was not unduly suggestive. Accordingly, even if defendant’s
-2-
trial counsel had filed a motion to suppress the identification procedure, there is not a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. Hence, defendant was not denied the
effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
